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Sir Arthur Tange was perhaps the most powerful Secretary of the Australian
Defence Department and one of the most powerful of the great ‘mandarins’ who
dominated the Commonwealth Public Service between the 1940s and the 1970s.
Here ‘powerful’ means having a strong, and often decisive, influence on both
administration and policy. Tange exerted that influence by virtue of his
intellectual capacity, his administrative ability and the sheer force of his
personality. He served as Secretary of the Defence Department from 1970 to
1979, the last decade of his career, having previously served as Secretary of the
Department of External Affairs (later renamed Foreign Affairs) from 1954 to
1965.
Tange wrote this account in his last years. The last draft was dated 6
November 2000, about six months before his death on 10 May 2001 at the age
of 86. It is a memoir rather than an autobiography, being based largely on
memory supplemented by limited reference to documentary material. He worked
on it in his home in the Canberra suburb of Manuka, tapping at an ageing
typewriter on his dining-room table, while I was working in his study on a
full-length biography. That biography, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins
(Allen & Unwin, 2006), made use of this text as well as his personal papers (now
held in the National Library of Australia as MS9847) and other documentary
and oral sources.
While that book gives a full account of his life, many friends, family members
and former colleagues wanted to see his own account. Controversies from his
time in Defence, including those associated with ‘the Tange report’ and ‘the
Tange reforms’, echo to this day, and it is still easy to identify both staunch
admirers and vitriolic critics in defence and public service circles.
This memoir says little about Tange’s life and career before he came to Defence
in 1970. He intended to write a similar memoir of his time in External Affairs,
but only a few preliminary passages had been sketched by the time of his death.
Nevertheless, one of the major themes implicit in this memoir (and argued in
greater detail in the biography) is the extent to which his administrative decisions
and policy advice in Defence in the 1970s were based on his experience in
External Affairs in the 1950s and 1960s. As Secretary of External Affairs, for
example, he was a member of the Defence Committee, the most important source
of advice to the Government on defence policy. Through that and other
associations, Tange had a close view of the relevant Ministers and their most
senior advisers, uniformed and civilian. This account shows what lessons he
derived from that experience and how he applied those lessons when he, rather
unexpectedly, became Secretary of the Defence Department.
vii
Arthur Tange (1914–2001)
Arthur Harold Tange was born in Sydney on 18 August
1914. His father, Charles Louis Tange, was a lawyer
who moved from Sydney to an orchard property at
Mangrove Mountain, near Gosford on the Central Coast
of New South Wales. This proved a rash investment,
losing the family much of the financial and social status
that had been gained by Charles’s father, Anton Tange,
who had emigrated from Denmark in 1854. Although
he was the seventh and youngest child of his father’s
two marriages, Arthur’s upbringing was in many ways more like that of an only
child. He attended Woy Woy Primary School and Gosford High School,
matriculating with good results although aged only 16. With the Depression
starting, Arthur was fortunate to get a job with the Bank of New South Wales,
of which the General Manager (the position today known as the Chief Executive
Officer of Westpac) was Sir Alfred Davidson, who was married to Arthur’s oldest
half-sister. Davidson’s support not only secured Arthur a job, but also enabled
him to go to university. He studied arts, majoring in economics, at the University
of Western Australia (UWA). Arthur took an honours degree, then regarded as
a post-graduate qualification, writing a thesis on the Australian banking system.
In later life Arthur liked to speak of the three great achievements of his student
days in Perth: he gained a first-class honours degree; he played rugby for Western
Australia against the Springboks; and he won the hand of Marjorie Shann,
daughter of the UWA professor of economics and history, Edward Shann. Arthur
and Marjorie were married at Christ Church, Claremont, on 19 November 1940.
They subsequently had two children, Christopher John, born in Canberra on 7
April 1944, and Jennifer Jane, born in New York on 31 January 1947.
The Bank of New South Wales employed Arthur first in the Economic
Department, the bank’s think tank in Sydney, and then in Fiji. After the outbreak
of war in 1939 he was protected under the manpower regulations from being
called up for military service, but in 1942 he was recruited, as a temporary
research officer, to the Department of Labour and National Service. His division
soon became the Department of Post-War Reconstruction (DPWR), in which
Arthur spent much of his time working on the international negotiations,
principally with the United States and the United Kingdom, over the Lend-Lease
agreement. In 1944 he was a member of the small Australian delegation to the
international conference at Bretton Woods, which established the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Towards the end of the 1939–45 war, the Department of External Affairs
(DEA) developed an interest in economic aspects of international affairs. For
some months Tange’s services were shared between DPWR and External Affairs,
viii
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until in 1946 he joined the DEA full-time. He was immediately posted to the
Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York, where his colleagues
included one of his future Ministers, Paul Hasluck. On his return to Canberra,
he rose quickly to a senior position in the small and youthful External Affairs.
In 1953, Tange was sent to the Australian Embassy in Washington, with the
diplomatic rank of Minister. The Government probably hoped that, as deputy
head of mission, he would curb the tendency of the Ambassador, Sir Percy
Spender, to act as if he were still the Minister for External Affairs. This task,
however, proved too much for Tange.
Within a year, the Minister for External Affairs, R.G. Casey (later Lord Casey),
offered Tange the position of Secretary of his Department. Tange took up the
post in early 1954, aged 39. Over the next eleven years he proved a strong leader,
reforming and modernising many aspects of the Department’s administration
and greatly improving its ability to give the Government well-informed advice
on foreign policy. Within weeks of his taking up the post, External Affairs had
to handle the breach in relations with the Soviet Union occasioned by the Petrov
affair. The subsequent years saw considerable growth in the Department’s
capacity to represent Australia abroad, especially in Asia, and to advise the
Government. There were also numerous international crises, including those
associated with Suez, Laos, West New Guinea, Indonesia and Malaysia, and
Vietnam. In some cases Tange was at the heart of Australian policy-making; in
others, most notably the Australian commitment to Vietnam in 1964–65, he
appears to have been deliberately excluded from influence.
This partly reflected his changing relationship with his Ministers, who were
four of the most significant politicians of the twentieth century: Casey, Robert
Menzies, Garfield Barwick and Paul Hasluck. Tange had an almost filial
relationship with Casey and a close and effective working relationship with
Barwick. Menzies’ attitude towards Tange seems to have been adversely affected
during the two years that Menzies was Minister for External Affairs as well as
Prime Minister (1960–61), but the chilliest relationship was with his former
colleague in New York, Hasluck.
Tange was knighted in 1959, the year he turned 45, and from then on was
almost invariably known as ‘Sir Arthur’. He had previously been made an Officer
of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1953 and Commander in the same
order (CBE) in 1955. Later, after the introduction of an Australian honours system,
he was made a Companion of the Order of Australia (AC) in 1977.
In 1965 Tange was dispatched as High Commissioner to India, the only
head-of-mission appointment in his diplomatic career. There he remained for
five years, often thinking that he would never be offered another ambassadorial
or other senior appointment. Then, in late 1969, he was successively offered, in
circumstances that mingled weighty decisions with farce, the three most
ix
Preface
important positions open to an official working in national security: those of
ambassador in Washington, Secretary of the Defence Department, and his former
post as Secretary of External Affairs. Although he had started preparing himself
for Washington, he turned that option aside in order to become Secretary of
Defence.
Tange served there from early 1970 until his retirement at the time of his
65th birthday in August 1979. This period included two changes of government,
from the conservative coalition to Labor and back to the coalition. The Prime
Ministers and Ministers for Defence whom he served included John Gorton and
Malcolm Fraser in both capacities, as well as William McMahon, David Fairbairn,
Gough Whitlam, Lance Barnard, William Morrison, and James Killen. These
were years of major, often controversial, reform in the administration of Defence,
which at times brought Tange to public attention. His report on the reorganisation
of the Defence group of departments, generally known as ‘the Tange report’,
charted the way for the Departments of Navy, Army, Air and Supply to be
merged into the Department of Defence, a process often known as ‘the Tange
reforms’. These administrative reforms were closely linked to changing ideas
on strategic policy, including the relative importance of alliance commitments
and developments in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood in the shaping of
Australian defence policy.
This memoir is Tange’s own account of his part in those administrative reforms
and policy shifts. It also records his involvement—or non-involvement or alleged
involvement—in several of the political crises of the 1970s, including the
downfall of John Gorton as Prime Minister and the dismissal of the Whitlam
Government.
The memoir closes with some brief comments on events in his retirement and
reflections on his life and career, especially his relations with many ministers
and Prime Ministers. Sir Arthur Tange died on 10 May 2001. His funeral service
was private, but a State Memorial service was held in Parliament House, Canberra,
on 24 May 2001.
Editorial note
This memoir was written very late in Sir Arthur Tange’s long life. Earlier in his
retirement, he had written a short family history, entitled Looking Back, which
was perhaps a better example of his skill as a writer. Tange was always fond of
writing but recognised that, throughout his life, he was inclined to be prolix
and to insert too many qualifying phrases into a single sentence. Some errors
found their way into the text, some no doubt occasioned by the difficulty of
reading his typescript with its many handwritten annotations and amendments.
Several individuals were identified only by surnames, and he was not always
consistent in spelling terms such as ‘South East Asia’ and ‘Southeast Asia’.
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In editing the text, I have kept editorial interventions to the minimum. In a
few cases, I have adjusted the word order, punctuation and/or syntax to make
the meaning clear, but have restricted that practice to the occasions when it
seemed absolutely necessary. Where appropriate I have added forenames and
positions. Footnotes have been added where they seemed necessary, including
those cases where Tange had specifically indicated that he wanted sources to be
noted. References to other relevant works have been made where that seemed
especially appropriate, but not to the above-mentioned biography, as such
references would have appeared on almost every paragraph. Readers should
assume that this memoir will be of greatest value if read in close coordination
with the relevant passages of the biography.
Throughout, I have sought to preserve not only the meaning but also the
style and tone of Tange’s text. For example, Tange’s use of capital letters for
words such as ‘Service’, ‘Department’ and ‘Minister’ have been left unchanged,
as a reminder that these are the words of someone who had followed Public
Service conventions for several decades.
Acknowledgements
Work on this memoir was carried out in parallel with the research and writing
of Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins. Accordingly, most of the
acknowledgements made in the Preface to that work apply here. It is particularly
appropriate to record my thanks to the Department of Defence, especially the
former Deputy Secretary (and now Professor of Strategic Studies at The Australian
National University), Hugh White; to the successive Secretaries of the
Department, especially Dr Allan Hawke and Mr Ric Smith; and the heads and
members of the Strategic Policy Branch, especially Mr Peter Jennings and Mr
Murray Perks.
Generous support from the Pratt Foundation, through its chief executive Mr
Sam Lipski, enabled Tange’s typescript of this memoir, with its many handwritten
annotations and amendments, to be turned into an electronic document.
Mr Christopher Tange and Mrs Jennifer Moir (née Tange) provided constant
support and encouragement in bringing to the public their father’s record. Many
colleagues and friends were similarly supportive, with particular thanks being
due to Deakin University and the University of New South Wales at the
Australian Defence Force Academy, in both of which institutions I held honorary
professorships. My wife, Jacky Abbott, has nobly tolerated the presence of
Arthur Tange in our life for many years. For a full list of those who have assisted
and supported me on the three-part Tange project (writing the biography, editing
this memoir, and organising and listing Tange’s papers for the National Library





Peter Edwards is a consultant historian and writer who has published on
Australian defence and foreign policies for more than thirty years. He is the
official historian of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–75
(Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam), for which he wrote the volumes dealing with
strategy and diplomacy, Crises and Commitments (1992) and A Nation at War
(1997). He was made a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) for this work.
His most recent book is Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (2006). Both A
Nation at War and Arthur Tange won major literary awards.
Dr Edwards is also the author of Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on
the Australian–American Alliance (2005), and Prime Ministers and Diplomats
(1983); the co-editor of Facing North (vol. 2, 2003); the editor of Australia Through
American Eyes (1977); and one of the founding editors of the series of Documents
on Australian Foreign Policy. He is a former editor, and now a contributing editor,
of the Australian Journal of International Affairs. Currently Dr Edwards is an
honorary Visiting Professor of the University of New South Wales at the
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. He has held a number of
consultancies with universities and government agencies and is a member of
historical advisory committees in the Department of Defence and the Department




The Road to Russell
A career in the Public Service which closed after a decade as Secretary to the
Department of Defence started from what might seem an unlikely origin. In
1942, aged 28, I was brought to Canberra from a wartime reserved occupation
to work on analysing Australia’s interests in the international economic and
financial regulations being proposed for Australia’s responses by the British and
American planners who were preparing for a better world system after the war
had been won. For a short period I was made responsible to Dr Roland Wilson
(later Secretary to the Treasury), but in 1943 the Labor Government created the
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, with J.B. Chifley as its Minister (and
concurrently Treasurer) and Dr H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs as its Director-General.
I worked under Coombs for several years, preparing papers and advice for several
of Australia’s most senior economists on the problems to be expected, and the
safeguards needed, to protect Australia in the impact of these post-war plans of
the two major economic powers. Over the years, I attended several international
conferences arranged to discuss and to amend and endorse these plans, beginning
with the 1944 Bretton Woods International Monetary Conference.
External Affairs 1945
I was seconded into the Department of External Affairs in 1945. That Department,
under the urging of Dr J.W. Burton, was seeking a role in policy in these
economic fields, particularly with the prospect of the United Nations and other
institutions being set up with various regulatory powers. Apart from Burton,
the Department was devoid of experience in economic matters. My secondment
became a continuing one, leading to permanence from 1946 onwards.
I have written about my External Affairs years elsewhere.1  I am here
recording only how my interest in national security and defence matters
developed. It was that interest that led me to accept, two decades later, the offer
by the Gorton/Fraser Ministry2  to become Secretary to the Department of
Defence.
But before this my duties lay elsewhere. I became an international conference
handyman and draftsman between 1945 and 1948, based in New York and
attending, as adviser and occasionally as leader of delegation, a frenzied round
of meetings at which Minister for External Affairs Dr H.V. Evatt’s policies of
pushing Australia into all the burgeoning specialised international institutions
required representation. I had a part in drafting what went into the constitution
and the rules of several of the new institutions being established. Returning to
1
the Department in late 1948 from the UN Mission in New York, I was made
responsible for overseeing the development of Australian policies and
representation in these areas as well as helping formulate our policies in the
political organs of the United Nations.
After the Liberal–Country Party Coalition won the 1949 election, I had my
first meeting with the new Minister for External Affairs, P.C. Spender. In his
Sydney office, a pinkish, shortish man with a bristling moustache greeted me
by first denouncing the policies of Evatt that I had been serving and then saying:
‘Burton says you know something about economics’. I confessed that I thought
I did. He then bade me produce some ideas for him to use at the meeting of
British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers scheduled shortly for Colombo. He
took me, along with others, to this meeting, and to subsequent meetings to set
up the Colombo Plan.
Burton chose to retire in 1951. Spender (after consulting Paul Hasluck, as the
latter told me much later) appointed A.S. Watt to succeed him. Hasluck also told
me that he had given Spender my name ‘in case he wanted a younger man’. Watt
was a scholarly man, with experience in the Department, a former Rhodes Scholar
and judge’s associate whose conservative views would not have commended
him to Evatt. He had been sent to serve in Moscow in 1947. Watt retained me
on my current duties.
Although not directly involved, I was able to observe the efforts to remedy
the distrust and some antagonism that had developed between the Defence
Department in Melbourne under Sir Frederick Shedden, and External Affairs
under Burton. Watt had served in Washington. He had a deep concern about
communism spreading internationally. He had then, and as I observed in later
years, a continuing anxiety about the possibility of espionage being directed
against officers of the Department, and the security of its communications.
I had been serving overseas between 1945 and late 1948, which were the
years of developing differences between Burton and Shedden that several
historians have documented.3  Knowing Burton well, and observing Shedden,
I came to believe in later years that the differences were the product of many
things: age, education, respect for conventional Public Service practices; but
particularly fundamental differences on the issues in East-West relations, on the
policy of non-alignment by emerging ex-colonies, and related questions. There
was also the competition between a well rooted, if conservative and somewhat
complacent, Department and a small group of untried newcomers in Canberra
elevated into influence by a radical Labor leadership. Shedden had earned a
high reputation by the support he had given Prime Minister John Curtin during
the war. He had been committed to collective British Commonwealth defence
under British leadership and responsive to the British desire for Australia to
make resistance to any Soviet incursion to the Middle East our priority in
2
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war—although then and later he was vigilant in preserving Australian authority
over its own forces. When I came to know Shedden later, it was not in his best
years. I saw little intellectual questioning of strategic priorities, while he attached
unusual importance to preserving his personal contacts with the significant
wartime figures with whom he had dealt in the past. He was an industrious
administrator, rigid in his attachment to procedures, and a skilled defender of
turf. In contrast was Burton’s belief that international relations should be based
on principles rather than power as he would argue—with great self-assurance
about the validity of his convictions—calling for conciliation with the Soviet
Union, more Australian concern with Southeast Asia, and wariness about a future
threat from China. In retrospect I thought conflict between Shedden and the
young nonconformist radical was inevitable. There were frictions over practical
matters, such as opposition to Shedden’s reform of his intelligence apparatus,
and Burton’s insouciance over evidence of the passage of sensitive information
clandestinely to the Soviet Union from one corner of External Affairs.4
International Security Issues: 1950 and beyond
In the second half of 1950 the focus of my work underwent a big change,
precipitated by North Korea’s military invasion of the South. My advisory role
was no longer concerned primarily with the economic organs of the United
Nations and the new Colombo Plan for aid in Southeast Asia. Spender and Watt
now looked to my division to advise on the political and constitutional objectives
for the military intervention in defence of South Korea to be laid down in the
United Nations and advocated through diplomatic channels. I was drawn into
helping to define a security policy for Australia that satisfied several
interests—domestic, political, and diplomatic—in relations with the Americans
and within the British Commonwealth. They were not easy to reconcile within
the framework of the UN approval that was required for the UN campaign. There
were sceptics in the non-aligned world about the validity of Western intervention
in an Asian country; and when the Communist Chinese entered the war (or when
that seemed a possibility to be avoided), disagreement spread over such questions
as the admission of Peking [Beijing] to the Chinese seat in the UN Security
Council, and whether Peking’s claims on Taiwan against Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang
Jieshi] should be resisted militarily. On these matters there were Anglo-American
disagreements and hardline opinion in the United States. In Australia, particularly
after China entered the war, Spender chose to argue against offering political
rewards to aggressors, an attitude having wide support as memories of pre-war
fascism in Europe exerted their influence. And Spender’s supreme objective was
to earn agreement from the United States to give him a security treaty, an
enterprise in which he had no support from Britain.
The work undertaken by myself and others in this tangle of interests is
included in Robert O’Neill’s official history5  and need not be repeated here. But
3
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it may be of interest to record some of the ideas which influenced me in tracing
my eventual passage into work on Australia’s military capabilities as a Pacific
nation, with its strategic interest centred on its near neighbourhood rather than
Europe, the Middle East or North Asia.
In 1950 we went militarily into North Asia with Australian ground forces.
This was a high policy decision fathered by Spender who pushed it through,
past what I believe to have been somewhat bewildered colleagues, while
fortuitously his cautious Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, was abroad and unable
to take part. Once the decision was made, I advocated, unsuccessfully, that we
make a larger military contribution. It was not that I saw any reason for
Australian sacrifices to protect the Korean people, governed by a corrupt leader;
nor did I see much evidence of spontaneous popular sympathy for this remote
people. But our membership of the UN Commission for the Unification of Korea,
which Evatt had sponsored and where we were represented by the highly
regarded James Plimsoll, gave us a moral as well as a practical duty to come to
the aid of the South.
Moreover, preservation of the possibility of a new collective security being
founded, we hoped, on the United States had to be fostered. But it should not
be at the price, as I saw it, of Australia being dragged into a new distant conflict
of dubious merit. I hoped the Government would accept advice not to commit
itself to a long-term commitment to give military support to whatever government
might emerge in Korea after the North Korean Army had been quelled. In
particular I was moved by believing then, and also in subsequent years of crisis
in the Western Pacific, that the Government of mainland China should not be
provoked into war that could spread into Southeast Asia and the approaches to
Australia. I took this view when, with a final peace in Korea yet to be settled,
the French were overrun by nationalist forces in Indo-China. While the
negotiations for an armistice in Korea were not succeeding, we also had to express
attitudes, in New York and Washington, on the activities of General Douglas
MacArthur in his free interpretation of his political instructions.
Spender took me to London in early 1951 as he carried his energetic and
single-minded campaign to a sceptical British audience. I recall the visit as one
of the most determined forays of its kind that I have witnessed. Meetings and
public addresses were packed into a few days, before he went on to Washington
to take a very important opportunity to put his case for a security treaty direct
to President Harry Truman. He left me behind in London, entrusted with the
task of composing a telegram to Menzies ranging widely (and somewhat
indeterminately) over all the issues.
If historians, when making their meticulous interpretations of what they
read, knew how some papers originated, it might lighten their days (and their
prose). On his journey to Southampton to join the RMS Queen Mary, Spender
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sat me in the ‘dickey seat’ of his Daimler to record his thoughts and his
instructions. His staccato speech seemed, as always, to be in a race with the
agility of his mind. We wound through the villages of southern England cloaked
in darkness, except when lights, apparently relics of the Second World War,
sporadically illuminated the moving vehicle. They proved essential for making
crude handwritten notes. At our destination we parted company in his cabin
after he gave me his second thoughts (Spender was not a man of few words),
interrupted by an altercation with a majestically uniformed purser upon whom
Spender vented his displeasure at the inadequacy of the cabin that Cunard had
provided to the Foreign Minister of Australia.
In London I pieced together what I thought Spender had told me to say. The
telegram to Canberra is now a small piece in the published history of the times6
and I doubt that Spender ever saw what he is recorded as saying to his Prime
Minster. I had anxieties in those days, but I also had fun.
In the 1950s the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs had no role
in decisions on the development of the three arms of the defence force. But when
it came to their deployment, membership of the Defence Committee, and advisory
sessions with Ministers from time to time, enabled the External Affairs Secretary
to express his judgement on where they should not be deployed. It is not possible
to say how much influence we had of this kind; for example, in opposing military
support to the Dutch in West New Guinea, or in advising the Government to
argue the Americans out of defending the off-shore islands in support of Chiang
Kai-shek against attacks from the mainland. In the final days of the attempts to
settle peace terms for the conflict with China over Korea (and over the issue of
repatriation of prisoners of war), we in External Affairs were wary of an American
idea of a pledge by the allies in Korea, declared to China, to take punitive action
if China broke the negotiated agreements. Widening the war was one of our
fears during those years.
These examples of the interconnected interests of External Affairs and Defence
illustrate why over some 30 years I held to the view that administrative and
inter-Ministerial arrangements were essential to make possible a consensus on
security policy. Contrary to the conventional thought that it was only a matter
of restraining unwise military initiatives, I came in later years to believe that
restraint was needed on the temptation, particularly for Prime Ministers, to
inflate Australia’s influence in the world, making commitments that outran the
community’s willingness to provide the resources needed by the Defence Force
if Australia’s military capability were put to the test.
In mid-1951 R.G. (later Lord) Casey replaced Spender, who had chosen to
become Ambassador to the United States. Casey took me on several overseas
missions. Those to Southeast Asia reflected his interest in the progress of the
British military commanders in Malaya and Singapore in subduing the jungle
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insurgency. He also wanted to meet and form an impression of the emerging
indigenous political leaders. I also accompanied him on a later tour through Cairo
and several European capitals, when he led the delegation to the UN General
Assembly in Paris. Casey was dismayed by the acrimony of the political debates
and by the ferocity of the attacks of Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet delegate, on
the Western alliance.
When I returned to Canberra in early 1952 I was again advising on the efforts
to break the conflict between voluntary and compulsory repatriation of prisoners
of war, in order to reach a settlement with the Chinese for an armistice in Korea.
At year’s end I was appointed to the embassy in Washington, with the rank of
Minister, under Spender, in order to pursue this and other matters. I was
Australia’s liaison officer with senior officers of the US State Department
consulting the 16 force contributors in Korea. One of the unrecorded duties that
I was given was to exercise restraint on Spender in his free-running presentation
of views, often at odds with those of Casey and Watt, on such matters as the
Korean negotiations, Indonesia and Dutch New Guinea.
My assignment was cut short when Casey, on a visit to Washington, told me
of Watt’s desire for a post in Southeast Asia, and offered me appointment as
Secretary of the Department. After 12 months in our new home, I packed up my
family again, disrupting the children’s schooling,7  and returned to Canberra to
take up my new post in January 1954.
While in Washington I saw at first hand the way the Defence Department
handled defence relations with the Americans—through a military mission not
integrated into the embassy and one senior officer in the embassy. Beyond
attending to routine business concerning relations between the armed Services
of the two countries, there seemed to be little interest in reporting the defence
policies of the United States towards Asia and the vigorous public debates in
Congress and elsewhere which had a part in shaping them. Nor was there much
evidence of guidance from Melbourne on this subject. Then, and later in
Canberra, I wondered whether there was a reluctance to grant Casey leadership
in security diplomacy or, more simply, slowness in recognising the implications
of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty.
In my new post in Canberra I was propelled by the events of 1954 into helping
the Government to respond to the recurring crises in the Western Pacific. The
Government sought to attract US involvement for the first time in arresting the
spread of communist influence on the Southeast Asian mainland, following the
collapse of the French in Indo-China. Support for the legitimacy of the Saigon
Government was needed after acceptable terms could not be reached with the
communist north for unification of Vietnam in the Geneva Conference. It was a
year in which effective cooperation with the Department of Defence on the
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deteriorating situation to our north had a renewed urgency. Steps were needed
to overcome the obstacles to quick and effective cooperation.
Defence Management in the 1950s: A view from Canberra
My first attendance at the Defence Committee had been in 1952. I had then
detected some condescension on the part of the Service Chiefs towards my
Department. Perhaps this was understandable in the case of Vice-Admiral Sir
John Collins and Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell, both lately returned
from distinguished service in a great war. The third was a seconded British
officer.
The six Departments in the Defence Group (Defence, Navy, Army, Air,
Supply, and Defence Support) were under overall policy guidance that seemed
to value precedent and procedure over analysis and new thinking. I should
acknowledge that there was much management activity in the Defence Group
of which External Affairs was necessarily uninformed. We would not have been
competent, in any case, to judge whether Defence decisions on manpower and
weapons selection, for example, were cost-effective. Our view was confined to
the way in which judgements were reached on where these capabilities might
have to be deployed—in short, the strategic posture of the country.
The devotion to orderly procedures was symbolised in the mechanistic
description used by Shedden to describe the senior policy-making bodies—the
‘Higher Defence Machinery’. The staff of the Defence Department was largely
civilian, while uniformed Service officers, with the aid of a Departmental
Secretary, managed the Services under their respective Ministers. It seemed to
us in Canberra that the Defence Department personnel were a mixture of a
handful of questioning and perceptive officers and a larger number performing
the modest role of guiding Service officers through the unfamiliar terrain of
public accountability. This put a premium on providing support to others
carrying higher authority, for example as Secretaries to inter-Service committees;
guiding but not initiating. Initiative seemed to lie with the Services, or took the
form of proposals made to Australia by Britain as the leader of Commonwealth
defence planning in the early post-war years.
Decisions by, or offers of consultation from, London or Washington required
speedy comprehension of international events and assessment of Australia’s
interests. The Australian Government sometimes demanded to be consulted
simply as a demonstration of our independence. I think that our inability to
come up with a reply must have shaken patience in London and Washington
on occasions. There was exasperation in Canberra at the necessity to consult the
Melbourne ‘machinery’ when secure communication was difficult, and travel
to meetings slow. The Joint Intelligence Committee, unlike its counterpart in
London, suffered these disadvantages and was a cumbersome way of drawing
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conclusions that could be used in a timely way by the Department of External
Affairs and by Ministers. The Joint Planning Committee, charged with advising
on the feasibility of military operations, was impenetrable by External Affairs.
If the Government was to be warned of the need for restraint on a proposed
military action, the Committee’s advice would have to be challenged later. On
one occasion when one of our officers was invited to attend, he heard a cry of
alarm from the naval member (later a Rear Admiral): ‘There is a stranger in the
room’. The Shedden discipline required that all past findings on a subject be
laid one upon the other, with consistency valued above innovation. There was
much turgid prose. More objective critics than I, in the person of successive
official historians, have described the inadequacies of the system.8
Both Departments suffered from the remoteness of Ministers from their
Departments and from each other. Casey preferred to spend as much time as
possible in Melbourne or his country property at Berwick. Other Ministers in
the Defence Group were scattered around the continent when Parliament was
in recess. Defence Minister Sir Philip McBride, with whom I had much to do in
later years when he was Acting Minister for External Affairs, might be beyond
reach for one or two days while touring the vast expanse of his sheep runs across
the north of South Australia. One ruminated fruitlessly on the ease of consultation
among Departments and Ministers in cosy Britain.
Prime Minister Robert Menzies was the pillar to whom we turned when crises
demanded a prompt response. He was resident in Canberra and sought the advice
of officials methodically, and of relevant Ministers when they were available to
meet with him. When Parliament was sitting, these meetings occurred not in
Cabinet sub-committees but around Menzies’ desk, often late at night. Generally
the Ministers for Defence and External Affairs would be present along with the
Secretaries of the Prime Minister’s and External Affairs Departments, but seldom
the Secretary of Defence or a Service Chief because of their isolation in
Melbourne. The decisions reached have to be discerned by historians from
outgoing telegrams to our missions abroad or to other governments.
When writing in later years of his Cabinet experience, Sir Paul Hasluck
remarked on the failure of a Cabinet committee, of which he was a member, to
meet and be informed by External Affairs. The comment accompanied some
disparaging references to one of his predecessors as Minister for External Affairs,
Casey, and was perhaps designed to fortify his criticism of the management of
affairs while he was sidelined in the Territories portfolio. Hasluck was apparently
unaware of Menzies’ preference for ad hoc meetings of the kind I have described.
Menzies had no disposition for attending Cabinet committee meetings simply
for educational purposes.
In my discussions with Shedden over the years I heard few opinions on
Australia’s strategic interests or priorities. He was more interested, it seemed,
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in procedures and in respect for the Defence Committee. Absence from its
meetings would earn a mild rebuke. His conversation in moments of relaxation,
as previously noted, dwelt very much on the famous wartime personalities with
whom he had dealt as the adviser and Secretary to Curtin’s War Cabinet. I was
aware that in that role he had earned the highest respect from the Government.
But I found his methods in respect of our strategic interests and their priorities
to be unsuited to the new age. Australia was forging a foreign policy in alliance
with a new ally and was actively engaged with military situations, rather than
directing its attention to British concerns with the Soviet threat in the Middle
East. Assessing the strength of potential threats to Australia’s independent
interests, within the area covered by the ANZUS Treaty, made considerable
demands on such intellectual resources as the two Departments possessed. In
his dealings with the British, Shedden was vigilant to protect Australia’s control
of its forces. There was much that needed high-level discussion of issues. But
the Defence Committee method looked to subordinate Service officers to come
up with recommendations for the Defence Committee to approve or disapprove.
The Committee was a place for decision rather than discussion of the substance.
I found this hard to resist because it seemed to reflect a use of staff officers in
the command system to which the Service Chiefs were attuned, and I was not.
The Macquarie Dictionary defines a bureaucrat as ‘an official who works by
fixed routine without exercising intelligent judgement’. There was an element
of such a bureaucrat in Shedden during his final service years.
Shedden seldom appeared in Canberra. I was ready to respect the
responsibilities and military knowledge resident in the Defence organisation.
Because of this, in August 1954 only six months after becoming Secretary, I
wrote to Shedden to ask for his cooperation. It was a time of recurring crises in
Asia, and Australia faced the possibility of being drawn into war in support of
the Americans. In plain language I had pointed out that errors of judgement by
the Americans demanded that we put our views to the Americans promptly as
events developed. This would have to be without the benefit of Defence advice
if their methods precluded prompt responses to my urgent requests. I recall no
response from Shedden or change in his methods. It was a case of priority being
given to process rather than to the substance and the outcome.
In the mid-1950s Menzies and his Ministers became dissatisfied with what
was coming out of Melbourne. They exerted pressure on Shedden to stand aside
and write up his experiences, for which he was given official assistance. It was
sad, but presumably a more dignified ending for his career could not be found.
His replacement in 1956 was Edwin (later Sir Edwin) Hicks, formerly Secretary
to the Department of Air. His experience lay less in security policy than in the
application of organisation and methods to Departments.
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External Affairs and Defence cooperation
Slowly the External Affairs and Defence Departments worked more closely
together. In 1957 the Secretary of External Affairs was made a full, as distinct
from an invited, member of the Defence Committee. This was also the year that
the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department (then Allen Brown) joined the
Committee, which was to have consequences for External Affairs authority in
later years. External Affairs assumed chairmanship of the Joint Intelligence
Committee, recognising it as the prime source of political intelligence, while the
Joint Intelligence Bureau in Melbourne assembled military intelligence of a static
kind. Preparation of material for meetings of the ANZUS and Southeast Asia
Treaty Organisation Councils necessitated joint work, although some continuing
problems remained in ensuring that the conclusions of meetings of the military
Chiefs in these organisations were presented in a useful way to the External
Affairs Minister for his Council meetings. I earlier described the external security
situations that demanded joint appreciations between the diplomatic and defence
arms of government. As the decade progressed, the growth of the PKI (Partai
Komunis Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia) and the growing
bellicosity of Indonesia’s President Sukarno in respect of Dutch New Guinea
and, later, the ‘Confrontation’ challenge to the birth of Malaysia, required many
meetings of the Defence Committee in response to calls on it from Ministers.
Beyond all this was the dangerous escalation of the confrontation between the
nuclear powers, on which the Committee offered the best judgement it could on
the information given us. While some academics offered analytical judgement
on the effectiveness or otherwise of deterrence of the Soviet Union, I do not
think the Australian Ministers were equipped to understand the complexities
of the issues. Nor do I believe that any Australian position other than an offer
of diplomatic support would have weighed with the United States.
Through the Defence Committee I made many associations and some lasting
friendships with the top levels of the Services and with their British, American
and New Zealand counterparts during their consultations. At other levels
productive work developed with the Defence Department’s Gordon Blakers,
whom I considered to be one of the wisest and most experienced contributors
to strategic thinking. Day-to-day cooperation outside the more stifling committee
procedures accelerated when the Defence Group moved up to Canberra. Other
Defence officials who contributed to memory and continuity were Gordon Poyser
and Don Clues. Service officers working in these areas had less continuity because
of the Service necessity of rotating officers. A more stable appointment at senior
level was that of Rear-Admiral Alan McNicoll (later Sir Alan when he was
appointed Chief of Naval Staff). External Affairs staffing in this area also needed
to be improved. I had the customary Public Service problem of what to do with
officers who did not measure up.
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The grip of the past in the strategic outlook
There were misunderstandings on both sides. The ideas embedded in Service
tradition grew out of the history of imperial defence, and subordinate attachment
to allied commands wherever governments sent them. Much of our national
history was so made.
During the 1950s Australia’s defence concerns became more focused
geographically. Leadership of the alliance fell on the Americans in the Pacific
and the British in Malaya/Singapore. Our alliance did not specify a role for
Australia, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did for its members. Casey,
while Minister for External Affairs, tried without success to get access to
American plans in the Pacific in order to see where Australia fitted. The
Americans fended us off with the argument that they maintained flexible
capabilities not tied to specific scenarios—and probably because our capabilities
in respect of the Soviet Union and China were so limited that we should confine
ourselves simply to maintaining operational compatibility with the Americans
against the day when we might be needed somewhere in concert with them.
Not surprisingly therefore, the Services, in Defence Committee discussions,
derived Australia’s role from generalisations, such as ‘limited war’ of no defined
location and ‘support of allies’. In those days I saw no reason to object. The
government of the day, while prudently avoiding commitment to some American
ideas on new military engagements in the Pacific, subscribed to the view that
our main defence lay in America honouring an obligation under the ANZUS
Treaty. In party politics, the Menzies-led Coalition claimed a unique ability to
ensure that support. Questioning whether there was certainty of that support,
including military action in every circumstance, was forbidden as, to use the
political jargon, ‘downgrading ANZUS’.
In 1959 I argued in the Defence Committee for a strategic posture that called
for more capabilities that could operate independently, from which Australian
contributions to allied-led operations could be drawn. The idea was incorporated
in the Strategic Basis recommendation sent up for Cabinet policy direction. It
was rejected by Cabinet. I was later told by Sir Garfield Barwick that a senior
Minister warned Cabinet that the concept was an invitation to the Chiefs to
demand more money.9  So much for national self-reliance.
I wanted to get competent officers into positions requiring dealings with the
Defence Department and with British, American and other officials, in Canberra
or in the respective capitals. Notable contributors from External Affairs were
John Quinn (later an Ambassador tragically killed in an aircraft crash in North
Africa), David (later Sir David) Hay, Alan Eastman, Robert Furlonger, and
Malcolm Booker. Later others followed.
11
The Road to Russell
The substance of advice given to Ministers during these years is not part of
this narrative. I am describing the awakening of my knowledge of defence
matters on a road that was later to lead to a decade in the Defence Department.
In these years I saw evidence of the high regard in which Australian Service
officers were held by other countries for their standards of operational efficiency.
I also began to form opinions that I retained in later years about their limitations
in strategic analysis and about the grip on them of historical experience that
was not always relevant to the present and the future. Inescapably I formed
judgements about such matters as educational background and intellectual
quality.
While External Affairs was much involved in these strategic assessments in
the 1950s, we had no role in decisions about the shape of our defence capabilities.
In earlier years Menzies had proclaimed ‘we cannot stand alone’. In November
1959 the Defence Minister, Athol Townley, told Parliament that ‘the primary
aim of our defence effort should therefore be the continual improvement of our
ability to react promptly and effectively with our allies to meet limited war
situations’. There was ambiguity in the definition of ‘threat’ in Defence usage.
Reflecting our historical engagement in allied operations worldwide, the term
had an open-ended connotation, although the assumed area of any Australian
military action was now much narrower.
By the early 1960s, Defence programming was putting more emphasis on a
capacity to act independently. In 1963 Townley spoke of the desirability of
being able to ‘react … by ourselves’. A trend in attitude was beginning to appear.
Although the size of our forces increased little, it coincided with growing
apprehension about developments to our immediate north, where the reactions
of the Americans could not be predicted. The growing bellicosity of Sukarno,
and the use of intimidation and some force to disrupt the incorporation of Borneo
and Sabah into Malaysia, were frequently reviewed in the Defence Committee,
which recommended increased defence provisions because of our long military
association with Malaya. In these years it was a Defence axiom that threats could
arise with little or no warning, demanding that adequate Australian forces be
available for deployment.
America’s definition of the ANZUS obligation
During 1963 Ministers became exercised over the uncertainties of US support
should Australia have to protect Australian New Guinea and if military conflict
with Indonesia were to arise from our commitment to come to the assistance of
Malaysia. In February 1964 I was sent to Washington for discussions on these
matters. During the course of the talks the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, asked
me pointedly whether Australia intended to increase its defence capabilities. I
do not think that my subsequent report had any significant effect. Ministers
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were committed to promoting economic development projects (like so-called
‘beef roads’ in Queensland) under the constraints of an anti-inflation policy.
The Americans had longstanding reservations, rooted in their history, about
defending British colonial interests in Southeast Asia. The consultations with
the Americans brought home to the Australian Government that any US support
to Australia with combat troops was neither guaranteed in advance nor
unconditional. But this was the last thing for the Government to admit publicly.
As to the adequacy of Australia’s ability to deal with any Indonesian attack,
Rusk said plainly to Hasluck in 1964 that the United States would expect to see
conscription in any country supporting Malaysia before considering giving help
themselves. I was impressed by the careful deliberation of his words as I heard
them. Later, in November 1964, Cabinet approved the introduction of national
service and increased provisions for defence. And the Prime Minister and Hasluck
issued a decree that any further questioning of the Americans about their view
of their ANZUS obligation must cease—presumably not wanting to risk an
unpalatable public answer.
I had opportunities to meet the British commanders of all three Services, and
I talked with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Peter (Lord) Carrington. I was with
the Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, when he met the US Navy
team and the Justice Department officials to negotiate the terms of Australian
consent to establishing their naval communications station at North West Cape.
Apart from hearing Barwick rejecting many of their requests for privileged
treatment with a lecture on the Federal Constitution, it was a useful introduction
to the US Navy’s global view, and the nuisance they found in other people’s
sovereignty.
I had a non-speaking part in various Prime Ministerial meetings with
high-level visitors. There were ANZUS meetings, Southeast Asia Treaty
Organisation meetings, and Commonwealth Ministerial meetings, and at all of
them, in the 1950s and early 1960s, international security problems were part
or the whole of the agenda.
These were years in which I sought help from the Services in improving my
understanding of Service activities. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir
Valston Hancock, offered to show me, in a Canberra bomber aircraft piloted by
himself, how a low-level attack could evade radar detection. I was disconcerted
when his deputy, Colin Hannah, bluntly questioned my sanity and recommended
I ask to be flown by a young flight lieutenant. Nevertheless the lesson from
Hancock proceeded. The chosen day had intensely high temperatures and
correspondingly high low-level turbulence. I had a trickle of blood from a stud
in the canopy over the jump seat after we came in low over a beach east of
Canberra and the Air Marshal, having lost radio contact, found that his appeals
for permission to ascend to calm air were unheard and fruitless. He told me of
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his fear of structural damage until we bounced northward towards Richmond
with radio restored. We landed for a needed respite before flying back to
Canberra, our intended destination.
The year 1964 and early months of 1965 were my last as Secretary of External
Affairs. They had a similarity with 1954 when I began. Our diplomacy continued
to be dominated by concern in the Menzies Government for the country’s
security. Situations in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia were straining relations
with allies. After a long period of nursing our relations with Indonesia with an
eye to the longer term, we in External Affairs (criticised as we only later learned
for being too conciliatory)10  accepted that a military response might be necessary
to curb Sukarno, while we could still hope for internal restraints on him.
Measures to support the disintegrating government in South Vietnam were not
my first priority because I could see no initiatives that Australia could effectively
take. My newly appointed Minister (Hasluck) thought otherwise. In public
statements by him and by the Prime Minister, the situation was seen as a
downward thrust from China through satellites into Southeast Asia.
My own influence on policy in these matters was diminished. Symptomatic
was the presentation to Cabinet of a Chiefs of Staff estimate (questionable in my
opinion) on the possibility of holding a military line in South Vietnam, without
the paper being accompanied by the customary External Affairs estimate of the
likelihood of effective government with popular support. Hasluck would not
have felt the need to have the Department advise him on such a matter.11
Earlier, in 1962, one of Barwick’s first actions after succeeding Menzies as
Minister for External Affairs was to address the Dutch–Indonesian dispute over
the status of West New Guinea, and the inertia of Australian policy. He had
taken some steps (which Menzies considered electorally risky for a Government
with a majority of one) to persuade the public of the enduring need for good
relations with our close neighbour. In the background was the certainty that
the Dutch would not remain in the territory, and the public needed to be
prepared. In 1961 I had myself warned Menzies in writing that the Dutch were
certain to leave, and said his Government needed to decide what it would prefer
to see in their place. When Barwick told Cabinet of the need for a process to
settle the dispute, he was told not to take any initiative.
During 1963 Barwick told me that the Prime Minister had suggested the need
to consider a change in the occupancy of the Secretary’s post. Barwick implied
that there was no hurry, but wanted suggestions as to where I would like to go.
I had the impression that he would have liked me to stay on. It was only years
later that I learned of the strength of Menzies’ dissatisfaction with me and his
determination to have me out (and that I was not to be offered the vacant
Washington Embassy posting). As a result of this, Barwick asked again later for
my decision. I expressed a preference for New Delhi, India, enabling an exchange
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to be made with Plimsoll if they accepted my recommendation that he succeed
me in Canberra. Barwick then retired, but Hasluck, his successor, moved
promptly to bring about the changes.
I remain uncertain of the reason for Menzies’ displeasure, which he never
expressed to me. Over the years my assessment of Australia’s best interests in
respect of nationalist struggles against colonialism, and the antipathy of some
Asian leaders to Australia’s military alignments, had sometimes differed markedly
from his view when he encountered these issues in the Commonwealth and read
reports of their treatment in the United Nations. Perhaps it was a matter of
personality. There was some solace in the fact that, as will appear later in this
narrative, four later Prime Ministers (Gorton, McMahon, Whitlam and Fraser)
did not share Menzies’ judgement. Each offered me appointments or
responsibilities as Departmental Secretary or Ambassador in a major embassy.
Moreover, after some months of Hasluck’s aloofness from his Department,
his disapproval of being offered advice on policy, and his schoolmasterish
scolding of senior officers on trivia of administration, I was personally pleased
to be heading for New Delhi.
Interlude in India
New Delhi was not a professionally demanding post. Bilateral relations were
cordial but constrained both politically and commercially. Relations had long
been affected by the contrast between India’s leadership of the Non-Aligned
Movement (which was in fact weighted against the United States) and Australia’s
military alliance with the United States. Nothing that Australia said was likely
to move India away from its opposition to the military intervention in support
of South Vietnam, nor its calculated playing off of the United States against the
Soviet Union while accepting American aid and being conciliatory to Moscow.
Pressure from powers greater than Australia to negotiate with Pakistan over
Kashmir would have been ineffective. The morass of bureaucratic regulation of
the economy under an old-fashioned socialism frustrated Australian business
investment.
Our substantial gifts of wheat during the food crisis earned us some goodwill
in the Indian Government. I directed much of my energy to cultivating a better
opinion of Australia in the influential print media and among members of the
Lok Sabha (the lower House of Parliament). I doubt that I made much impression
on the coterie preserving the Jawaharlal Nehru tradition (including his daughter
Indira) and certainly not on the Defence Minister Krishna Menon, passionate
defender of the Nehru faith. I recall that before I addressed a meeting of a young
lawyers’ association, he introduced me with a warning to my listeners that I was
aligned with the United States. Such absurdities were not universal and I was
on good terms with some younger Ministers who were prepared to listen. There
15
The Road to Russell
were plentiful opportunities for speaking engagements around the country
where English was in common use among those influencing policy and opinions.
I gave special attention to the role of the armed Services at a time of spreading
separatist movements, as well as the unresolved border dispute with China, and
the feud with Pakistan. Some observers were speculating about the possibility
of an Army takeover, which I discounted. On the face of it, the Army had great
power and undoubted popular prestige. I had several talks with the General
(later Field Marshal) commanding Eastern Command whose force of 300 000
illustrated the point. The British tradition of keeping out of politics seemed
secure. Candour with me was encouraged by respect for Australia’s Service
traditions and record, and for our historical British connection. I lectured often
at senior Service establishments. There was limited sympathy there for the Soviet
Union about which our intelligence assessors in Canberra showed interest, not
least when the Indian Navy began to acquire Soviet submarines.
I learned more about British mess decorum in India than I did elsewhere. In
speech and drill the customs of Sandhurst flourished, and their polo was certainly
better. Nor was the Indian Navy an exception to the British tradition, judging
by a scene on the grassy uplands of the Nilgiri Hills in the south as I approached
the Wellington Staff College for one of my regular speaking engagements. A
dishevelled rider in a red hunting jacket, tossed off his horse, was identified as
a bearded Sikh naval captain. I learned that his quarry was a jackal because of
the paucity of foxes.
Access to Bhutan was very restricted and only a handful of ambassadors were
permitted entry. The Indian Army had at least one division deployed to protect
the country’s frontier with China. Its Chief (General Kumaramangalam) made
arrangements direct with the King for him to receive me. A young Australian
house-guest was greatly impressed to hear him say: ‘I shall ring the King’.12
The Air Force was more reclusive, perhaps because of heavy reliance on Soviet
deliveries of equipment, and I found congenial relations to be more difficult. In
contrast, an Army General, Sen, when in office had said, after dinner in the
Australian High Commissioner’s Residence, that he was leading a study of ways
of conducting a successful coup against the Government. After a suitably dramatic
pause he added that it was done at the request of the Minister for Defence, and
had concluded that if any dissident command in the Hindu north were to start
such a move, it would be quickly suppressed by loyal units from elsewhere.
There was time in India to reflect on the strategic assessments of my own
country and the level of our defence preparation, while the Government dwelt
on fears for national security. There was still a propensity, after Sukarno had
been dislodged, to give more emphasis in Australia to our dependence on the
ANZUS Treaty than to a sober estimate of Australia’s own capability to look
after itself. There was not much in India’s policies to emulate. Yet, wrong-headed
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and hypocritical as India’s policies sometimes were, one’s mind was gripped by
the undeviating direction of India towards national self-interest without
concession to sentiment towards others, or to the ‘loyalty’ so evident in Australian
official policies towards our ‘traditional friends’.
I visited Vietnam twice during my New Delhi assignment, the better to
understand the prospects of the Saigon Government. In 1967 the Australian
Ambassador, L.H. Border, escorted me to three of the Corps Headquarters to
meet local commanders and officials. I flew by helicopter to the Australian Task
Force Headquarters at Nui Dat for a briefing from those in the field. In 1969 I
visited Saigon again. On each occasion I was briefed by the American senior
commander and given what a sceptical Australian Army officer described to me
as the optimistic briefing customarily given to American Congressmen. I was
also briefed by each of the Australian two-star generals serving at the so-called
‘Free World’ Headquarters. I was later to serve with each in Canberra.
In pursuing these interests as an External Affairs official, and reporting what
I thought of the state of the South Vietnam’s Government and my impressions
of the US effort, I was influenced by my own conviction of the need for Australia
to have a system to marry defence and foreign policy activities so as to produce
sound security policy.
After India: Where to move?
By 1969 I was entering my fifth year and the fifth summer in India. The number
of summers endured has been the traditional Western European’s measure of a
family’s ability to survive the debilitating heat and the intestinal torments of
the north Indian plain, particularly for anyone determined to get out of the
air-conditioning and secure hygiene in order to meet Indians in their own
environment throughout the country, as I did.
My time was coming to an end as 1970 approached. Before relating some
twists and turns that finally were to place me in the Department of Defence, I
should describe some correspondence in 1968, two years earlier, which might
well have had an effect. I had then offered some gratuitous advice to an old
friend, Sir Henry Bland, when I learned that he had been appointed Secretary
of the Department of Defence in succession to Sir Edwin Hicks. Drawing on my
accumulated judgement of the weaknesses in that Department in my dealings
with it for over a decade, I wrote to Bland urging him to reform the system, and
went on to argue why that was necessary:
You may be asking what it has to do with me. Put it down to the
exuberance of an early retirement and to eleven and a half years of
participation in the Defence Committee. In fact I first attended Fred
Shedden’s performing animal show in Melbourne as an acting ‘invited
member’ in about 1952. Chiefs of Staff have come and gone like a mirage
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in a desert. But one visible and rocklike feature that remained with us
always was the indomitable resistance of the Department of Defence to
being itself the innovator of anything, or the original source of ideas on
strategy, or choice of weapons, or defence associations with the outside
world—or anything else. Accountancy and minute-taking have been its
forte—from Secretary down. It has been heartbreaking—and sometimes
frightening through the years. Time and again it has been EA [External
Affairs] (whether its views were right or wrong) which has had to
say—‘Look! This is a problem. It needs an answer—by next Thursday.
Please forget about the holiday weekend’. It has been partly mental
sterility. But it has been more a deplorably wrong approach and system
of administering the formulations of the ‘defence view’ of current
international or domestic situations to say nothing of the determination
of purely ‘defence’ questions like the choice of weapons systems—in
respect of which I have no more knowledge than an outside listener but
got an impression of the superficiality of much of the analysis.
So I hope you are going to import some brains and—more
important—stimulate them and those that the Department already
possesses, to come up with ideas without waiting for the Joint Service
machinery or EA to speak first.
Which leads to the tripartite Joint Service machinery—with its Defence
Department appendages, and EA participation where the subject matter
is relevant. I do not believe that past methods of working the system are
adequate for the needs of the past decade (much less the future). There
is absolutely no stimulus to fresh thinking or re-analysis of traditional
conclusions because Services inescapably argue from individual Service
briefs and get no marks for supporting an innovation of ideas from
another which might have ill consequences for their own. They are not
stupid men. It is the system that is wrong. And, to compound the
problem, the prime attitude of the Defence Department is, it seems, to
remind all concerned of the past decisions on the question and to ensure
that the commencement of the paper quotes the past decision. It is like
starting a romance with your late wife’s photograph in plain
view—dampening to all. Tattered old clichés in papers coming up to the
Defence Committee get sanctified as holy writ but the system abhors
change.
A more balanced view than this of Bland’s Department would acknowledge
that some blame lay with the Coalition Governments for preserving four other
Departments (Navy, Army, Air and Supply) over which the Defence Department
had only partial control; and that the Defence Department’s own methods had
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served the country well enough in the Second World War. My exaggerated
language was aimed at moving Bland (himself an innovative reformer).
Moreover, when writing as I did, I had no thought of leaving External Affairs.
I looked forward to further years in India and to the eventual possibility of
heading one of the three major high commissions or embassies, although aware
that two of them had been filled invariably by politicians.13
In March 1969 I was dismayed to be offered, by an inexperienced Minister
for External Affairs (Gordon Freeth), a new position of Deputy High Commissioner
in London to be created for me. I recalled the persistent unwillingness of High
Commissioners there to allow any subordinate to have access to British Cabinet
Ministers. In particular, the Australian High Commissioner in London from 1951
to 1956, Sir Thomas White (not the most discerning of intellectuals), had fended
off an attempt by Menzies to have him bring External Affairs people in Australia
House into high-level contacts. I rejected the idea of being inadvertently demoted
in this way to talking only with officials. I asked for an ambassadorial position
of responsibility such as Washington or Tokyo or London (in that order of
preference), and otherwise to remain in India.
In Canberra five months later, dining with Freeth and later having Sunday
morning drinks with John Gorton at the Lodge, I was offered the posting to
Washington. Keith Waller (the incumbent) and I corresponded thereafter about
arrangements for the takeover, preserving confidentiality as protocol required.
I also wrote a critical commentary to my old friend Plimsoll on the loss of
initiative in the Department of External Affairs and on the exclusion of officers
from policy discussion with Ministers. On the basis of discussion with several
officers, I attributed this in part to an inheritance from the stifling attitude of
the former Minister, Paul Hasluck. This had a sequel.
The Defence Department appointment
Administration under Gorton was often unorthodox, sometimes scornful of
convention and prevailing lines of authority, and affected by the Prime Minister’s
preferences for particular individuals. These habits extended to his relations
with some of his Cabinet colleagues, as I was to observe more than once at close
quarters. Early on 21 November 1969, as I was dressing for the day, the Residence
Head Bearer/Major Domo (Shafiq Mohammed Ali) ascended the stairs in an
excited state crying: ‘Sahib! Sahib! There is a man on telephone from Australia
wanting to speak to Sahib and I am telling him it is not right time and please go
away, but he is angry man. I am not knowing his name because telephone is not
good—something like “Gorton”.’ After expressing hasty apologies to the Prime
Minister, I heard him say that he and the Defence Minister, Malcolm Fraser,
wanted me to succeed Sir Henry Bland who had suddenly decided to retire
because of his wife’s indifferent health. Having said I would do whatever he
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thought best, I made a point of saying that I had no experience as a member of
any of the Services. He said this did not matter. I suggested that Fraser discuss
the timing with my newly appointed Minister, William McMahon.
Four days later McMahon rang me to say that he would like me to return as
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (re-named Foreign Affairs in
1970), as he thought it best if Plimsoll moved on. I told him I thought that much
needed attention in the Department as a result of Plimsoll’s administrative
shortcomings, but this was not for me as I was now committed elsewhere.
McMahon said he had been kept in the dark by Gorton and Fraser over the
Defence appointment offer and would consult his colleagues. Asked which
Department I preferred, I said External Affairs. (On reflection later I decided
that my return would not have been good for the Department.) In another
telephone call to New Delhi, McMahon said that the Prime Minister had only
then confirmed what had been going on in the dark. In a cable, through
commercial channels, he asked me to report on the Department’s deficiencies
that I had referred to, and to give him an assessment of the officers whom I
thought ought to be considered to replace Plimsoll. I wrote doing so, in my own
hand without keeping any copy, recommending Waller. Waller was in fact
appointed. Lest my view of Plimsoll should be misinterpreted, I should add that
in overseas missions—and he headed all of our major ones as no other career
officer had done—Plimsoll was unique in his ability, perhaps our best. People
at the top, including difficult people like Syngman Rhee in Korea, opened their
doors to him. Administration of a large Department and nurturing its staff were,
however, not his forte.
The announcement was made and I made my farewells in India. On the way
back to Australia I made some visits to gather information that would be more
difficult to make in my new capacity without media speculation—Tokyo, the
American supply base on Okinawa, and Jakarta.
You will get on much better than our Defence Secretary because you
know nothing about weapons whereas he has been there too long and
thinks he knows a lot.
An Indian Chief of the Naval Staff said this to me as I departed for Canberra
in January 1970. Would the same be said about me nine years hence?
Defence Minister Fraser: His strategic outlook
The leisurely pace of the Department under Edwin Hicks that I visited during
the 1960s had changed. Bland had started many changes. Fraser, who was 39,
had been in office only a matter of weeks and already the staff were experiencing
his demands with urgent timetables attached. He intended to make a far-reaching
statement on defence policy, to bring to decision outstanding matters (not least
the delivery of the problem-plagued F-111 aircraft which had the Government
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under continuous attack from the Opposition and the media), and to record his
view of Australia’s strategic priorities. Bland for his part was trying to round
up quickly, before departure, the many enquiries, proposed reforms in
inter-Service collaboration, and central staffing reorganisation that he had
initiated under Allen Fairhall.
Fraser made his statement on 10 March 1970.14  He recapitulated and endorsed
the reforms that his predecessor (Fairhall) had approved on Bland’s advice. On
strategy he promised ambitious policies: to reject isolation; to involve Australia
in the processes of change in Southeast Asia and the surrounding Pacific Ocean
and Indian Ocean waters; to prepare Australian forces for regional security; to
maintain the focus on Malaya and Singapore; to make our forces more self
contained; and to include an offensive capacity.
In later years, after experiencing the failure of successive governments to
finance a capability which lived up to these ambitions, I began to recognise the
Fraser statement to be in this respect at one with those of the Menzies
Government earlier: to make commitments for sound diplomatic reasons which
outran the Government’s later willingness to provide the defence capabilities
to implement them. Eventually Australia had to narrow its focus away from the
wider visions of Spender, Casey and their successors, and to concentrate more
on capabilities to defend our own soil and nearer neighbourhood, abandoning
some strategic capabilities for more distant operations for which finance could
not be found.
Some years had to pass before advocates of a comprehensively equipped
Defence Force were forced to accept choices and priorities among Fraser’s
objectives. It was to prove a long drawn-out effort to bring the Services to accept
the unpalatable. And it took longer—long after my time—before Ministers
accepted narrower strategic objectives and the need to bring defence capabilities
into line with those more limited strategic interests, under a limited budget and
accepting traditional popular opposition to compulsory Army service. In this
process, rejection of capabilities is fiercely fought by the interested Service and
its parliamentary supporters, is disliked by allies, and requires courage by
Ministers. The eventual abandonment of Australia’s aircraft carrier with its
distant blue-water capabilities is an example.
A common outlook had to be achieved. Fraser made a prescient remark, only
months after President Richard Nixon’s 1969 forecast at Guam of reduced
American world policing: ‘We need to ensure that each of the Services prepares
for the same kind of conflicts, in the same places, and in the same time scale.’
An encouraging aspect of Fraser’s speech was the fact that he surveyed the
world situation and gave strategic objectives—over-ambitious or not—their
status as the foundation of defence activities (incidentally earning a rebuke from
McMahon for intrusion into his Foreign Affairs territory). Previous statements
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and public comment tended to focus endlessly on the adequacy (or inadequacy)
of ships, aircraft, weapons and Army manpower, without focus on where
Australian interests were likely to require these military assets to be actually
used. Geographic focus was missing and was usually submerged in the concept
of ensuring ‘balance’ and ‘operational compatibility with allies’. As I shall suggest
later, there was powerful resistance that grew out of our historical national
allegiances which were the basis of traditions within the Services themselves,
before a Minister for Defence was able to say with an authority not previously
existing: ‘The Defence policy of the Government is to pursue a disciplined
relationship between strategy and force structure within the constraints of what
is financially feasible’.15
New to the scene in January 1970, I made no significant contribution to the
Fraser statement. My first priorities were to take hold of a large system, to learn
about it, and to consolidate the Bland reforms.
The Fairhall/Bland Reforms inherited
During 16 years in the industrial relations world as Secretary of the Department
of Labour and National Service, Bland had demonstrated confidence in his own
opinions and readiness to enter a fight undaunted by rank or odds. These were
qualities eminently suitable for one about to enlarge Ministerial control and
impose unified objectives on the Services’ expenditure and activities.
By mid-1968 Bland had persuaded his Minister, Allen Fairhall, to agree to
innovations to achieve these results. One method was to cease to rely in the
Department on the committees to which each Service sent its representative,
unavoidably connected with satisfying the interest of the Service; and to replace
them with officers, chosen for their qualities, to serve for some years in the
Department as members of a joint staff in an environment conducive to more
objective analysis. Another innovation called for a system of analysing proposals
that each Service made for a place in the Defence Minister’s expenditure
programme for ships, aircraft and their weapons systems (and, in the case of the
Army particularly, for manning levels). This would involve the Joint Staff. In
what turned out in subsequent years to be one of the most controversial aspects
of the reform, Fairhall decided that qualified civilians were to join in the process.
Bland set about recruiting such civilians.
The second leg of the reforms was to create a methodical system of keeping
under regular review commitments to future expenditure, tabulated according
to the year of impact on the budget, and to keep such commitments within an
annual limit laid down by Ministers. They made no commitment to the figures,
which were known only as ‘financial guidance’. Proposed commitments would
be judged by the analysis process for their conformity to the official strategic
outlook, subordinating single-Service ambitions to collective defence priorities.
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Bland sent officers to study the Rand Corporation system used by the US
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. It was later adopted as the Five Year
Defence Rolling Program—‘rolling’ because there was an annual review of
outlays forecast and adjustments made to the content where necessary, whether
because of changes in cost, or of delivery or other problems. I believe Gordon
Blakers gave Bland the idea after Blakers had had a briefing by the Pentagon on
the Rand concept of applying the test of cost-effectiveness to proposals to acquire
new weapons and other capabilities. It rested on detailed questioning of their
conformity to endorsed strategy, to priorities in the approved programme, and
to financial limits. The so-called Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
demanded disciplined analysis. The Defence Department was the first to introduce
this forward programming into Canberra administration in the face of Treasury
scepticism. It was many years before the system was widely adopted elsewhere
in Commonwealth Departments.
Fraser adopted the new system, but its introduction required new procedures
and there was latent resistance to change. The desire remained to safeguard the
power of decision by professional Service officers in the interests of their Service,
and perhaps of members of the specialised branches for which they had been
trained and where their careers lay. In their view, the Defence Department did
not understand Service needs and was a predominantly civilian Department,
not all of whose staff was of the high quality that should accompany the power
of saying ‘no’. Possibly some high-handedness contributed to a mood of
non-cooperation.
Understandably Bland, in his 24 months, had been unable to reform
entrenched Service attitudes towards each other and towards the Department
of Defence and its Minister. I came to believe that nothing less than a kind of
cultural change over time had to be the objective. Tribalism is not eliminated
solely by making new rules. Progress was made in my time. But it took decades,
a succession of Labor Governments committed to reform, and the arrival of a
new generation of more liberally educated Service officers, before it could be
said that there was no turning back from the reforms that had their genesis in
1968.
After Bland retired for family reasons, he was justifiably commended in
editorials of major journals. He later expanded his views on defence
reorganisation in the 1970 Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, following Lieutenant
General Sir Leslie Morshead’s idea of fewer Departments.16 When I later
developed my own views on that matter, I did not adopt Bland’s particular
solution.
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The scope of the Defence Group empire
In the year that I came to the Defence Department, the Defence Group’s 1970–71
budget was responsible for 14 per cent of total Commonwealth expenditure, and
was estimated to be 3.6 per cent of the Gross National Product. Much of this
was attributed to our operational expenditure in respect of Vietnam. As I was
later to discover, other requirements were neglected. The number of civilian
staff, mostly dedicated to activities in the Service commands, was very large.
The Defence Group’s activities were widely dispersed geographically. They
required the services of a wide range of professional personnel in shipbuilding;
aircraft and arms and stores production; scientific research and its application
to the repair and the modification of equipment to unique Australian climatic
and other conditions; health services; and much more. There were establishments
for education, and others for training in the advanced technologies employed
in weapon controls and the sensors needed for all environments. The range of
activities sustained by the Defence vote was a microcosm of Commonwealth
Government administration across the board, as well as of much within the
province of State administrations. Relations with allies had to be fostered and
disagreement negotiated away. Important intelligence-gathering systems and
analyses of the product had to be managed.
I had to remedy my lack of knowledge of the way each Service managed
itself, and of the operational requirements that lay behind each Service’s
submissions to Defence for financial approvals. In the equipment area each
Service had its own philosophies, based on accumulated experience in combat,
on such matters as survivability in conflict, life in service, acceptable rate of
obsolescence, and maintainability under Australian conditions. Those conditions
included the physical environment (such as the hot wet and hot dry climate),
paucity of ports, distance from bases, as well as the country’s industrial capability
to meet requirements or to modify equipment without dependence on distant
countries of origin.
Five Defence Group Ministries: Previous unsuccessful
reforms
It soon became apparent to me that I had to clarify the authority I derived from
the Minister. Fundamental to this was to get recognition of his authority over
the constituent parts of the Defence Group, particularly the Army, the Air Force
and the Navy. The Department of Supply, while jealous of its autonomy, was
under Public Service management and more amenable to guidance.
Fairhall had in writing called on the Defence Group Ministers to cooperate
with the system instituted by him on Bland’s advice. But before the end of 1970,
I could see some of the problems that Fraser had in consulting and winning the
cooperation of these Ministers. They were based far apart, while Fraser made
24
Defence Policy-Making
his home in Canberra. Each had full Ministerial status, yet none (apart from the
Minister for Supply) was a member of the Cabinet where financial and foreign
policy restraints were debated and policy decided. The Service Ministers were
not privy to the documentation and high-level assessments in which their own
Chiefs of Staff shared. Nevertheless, each Service expected its Minister to give
parliamentary and public support, to foster morale and to acknowledge the
Service’s achievements.
In 1970 the total number of regulars in the three Services was 84 000. The
system of control had long been an anachronism. It had been designed for
management of more than a million Navy, Army and Air Force personnel during
the Second World War, serving commands remote from each other around the
world under various higher commands (usually allied). When they were brought
together back in Australia to satisfy peacetime priorities with drastically reduced
numbers, there was rivalry between Services pursuing different strategic concepts
with not always consistent military capabilities. It is reasonable to speculate that
the rivalry was made more likely by the weakness in the system of Ministerial
oversight. Fraser, not a notably patient man, found that consultation with the
Service Ministers—James Killen (Navy), Andrew Peacock (Army) and Senator
Tom Drake-Brockman (Air)—was impeded by their being scattered around
Australia from North Queensland to the Northwest of Western Australia, while
Fraser resided and worked in Canberra. They complained, and he complained.
What should have been fundamental to the authority of the Defence Minister
was the Menzies ‘directive’ of 1958. At that time, the Prime Minister had
explained to Parliament his Cabinet’s rejection of the Morshead Committee’s
recommendation that it abolish the Service Departments and the decision to
adopt the alternative of issuing a firm declaration giving the Defence Minister
overall policy command. When I came into the Department 12 years later, I did
not find anyone who knew of the directive; nor did the Service leaders
acknowledge its significance. In formal papers leading to decisions or to
recommendations to the Government, the Menzies directive was never quoted.
The Menzies solution to the disunity and lack of adequate central control in
the Defence system was, in my view, a failure. It may be that a lethargic Defence
Department in the late 1950s and early 1960s was at fault in not vigorously
keeping before the top layer of the Services, always moving between Canberra
and their commands, their responsibility to observe the directive. Or there may
have been a convenient amnesia. In any case, there was probably a deeper cause
of resistance to supervision by the Defence Minister of the professional activities
of the Service Chiefs. They enjoyed—or claimed—the right to go over the head
of their Minister to the Prime Minister. I occasionally heard officers flirting with
the idea that the Governor-General’s constitutional status as commander-in-chief
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had practical application, although I did not hear this disturbing view of
responsible government from any of the Chiefs of Staff.
Respect for the authority of the civil power was never in question. They were
entitled to say (and often did) that civil servants were not the civil power. At
the same time, I believe that public servants did find in the Services differences
from their own instinctive respect for Ministerial authority, and from their desire
to assist Ministers to the utmost, whether asked or not. Service leaders are
understandably conscious of the unique nature of their profession, requiring as
it does dedication to a duty to put their lives at risk in a way not shared by any
other. I would expect that keeping Ministers out of trouble politically would
not be much on their mind.
To reform practices within the military command system required military,
not civilian, leadership. The Menzies decision had created the office of Chairman
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, placed in the Department and answering direct
to the Minister, with a rank higher than that of the Chiefs. When I entered the
Department, the Chairman was General Sir John Wilton, then approaching the
end of a four-and-a-half year term. Bland had told me of some differences between
them. Wilton was a friend of mine from my External Affairs days and we had
that advantage in managing our relationship. But he was a taciturn man and I
found this inhibiting when discussing with him ideas about reforms. Wilton
was chafing under his lack of power of command over the Services and his
somewhat obsessive interest in this remedy for deficiencies in policy directions
of the Defence Group. While as a civilian I expected that, given goodwill,
persuasion could be exercised by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
I was aware that command had to be legally based because of implications for
life and death. The more relaxed and informal attitudes in the Public Service
were not wholly applicable and would not survive endemic rivalries over
resources and power. In later discussions of the reforms under Labor, I learned
how often a proposal for change might be judged by where the power of decisions
would reside in a changed arrangement, rather than by the intrinsic merits of
change.
Some writers have attributed intellectual qualities to Wilton that I did not
discover.17  He gave me (as he had done to Bland) his proposed changes in the
chain of authority. I was unwilling to give his ideas priority over many other
reforms that had been initiated and not brought to fruition, and others that were
needed.
In any case I was wary of his objective, as Bland had been. This was justified
when I became aware (from reading an essay by Ian McNeill)18  of Wilton’s
memoirs. He had expressed his desire that submissions to the Minister, apparently
irrespective of subject, be made by the military Chief rather than by the
Departmental Secretary. Perhaps this debate had gone on in the Army Department
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earlier. To convert the Defence Department into a military command headquarters
in this way (as might be found, for example, in Indonesia) was something no
government was likely to tolerate. Menzies’ Coalition Cabinet—the more likely
of the two alternative parties to grant status to the Services—had specifically
given, as a reason for its opposition to the abolition of the Service Ministers,
that the consequential disappearance of the Public Service Departmental
Secretaries would give too much authority to the Service Chiefs.
Managing the Department with limited powers
For me in 1970 there was much to learn about the requirements of each Service
and what went on inside each of their different systems. Weapons procurement
apart, Defence could only exert influence through its right of approval of total
budget allocations and major weapons acquisitions. Attitudes did not help. The
Defence Department was seen as an outsider—a primarily civilian regulatory
Department, no more welcome to involve itself in Service decisions than was an
analogous Department, the Treasury. The vast area of expenditures and decisions
on maintenance and running costs, which imposed commitments on future
budgets, remained a mystery to me. There was some confirmation that the
secretaries of the Service Departments had their difficulties too, despite their
responsibility under the law to safeguard economy in expenditure. In 1968 W.J.
Curtis, then Deputy Secretary in Defence under Bland after long experience in
the Army Department, spoke of that Department’s lack of penetration into Army
activity. Entry into this area by the Defence Department had to await the
progressive introduction of the programming of intended expenditures, with a
ceiling which provided an incentive to establish higher and lower priorities. In
the absence of such a system, only resolute military leadership would have made
any progress. Parliament had many former officer members ready to protect one
Service or another against change, particularly if it involved unwelcome civilian
initiatives.
For the new Departmental Secretary in the Fraser years, 1970 and 1971, there
was more to defence administration and policy advice than battling over reforms
to the antiquated system. There were intelligence arrangements with allies to
deal with; defence arrangements with Singapore and Malaysia (whose relations
with each other were deteriorating); the consequences of supporting our forces
in Vietnam; and major weapons procurement. Meetings had to be attended in
Singapore and Wellington. There were some problems in the Department
following the influx of Service officers, and the Fairhall/Bland exhortation for
them to take a ‘Defence’ rather than a single-Service approach to their duties.
There were a few cases when exploratory ideas about reforms, still not considered
at the policy level, were rushed off secretly to the Service that might be affected,
leading to premature reactions and occasionally appeals to sympathetic
journalists. This was no way to encourage people to put to paper innovative
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thinking about possible reforms. Civilians in the Department became wary. I
was probably at fault for withholding access by these Service officers to
departmental files. But, with time, a more trusting atmosphere developed, as all
wrestled with the procedures for introducing defence programming for the
ensuing five years.
My wish to get out of Canberra in 1970 in order to visit the commands and
operational units was frustrated by having to attend to jurisdictional disputes
of the kind described. I concluded that Bland had introduced too many
rationalisation studies, and too many changes to the practices required of the
Services, in too short a time. Moreover, to be successful, the changes required
Service officers to look for solutions without bias towards their own Service.
There was no less a requirement to find civilians who understood the needs and
ethos of the Services, but also with the intellectual ability to be innovative, and
the stuffing to stand up for what they believed. Such people were hard to find
in sufficient numbers in the Defence Group. Many in the geographic commands,
like the stereotypical ‘Colonel’s clerk’, acquiesced in Service authority. Tempers
were frayed by some Defence Department demands with short timetables, and
by some ideas of doubtful utility put to the Services. Some emollient was needed,
as well as new priorities for our activities.
I let some of Bland’s inquiries run down. I gave high priority to the handful
of officers (principally John Moten and John Enfield) who were drawing up the
procedures for the new system of defence programming. Time had to be given
to explaining the system to officers at all relevant levels, and to circumventing
the sceptics about the McNamara method of control.
Its significance for the authority of the Defence Minister and his advisers
went much further. With the exception of large capital expenditure items, which
would go to Cabinet individually, Treasury would cease to be concerned with
the detail of expenditure of the Services and Supply. The Defence Department,
consulting within the Defence Group, would become the system’s treasury,
acting within the overall expenditure limit agreed with Treasury.
There were weaknesses and anomalies. The rights of the Defence Group
Ministers and of the Service Boards remained intact in legislation. Central scrutiny
of the expenditure on the running costs of the Services and the group’s factories
and science laboratories, under their respective systems of authorisation, was
impossible. As to decisions on equipment procurement, with the foreseeable
related manning and maintenance expenditures they would generate, I
concentrated on having this major aspect of the Secretary’s financial
responsibilities put to systems analysis by a mixed committee of qualified Public
Service and uniformed officers. As I said earlier, this area of control in the
Department was to become the focal point of controversy and objection to civilian
intervention throughout my years in the Defence Department.
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In his Defence Report published in September, Fraser said:
The application of systematic analysis to the Services’ proposals does
not imply any intention to replace judgement by analysis. That is plainly
impossible. On the other hand, the factors that have been referred to
(the interest of local manufacturers), and the increasing military
technology and its rapid rate of change, make it increasingly unlikely
that reliance can be placed solely on unsupported judgement. Judgement
must be complemented by the systematic analysis of alternative
solutions—taking account of benefits and costs.
In effect, the intention was to displace the traditional Service ‘requirement’,
with its mandatory connotation, with the more supplicant term ‘bids’.
Terminology is important. If Fraser realised what an uphill battle it would be,
given the existing Ministerial arrangements, he did not admit it publicly for
understandable reasons. The Opposition would have loved it.
Fraser’s initiatives—and conflicts with Gorton
My early months working under Fraser were spent chiefly on establishing the
new administrative apparatus already described, rather than on policy advising.
Fraser for his part was still wrestling with the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam,
in the atmosphere of public passion and protest that had built up over many
months. I had not experienced this. In India, with no television and only meagre
radio reports from Australia, my eyes had been on that country’s turmoil, its
military tensions and its conflicts with its neighbours. I was told of Fraser’s
earlier attempt, when he was Army Minister, to start an orderly withdrawal of
ground troops from Vietnam. It had been difficult to calibrate such a withdrawal
with unpredictable American withdrawals in a way that avoided appearing
simply to do what the Americans did. I learned of Fraser’s belief in using skills
within Army units in forms of civil assistance to the community to foster support
for the Saigon Government.
Handling our military presence in Vietnam, with its conscripted component,
in the face of popular protests, was a major preoccupation for Fraser. But he had
also committed himself, in his 10 March 1970 statement, to a programme of
extensive changes. In addition, there was another burning problem—the
Government’s failure to achieve delivery of the F-111, the subject of accusations
of mounting costs and Labor taunts in Parliament.
Fraser decided that the delivery problem had to be solved. There was a sharp
difference with the Air Force over our insistence on bringing defence scientists
in to advise him on the feasibility of the Americans solving the metal fatigue
problem that had crippled the retractable wing system of the aircraft. The Air
Force relied on its powerful engineering branch to monitor the situation. I had
no doubt that it also wanted to preserve its exclusive relations with the US Air
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Force, whose goodwill they might lose if our negotiating tactics impacted on the
US Air Force budget.
Believing the long-running controversy in Parliament to be politically
intolerable, Fraser led a team to Washington. He made me a member, along with
the Secretary of the Air Department (Fred J. Green) and the Chief of Air Staff
(Air Marshal Colin Hannah). On the eve of meeting the Americans, Fraser
assembled his team for a late Sunday night session in the Australian Embassy
chancery to try out various ways of approaching the Americans. Playing devil’s
advocate, Fraser shot down most of the arguments that we suggested, based on
our agreement to accept supply of an airworthy F-111. Following loss of sleep
during the journey to Washington, the occasion overwhelmed both Hannah and
Green; one of them went to bed for several days.
Fraser doubted that the Air Department’s conciliatory approach would give
us satisfaction. He decided to go over the head of both Air Forces. He presented
to Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, a largely political case about the damage
to defence relations. He reminded the American that the Labor Opposition, who
had attacked the transaction from the beginning, took a different view of our
ANZUS association with the Americans. Fraser asked, in effect, that the Americans
produce a viable aircraft or give us our money back. As Fraser himself has
subsequently recorded,19  the venue of the negotiation shifted from the Pentagon
to a stadium holding a baseball game that Laird wanted to watch. Perched on
uncomfortable benches among shouting spectators, in an atmosphere redolent
of hot dogs, the two negotiators went on with their business.
After stressing the need for a viable aircraft in our joint strategic interests,
Fraser accepted an offer to lease F-4 Phantom aircraft to bridge the gap until the
F-111 problem was solved. Eventually we took delivery of this technologically
advanced aircraft at a cost that was, in the context of rapidly rising prices,
relatively modest, despite Opposition claims to the contrary.
Before returning to Australia, Fraser and I had a welcome diversion visiting
mutual friends at their vacation retreat on the Virginia coast. William Battle, a
wartime friend of John Kennedy, had been his Ambassador in Canberra during
Fraser’s early days in Parliament and mine in External Affairs.20
Back at home, Fraser decided to satisfy Service grievances over pay and
conditions, a subject on which he felt I had been unduly cautious. Slowness of
the legal authorities in drafting regulations to adjust pay (for example for the
Navy’s technicians) compounded the deficiencies of an earlier decision imposed
on the Department and the Services. This had aligned their pay to civilian awards,
a system that was incapable of recognising the command responsibilities of
non-commissioned officers in the Services. This was creating anomalies and
resentments as pay levels followed, after long delays, the wage blow-outs then
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prevalent in the civilian economy. A report by Justice Kerr defined for the first
time a distinct profession of arms and a system of matching pay to responsibilities.
In this and other ways Treasury intrusion into Defence management had
reduced the Department’s standing in the eyes of Service personnel. Bland had
only recently got the Treasury out of controlling the works programmes of the
Services in their various bases and establishments. It took time to wear down
Treasury’s parsimony over the housing provided for other ranks.
Fraser called for a prompt study of the feasibility of locating a task force in
Western Australia. He was disinclined to accept the Army’s reservations and
typically slow responses. I was more sympathetic to the Army’s argument that
it would be inefficient, and costly for training, to have to bring the task force
together with specialists located on the east coast. I thought that Fraser’s
motivation was probably political, with an eye to the Western Australian
electorate, which complained of its lack of defence protection. The idea died,
but not before distrust of the Army developed.
I had my own frustrations with the Army and with the Army Department.
There was an absence of candour or willingness to admit the existence of a
problem that Defence could help to solve. Getting the right outcome for the
totality of the defence effort required a shared belief in that objective rather
than solutions sought by one Service in isolation from the others. I had to live
with this insistence by all the Service Departments on their domestic jurisdiction,
but it was the Army that was the most reluctant.
The Army was involved in one of Fraser’s setbacks, but it was only one of
several actions by the Prime Minister, Gorton, that gave it importance. The
Prime Minister took it upon himself to authorise a call-out of the Pacific Islands
Regiment, to provide a legal basis should the Administrator (Sir David Hay) later
decide it was necessary to use troops to quell an uprising in New Guinea. In so
acting, the Prime Minister overrode Fraser’s earlier decision not to recommend
the action to the Governor-General. My advice supported Fraser’s view, as I
believed there would be damage to the Army’s image and that of Australia if
Australian-led soldiers were used against indigenous people in a trust territory
before civilian policing had demonstrably failed. The Governor-General (Sir Paul
Hasluck, who had been a Territories Minister) asked whether the proposal had
Cabinet backing. The matter did not come to a head as, in the event, the
Administrator did not call out the Pacific Islands Regiment.
There were other setbacks. Gorton’s reservations led Cabinet to postpone
indefinitely the creation of a tri-Service academy recommended by a committee
chaired by Sir Leslie Martin. (The title ‘Australian Defence Force Academy’ was
only established some years later on my recommendation.)
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I was not involved in yet another event involving Fraser and Gorton which
developed into a crisis leading to the departure of both men from Ministerial
office and which prepared the way for the downfall of the Coalition Government
within two years. The situation arose out of Fraser’s determination to exercise
his authority over the way in which the Army command was acting in Vietnam,
not in respect of its military operations in Phuoc Tuy province but in its dealings
with the Saigon Government and others over civic assistance to local
communities. His channel for conveying his questions and instructions was the
newly appointed Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Sir Victor
Smith. I saw the Secretary as having no more than a watching role in respect of
conformity to government policy by the Services in such operations, as I was
not a proper channel for instructions where commands were needed.
After a visit to Vietnam to survey the political situation, the prospects of the
Saigon Government, and the progress in pacification of the countryside, Fraser
had come away dissatisfied with progress. He believed that reporting from Saigon
through military and embassy channels was fragmented and inadequate. Taking
a close interest in policy issues, he directed the Joint Intelligence Organisation,
which served the inter-departmental National Intelligence Committee, to gather
more information on the situation. The Director of the Joint Intelligence
Organisation, Robert Furlonger, having no intelligence-gathering function,
informed the Army of the task he had been given and sought their cooperation.
In February and early March 1971, a crisis of misunderstanding and distrust
began, fuelled by unauthorised statements to the media in Saigon suggesting,
wrongly, that Defence policy towards the continuation of ‘civic action’ had
changed. It was further fuelled by an outrageously inaccurate report in the
Sydney Daily Telegraph that the Joint Intelligence Organisation had been
instructed to report on what the Army was doing, with the implication of spying
on them.
There was substance in Fraser’s indignant belief that the Army was acting
on the assumption that, because the total withdrawal of the Army could be
foreseen, forms of aid to the civil community (such as new building, medical
assistance and so forth) should be reduced to those that could be completed
before the withdrawal. As Fraser believed that some Army activity (such as that
of the engineers) could continue after the remainder had withdrawn to Australia,
he objected strongly to the Army's creating new policies and letting them appear
in the media. Whether this was in fact the case, or just a suggestion in Army
planning papers, is obscure. Fraser preferred to believe the former. He was, it
seems, conducting his own unacknowledged briefing of selected media, making
clear his disapproval of Army actions in Vietnam over civic action.
At this point the Prime Minister made another imprudent entry into Fraser’s
domain.21  Having read (as he later explained publicly) media reports of actions
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by Fraser deleterious to the Army’s reputation, he spoke, not to his Minister to
satisfy his disquiet, but to the Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant General Sir
Thomas Daly) to obtain his view of events. What was said during the discussion
is in contention. A prominent journalist wrote a story saying that Daly had
complained of Fraser’s disloyalty to the Army. Gorton left this statement
unchallenged by not denying it.
Fraser reacted strongly. While not involved in this deteriorating situation, I
had become aware, from discussions with Fraser over some months, of his critical
view of the way Gorton conducted his office. When undermined in this way,
he called me to his office to tell me of his decision to resign. I considered this to
be a political matter and confined myself to advising on some of the formalities
that Fraser would have to observe. Having set the process in motion, Fraser told
me a day or two later that Gorton had offered some reconciliation. We discussed
the steps already taken to give effect to the resignation. Fraser decided that he
would go on with it. I took no part in his preparation of his resignation
announcement in Parliament (privately I thought the language a little
exaggerated). He was gracious and generous in saying farewell to officers of the
Department.
Defence lost a strong and purposeful leader, better in these respects than any
Coalition Minister for Defence up to the time of my retirement in 1979, and
possibly better than any predecessor. His statement on 10 March 1970 of intended
reforms, some of which he had inherited, was a remarkable survey of defects
needing to be fixed. Whether he would have been strong enough to bring them
about, had he remained in office, cannot be known. While always determined
to get his own way, his insistence on consulting colleagues when Prime Minister
later has been commended by some as desirable practice.22  On my observation
of him in Defence, I incline to the view that he needed the reassurance of support
before acting. One needed reform he did not attempt was abolition of the Service
Ministers. On that he would not have had the support of his Prime Minister,
Gorton.
He had opinions about most things and was sometimes impetuous in forming
them. He expected his advisers to disagree with him and some found his
personality hard to endure. He was not always considerate enough to recognise
the pressures felt by some. Setting short timetables for production of results by
his subordinates maintained his reputation for vigour as a Minister, but it
sometimes made for unreasonable demands on those serving him. Sunday night
had to be accepted as a normal working time if it happened to suit him.
As to my own relations, Fraser told me in later years that, when considering
names for Bland’s successor, he rejected several names because, as he put it, ‘I
wanted someone who was willing to disagree with me’. It was not long before
I had to oblige him. It was, as I recollect, over an administrative matter—his
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wanting one of my staff for an assignment when I said I needed him elsewhere.
We exchanged one or two testy minutes before he brought the tiff to an end
with an admirable solution: ‘Before writing further formal notes I ask you to
come over and discuss the matter that apparently disturbs you. It might be best
to come at an hour when we can put a whisky in our hands.’
He had much to do with my decision to acquire a trout fishing haven in the
mountains, blessed by the absence of a telephone or easy access. But there was
never any rancour in our relations. Indeed, we shared a common love of
fly-fishing. After becoming Prime Minister, he gave my wife and me the pleasure
of having him as our guest at my haven.
Gorton the Defence Minister
Gorton had the portfolio for five months until McMahon dismissed him. Press
verdicts on Gorton made much of his inability as a Minister to shake off the
imperial style of Prime Ministership. I thought that in his relations with his new
department he behaved very much the way Gorton always had—unorthodox,
unconventional, not easy to persuade where his sense of loyalty to some group
was involved, and prone to leaving his administrators in some uncertainty while
he did what he had made up his mind to do. At the same time, one knew that
Gorton had intellectual qualities of a kind seldom found among Defence Ministers.
He was confident of his own judgement on policy matters. While he did not
tell his Department, as Hasluck had done in External Affairs, to speak on policy
matters only when spoken to, he did not encourage policy advice. I had had an
altercation with him years earlier when he was Minister Assisting the Minister
for External Affairs. When he disputed, in brusque and uncompromising
language, my right to vet expenditure proposals made to him by the Director
of the Antarctic Division of the Department, I confronted him. The encounter
ended in a draw. I am sure his respect for the adventurous Antarctic explorers
was greater than his respect for chair-bound staff. Memory of this episode set
me wondering how he would respond to the current programme of expanding
the Defence Department’s oversight of Service activities. The matter was not
put to the test before he left the portfolio. I had no reason to foresee any personal
distrust in as much as he had himself as Prime Minister offered me the
Washington Embassy posting and later had personally asked me in that phone
call to New Delhi to accept the diversion to the Defence Department sought by
Fraser.
He showed his independence from his officers in ways unusual for a Minister.
When Cabinet in mid-year called for a A$50 million cut in the Defence budget,
he personally walked the rounds of the three Service buildings at Russell on a
Sunday morning, trying out what cuts they could wear. Meanwhile his
Departmental Secretary sat in his office waiting to be handed the scrap of paper
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recording Gorton’s findings. A Chief of Staff later confided to me that he thought
that Gorton had ‘cooked the books’ in his favour.
In a debate over the size of the Army, Gorton overrode the objective of both
his Departmental Secretary and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
to reduce Army manpower, in order to satisfy the requirement for better
capabilities in other Services. The opposition he could expect from Army
sympathisers might have given his Prime Minister the opportunity to ‘get’ him.
Perhaps this was indeed in Gorton’s mind. Gorton’s rejection of a proposal,
unanimously supported by the Service Chiefs, to place over the individual
Service medical officers a superior medical officer answering to the Chairman
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was a bad omen for any new rationalisation
efforts.
He showed his independence from previous Coalition attitudes in areas that
I personally found encouraging. He had formed his own views on external
defence relations while Prime Minister (and they appeared in an address to the
Imperial Service Club in Sydney), for which he had not looked to the Department
for advice.23  He attacked some over-simplified slogans that had long been at
the heart of the Coalition’s policies in its conflict with the Labor Party over
whether Australia’s strategy needed forward bases and deployments. This was
the conflict between ‘forward defence’ and ‘fortress Australia’. Gorton pointed
out that the ability to project power abroad did not, of itself, necessitate the
stationing of forces overseas. If we did deploy them thus, it should be designed
to strengthen the Australian fortress. The real issue was how best to defend
Australian soil. It was this simple definition of Australia’s interest that we were
later to urge on David Fairbairn and William McMahon and over which they
both stumbled and retreated. Moreover, when advocating cooperation with
allies, Gorton seemed to be thinking of Asian countries. He did not mention
ANZUS once.
With the case for withdrawing from Vietnam growing, and our troops in
Singapore the subject of dispute over finance, this trimming of sails was
expedient. Looking to the longer-term implications, we in the Defence
Department saw some prospect of what in External Affairs I and others had long
advocated in our advice, but without success—namely less dependence on the
major powers in favour of what we came to call greater ‘self-reliance’. But
Gorton’s ideas did not survive after his short-lived term as Defence Minister.
We saw less prospect of obtaining the Minister’s support for our efforts to
impose on the Services what we believed to be more rational priorities in respect
of manpower and equipment. The Imperial Service Club speech offered the
Services all that they said they needed—more spending, better conditions of
service and (doubtless with the previous Minister in mind) loyalty from Ministers.
There was nothing about facing up to the discipline of priorities.
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I could see the Department and its programming system reverting to a role
of simply supporting Service bids for funds—the ‘adding machine’ role of earlier
times. I saw little prospect that Gorton would support increased authority for
the Defence Minister over the Services, or any interest in reforming the existing
clumsy apparatus of policy control. Before these gloomy ruminations materialised,
Gorton was dismissed from the Cabinet by McMahon for reasons that had nothing
to do with defence programming.
Fairbairn: Minister for Defence 1971
David Fairbairn took office in August 1971. He had won his Distinguished Flying
Cross serving in the Air Force in Europe and had been Minister for Air as well
as occupying some other portfolios during his career. Working for Ministers
who disliked their predecessor, as did both Gorton and Fairbairn (and Hasluck
in External Affairs), taught me to be wary of carrying personal loyalty to a
Minister beyond the duties of the job, although in one or two cases a friendship
was sustained when we were both in private life.
Fairbairn was a different personality from Gorton, and he was different in
intellectual grasp of issues, ability to articulate ideas, speed of comprehension
and much else. The Department found him congenial and no doubt the Services
did even more so. He clearly enjoyed his official and social engagements with
them. One noticed that he showed unusual respect for some senior officers, under
whom he had served but to whom he was now entitled to issue firm orders. To
the Department he was gentlemanly in conduct, invariably courteous and
singularly undemanding. His reading of papers was rather slow. He left in doubt
whether he always absorbed what the Department put to him.
According to Gorton, Fairbairn had earlier asked him for the High
Commissionership in London. (After his Defence years he was to achieve the
lesser post of Ambassador to the Netherlands.) He had the necessary social
attributes for diplomatic life.
After the customary briefing of a new Minister into the various classified
areas, it was necessary to explain the budget provisions that had already been
announced. For the Department, after the disruptions of previous months, it
was necessary to undertake the first effective effort to construct a five-year
comprehensive programme and to establish what objectives we would recommend
for the force structure now that the withdrawal of forces from the Vietnam
commitment could be anticipated.
The Department needed more systems analysts. This was a relatively new
concept in Canberra administration, especially in financial control, and analysts
were hard to find. In any case there was some reluctance to enter the relatively
unknown ‘military’ environment with its known tensions. For work on assessing
the strategic environment I turned to Foreign Affairs. I brought in R.N. Hamilton
36
Defence Policy-Making
after his service in Africa. Gordon Jockel took over the Joint Intelligence
Organisation after serving as Ambassador in Indonesia, and later in 1973 I
persuaded W.B. (Bill) Pritchett to join after serving in London. (He eventually
became my successor as Secretary.) Paul Dibb, who later earned high repute for
groundbreaking work on the force structure, came into the Joint Intelligence
Organisation.
I came to the view that the Chief Defence Scientist was not making much
impact on force structure debates and decisions. On the retirement of the current
incumbent, I took the advice of the Chairman of the Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation (Sir Frederick White) and appointed to the
position Dr John L. Farrands, head of the Aeronautical Research Laboratories.
Added to his professional knowledge, he proved to have personal qualities of
temperament that gave him persuasive influence in dealings with the Service
Chiefs. My working relations with him were all the better for our sharing an
addiction to fly-fishing on the stream adjoining my mountain property.
I wanted to develop the Defence Department’s competence in assessing
situations where we had a defence interest, notably Southeast Asia. I remained
convinced that my old Department, Foreign Affairs (as External Affairs was
renamed in 1970), should retain a large say in estimates and assessments of this
kind, but I was aware of its limitations. I wanted some analysts to be closer to
the realities of our military capabilities and the restraints on deployments
overseas. Liaison officers from Foreign Affairs rotating through Canberra lacked
this awareness. But several such officers, after being employed inside Defence
alongside the military staff, provided a needed continuity of balanced judgement.
I needed this for the further reason that there was an overweighting of
military judgement in the Department. While at the senior level we had the
talented and wise Gordon Blakers, the lower levels were weaker. Civilians were
needed to balance military judgement because there was evidence that some
military officers’ appreciations of the nature and whereabouts of threats was
influenced by the role they saw for the Service whose uniform they wore. The
Fairhall/Bland exhortation for complete objectivity could not always prevail
over the pursuit of ‘crest of the wave’ technology pressed on the Services by
British, American and other manufacturers.
To hold up Service bids for questioning was a heavy responsibility. In these
early months the Department’s staff did not always perform well. Apart from
this form of supervision, the Department was also required to satisfy Service
needs, where support functions had been centralised. Performance by the
Department’s computer services ran into difficulties, compounded by the loss
of key personnel in an increasingly competitive environment. The Air Force was
dissatisfied with the service. Keeping aircraft airworthy and in service depended
on timely access to accurate records of its vast inventory.
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We were in a continuous contest over the exercise of the authority that the
Department claimed under the new programming procedures. Past Ministerial
exhortations and claims of authority were not very effective in the face of a legal
position that gave Service Ministers and their boards autonomy, other than
control of the aggregates in the annual budget. In practice, the Defence Minister’s
strength lay in his conviction, persistence and courage rather than in past
declarations. His standing in the Ministry and interested sections of the
backbench no doubt contributed as well. He had no practical control of the
nature and purpose of Service training (all Service activity when not in combat).
Training reflected the Services’ own expectations of where they would be
fighting, although this was the prerogative of government. Beach landings,
jungle tactics, air superiority or air-to-surface attack, destruction of
submarines—all involved strategic assumptions that might or might not be valid
or common to the three Services, about where we would find an enemy. Civilian
control of running costs rested with Service Departmental Secretaries. They had
no part in the formulation of strategic guidance, and might never have seen the
Defence Committee’s conclusions. I formed the impression that those Service
Chiefs who took part in Defence Committee deliberations did not pass papers
far down the command chain. My growing frustration appears in a diary note
made on 26 September 1972:
We are told by Army and Air, because of the complexity and number
of people involved, they cannot, in less than six months, give us the
statement of their long term capability objective and the contribution
made (to it) by this (1973–8) Five Year Defence Programme. This after
Army has written hundreds of pages calling for an Army of 50 000; the
three Services proposed weapons authorisations of $3000 million (and
were granted $1500m); and the three Chiefs and the three Secretaries
endorsed in the Defence Administration Committee the need to spend
some $7000m. in the next five years at fixed prices. In pursuit of what
we ask? They claim time to answer.
This note, written some months before Labor re-wrote our strategic priorities,
contained my own thinking on that matter:
The transition to a defence policy for the Australian continent and its
interests, away from having capabilities to offer loyalty to an ally,
requires great mental adjustment—as well as perception and leadership
of thought. There has not been much of the latter in the Defence
Department (sic). We still don’t know whether the Australian community
really wants to spend money for the defence of Australia’s interests. It
is a new thought—at least since the threat of Japanese hegemony—which
left curiously little mark except a belief in ‘forward defence’.
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Speaking to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian
National University in 1974, I described the situation in 1972 as follows:
The formalities of separate identity—sanctified by the Administrative
Order—imposed an obstacle to the harmonising of Service activities, and
to the reconciliation of the exercise of military command with the policy
objectives of the Defence Minister—strategic, diplomatic, political,
industrial, social, and (use of) resources. Communication inside the system
was inadequate. It was formal, stilted, slow, and clumsy; too many people
to get together.
I, personally, was dismayed at the amount of time and nervous energy
that had to be applied to enquiring—in terms acceptable (given the
formal autonomy that existed)—into what was going on, whether what
one read in the newspapers was true or not. Sometimes, if one called a
committee together to consult or explore, one had to expect an argument
as to whether there should be such a committee or what its terms of
reference should be.
… For its part, the Department of Defence set out to break down the
separatism by setting goals that its own staffing did not enable it to reach.
The result was some frustration, thwarted single Service projects, and
not enough suggested by way of alternatives promptly enough by the
Central machinery.
A strong-minded Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, aided by such
an influential civilian as Gordon Blakers, could bring about change in Service
priorities for capital equipment (weapons and their platforms, such as ships and
aircraft). Blakers has lately reminded me that in the mid-1960s Air Chief Marshal
Sir Frederick Scherger, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, had brought
about a preference for long-range maritime aircraft over bombers. He also
overcame the Army’s plan to locate a new task force on the Mornington Peninsula
in the extreme (and salubrious) southeast of Australia, and had it despatched to
north Queensland. More Hercules aircraft entered the programme. These were
early signs of greater emphasis on continental defence, no doubt precipitated
by the growing unpredictability of Sukarno’s Indonesia. But in later times
military advice of this kind, founded on strategic considerations rather than on
the simpler notion of replacing what we already had in service, became rarer.
The Services liked deployments to overseas bases and the equipment that
went with them. For the Navy, it was a ‘blue-water’ capability protected by
carrier-borne aircraft that gave them status with the American and British navies.
Air Force Chiefs described service at the base at Butterworth in Malaysia as good
for morale, not merely for the operational exercises but also for families able to
enjoy amenities not found around Australian airfields. I do not know whether
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these benefits coloured the belief that these deployments improved the likelihood
of American support under ANZUS should we need it.
As to that, I retained a memory of the blunt warning that I heard Dean Rusk
give to Hasluck in 1964. During the discussion of worsening relations between
Malaysia and Indonesia, Hasluck volunteered to inform the Americans before
committing Australian forces in support of Malaysia. Responding to the inherent
assumption that such a deployment would trigger an expectation of American
military support, Rusk pointedly said that the United States would expect that
Australia would have introduced conscription and full mobilisation, and added
‘there is no residuum of responsibility falling on the United States that is reached
at a certain point’. This statement of the unpredictability of American military
support confirmed to me how misleading had been many of the Australian
Government’s statements of the previous two decades, implying that ANZUS
gave us an unqualified undertaking. Menzies had said: ‘Australia cannot stand
alone.’ The truth of the matter had always been that in some circumstances, or
for some testing period, Australian combat forces would stand alone. Some
advisers, including myself, believed the Government should say as much. But
the expediency of presenting the Coalition as the assurance of security for
Australia, while it claimed that the Labor Party was distrusted in Washington,
meant that such candour would be rejected as ‘downgrading’ ANZUS—a phrase
frequently used.
When the Government told us in 1972 to prepare a White Paper on defence,
we saw an opportunity to present new ideas and a more realistic view of what
we needed to do for ourselves in response to the kind of threat-level then
foreseeable.
The Department’s 1972 ‘Defence Review’: New ideas
Preparation of the White Paper required many contributors. R.N. Hamilton and
Gordon Blakers, along with contributors from Foreign Affairs, did most of the
drafting. I personally put my stamp on it by incorporating ideas that had matured
in my mind over the years, some of which I described earlier. One of these was
to obtain a changed expression of national attitude in statements of our strategic
outlook. I wanted to have self-reliance recognised as having a necessary place
in the posture of an independent self-respecting country. While in later decades
the concept became regularly used in the language of all political parties, I believe
I was the first to make it part of the language of discussion. Much defence policy
lies in the mind; and what may seem no more than a slogan can be made a
powerful directing influence on more material matters.
In a talk with the editor of a Sydney periodical [Donald Horne of the Bulletin],
I tried out the idea that this concept might provide an escape from the sterile
political argument between ‘forward’ and ‘continental’ defence.24  I had noticed
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that Gorton had gone in that direction in a speech several months earlier. Each
of the political parties had adopted one of the two concepts and the result had
been an anaesthetising effect on discussion as to what best served Australia.
‘Self-reliance’ had an emotive resonance for people who took pride in the history
and legends of the sturdy individualism of the country’s early settlers and in
past military campaigns—all of which shaped the ethos of the nation. We
peppered our paper with references to self-reliance. It was the nearest I ever got
to launching a political idea that might detach Australian policy statements from
the degree of public dependence on the United States that had been expressed
since 1950. Slogan or not, it would give defence planners something to replace
the loose guidance calling for interoperability with the forces of our chief
protector as the major objective. The draftsmen gave their draft a nationalist
tone without unrealistically disassociating us from allies, declaring the protection
of Australian interests (not simply the continent) to be the supreme objective of
defence planning. On the stationing of forces overseas—a subject of sharp
political debate—we wanted the Government’s paper to recite some of the
conditions which had to exist to permit maintenance of the deployment. The
review suggested that deployment needed to satisfy the interests of both
countries, which might not continue to be the case. Moreover the document
could serve another purpose, which was to demonstrate the significance of
distance, whether in estimating a threat or calculating the practicalities of
deploying to meet it. There had long been imprecision as to what were the
boundaries of ‘our region’, a term so frequently used in External Affairs and by
Ministers.
One of my fetishes in the Defence Department was to have maps of Australia
in plain view during discussions to show how remote we were from the mainland
of Southeast Asia. The other side of that coin was the illustration of just how
much distance separated our major defence bases in southern Australia from the
area of assumed threat, even after the move northward had begun to take effect.
The inclusion in the Defence Review of a map illustrating the distances in the
continent’s environment was in no sense an academic exercise.
Distance meant different things to different Services. In a pre-Vietnam War
presentation in 1963 by the then Minister of how the Services saw their roles,
the Air Force seemed to have recognised the constraints of distance, most of its
airfields and maintenance facilities being in the south of the continent. Its primary
function, the statement said, was ‘the security of Australian territory and its sea
and air approaches but with mobility to operate in Southeast Asia’. The Navy
was unconstrained by distance so long as it had blue-water capabilities. It said
its role ‘was preparation for any kind of war in which Australia could be
involved’ and ‘protection of convoys to the operational area wherever it may
be’—Delphic but logical and a case for a blue-water navy until it was told
otherwise. That came later when the Government declared a need for coastal
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protection in brown water by patrol boats. This revealed the paucity of ports
and facilities in the north of Australia. For the Army, distance had always been
a constraint when called on by governments to operate at a far distance (Japan,
Korea, Vietnam and Malaysia), because of the paucity of means of transport for
men and materiel.
Another powerful influence on the make-up of defence preparation was the
immediacy (as distinct from the location) of the threat which the Government
recognised and to which it expected the Services to respond. A threat would
naturally cause the Services to ask for more resources; and experience showed
that a more likely consequence, after governments predictably declined to do
so, would be to absorb more of the Defence vote on stores and stockpiles and
other consumables at the expense of capital assets in the form of equipment and
ground installations for use in future contingencies. The current trend in the
disposition of defence money led us to draw attention to this requirement of
sound planning.25 The new Five Year Defence Programme revealed that there
would be inescapable expenditures in the future as obsolescence overtook major
items (such as destroyers and aircraft), and illustrated the need to avoid cuts in
current capital spending that would result in an overload on future budgets.
On the central question as to where our essential strategic interest lay, we
pointed to the prospect of governments in Southeast Asia becoming more capable
of dealing with their insurgencies and any likely defence problem. We
recommended a changed strategic focus to one closer to our own territory. In
this we were, I believe, tacitly acknowledging the past unwillingness of
governments to have a defence vote big enough to enable us to project significant
forces far from Australia. We argued for having capabilities ‘which are
particularly suitable to meet conditions in an ocean and archipelago environment’.
This geographic definition would be a calculated retreat from giving priority to
the Asian mainland to giving priority to an area containing the uncertainties
that existed over Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The argument had obvious
implications for the Air Force and the Navy, giving them priority over the Army
but weakening the case for a blue-water fleet based on a carrier, as compared
with other naval vessels. The Army’s Chief had difficulty in accepting the
priority.
After its finalisation, the Prime Minister threw the status of the document
into confusion by deciding against presenting it as a White Paper expressing
Government policy, and instead declaring it to be a Departmental ‘Review’.
When Fairbairn presented it to Parliament, his speech accepted the idea of greater
self-reliance. He was probably thinking of hardware rather than attitude. He
was more equivocal on the question of retaining forces overseas.
In effect, the Department was lumbered with responsibility for a hybrid—a
document that included views we knew the Government would want to include
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which we did not share, and an analysis of the desirable strategic posture that
failed to receive government endorsement. We were chided by the Opposition
for being ‘political’ in our advice. Nevertheless, the Labor Opposition (and
specifically a future Prime Minister, Paul Keating) gave much of the ‘Review’ a
tick of approval. From the backbench Gorton liked the attempt to remove the
artificial dichotomy between ‘forward’ and ‘continental’ defence.
McMahon’s caution might well have been for fear of devil in the detail. In
retrospect I believe I made an error in allowing the document to include every
new idea that the Department felt to be important. It became an indigestible
document for Ministers. I doubt whether the document had any lasting influence
on members of the Coalition Cabinet or of its backbench. Domestically, it did
disseminate ideas within the Services and the Department that might have
influenced Service priorities. But this can only be speculation.
The ‘Review’ has not received much attention by historians or by
commentators on the defence policies of the 1970s, but those interested in the
evolution of thinking in Canberra’s advisory system will recognise that much
of the document presaged reforms later implemented in the Whitlam/Barnard
years. Herein may lie the reason why, as we shall see, Labor, when taking office
in 1972, found the Department well prepared to implement its policies.
While preparing the intended White Paper, we found that Fairbairn was
more comfortable in discussing Service bids for equipment than in more abstract
reasoning over the strategic outlook. In this there was a contrast with the visiting
Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt.
Fortuitously, as a result of an unexpected commitment in the House of
Representatives which prevented Fairbairn keeping an appointment with him,
I was called upon to receive Schmidt. I called together the members of the Defence
Committee (the Service Chiefs and the Secretaries of the Departments of the
Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs and Treasury). It proved to be a most stimulating
experience. Schmidt gave us his view of the state of Europe and of the Western
alliance in the stand-off with the Soviet Union. He asked all the right questions
after I offered my view of the situation in Northeast Asia and, more confidently,
the prospects in Southeast Asia and in Australia’s neighbourhood. We were
privileged because Schmidt later became Chancellor of the German Federation
and earned the reputation of being foremost among the European statesmen of
modern times.
It was the more regrettable that Fairbairn fluffed his opportunity, when
toasting him at an official dinner, by making lame jokes about the Iron Cross on
his visitor’s aircraft and the superfluity of a party in a democracy having to
proclaim the word ‘democratic’ in the title of his political party. Schmidt replied
with an urbane account of the honourable history of his party in outlasting three
dictators (including Adolf Hitler).
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Attention to ongoing matters for decision did not wait on the outcome of the
Defence Review. Decisions were needed on the acquisition of a new type of
destroyer for the Navy and on the development of a naval base at Garden Island,
south of Fremantle. There was a strong push from the Navy’s designers and
dockyards within the system to have the destroyer’s hull designed and built in
Australia. As the Navy intended to incorporate from overseas the most modern
(and changing) sensors, weapons and control systems, there were warnings that
matching them with the hull would be a formidable and perhaps insuperable
task. Nevertheless, the plan received Defence Committee endorsement. I did not
feel I had the necessary understanding of the subject to deny what the Navy
wanted. As time passed, the problems grew, the list of requirements grew, the
size of the hull grew, and so did the estimates of cost.
During the year I took opportunities to escape Canberra and to learn about
Service life, albeit in pampered and peaceful conditions. In March the Navy
winched me down to HMAS Brisbane’s after-deck from a helicopter at sea during
a Pacific Ocean exercise, enabling me to observe a Tartar missile firing. They
then tested my nerves with a jackstay transfer across the ocean waves to HMAS
Parramatta. In this my safety from being doused in the sea seemed to depend
on what the crew members, who were holding taut the hawser, thought of this
particular civilian.
Some time later the Army, during a visit to their training establishment at
Singleton, had me throwing grenades at targets, followed by an unscheduled
lesson in helicopter flying. On my return flight to Victoria Barracks the obliging
Army pilot offered me the controls, assuring me that his status as instructor
made this legal. I headed south erratically over the Central Coast aiming, on his
instruction, at the Sydney Harbour Bridge in a long descent. But the prospect
of disaster as we approached tall buildings beyond the bridge caused a collapse
of nerve and I asked to be relieved of my post.
The Services, particularly the Army, have a good record of preserving the
historic buildings they have occupied since colonial days. But there were eyesores
in the form of structures erected through necessity in environmentally sensitive
areas during the Second World War. At this time in the 1970s there was not
much interest in the environment among politicians. As a former Sydney-sider
I took a possibly parochial interest in Sydney Harbour. I visited several sites
where there were offending structures. I questioned whether the Army needed,
for any operational purpose, sites on headlands adjacent to the harbour in
Sydney; and in particular the wooden barracks resembling woolsheds disfiguring
a site of such historic importance as South Head. Having achieved their removal
I took a more sympathetic view of the Navy’s claim to be by the sea, but helped
ensure that when they were provided with an installation for advanced training
on South Head it would be secreted underground.
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In the same mood I had cast a speculative eye on the Navy’s ugly industrial
stockpile littering part of historic Garden Island. This was the forerunner of
some rehabilitation of historic buildings, which the Navy had preserved well.
When Labor was in office, soon afterwards, they transferred most of the materials
to an abandoned car factory at Zetland so that the Navy had quick access.
By October, the defeat of the Government in the forthcoming election was
widely predicted. There were many activities and international arrangements
needing to be carried on, irrespective of which political party was in power.
Few on Labor’s front bench had experience in government. Allies would need
reassurance that classified military information entrusted to Australia would be
protected. In the debate on the Defence Review, Lance Barnard, Labor’s Defence
spokesman, had declared his party’s opposition to foreign bases on Australian
soil, and their intention to withdraw from Singapore. I asked Fairbairn for
permission to meet Barnard in order to assure him that he would be fully briefed
on such matters immediately, should he gain office, and to advise him to hold
off definitive public commitments until he was in possession of all the relevant
information. I said there would be nothing prejudicial to the Coalition in anything
I said to Barnard.
Fairbairn was liberal-minded and forthcoming in response. In a discussion
with Barnard over lunch at Parliament House I told him that we would be ready
with information if elected. He told me of various policy changes that Labor had
in mind. One of them was to centralise the Defence Group of Departments along
with their control. I said that he would find that I had some definite views on
that subject to offer him.
In November, on the recommendation of Coombs, I attended a seminar at
Ditchley in England, held by an Atlantic club interested in international affairs.
There was a mixture of senior American and British officials, academics of both
countries, and members of the Armed Services Committee of Congress and the
White House staff. Outside the meeting the Director of the Royal College of
Defence Studies, Alistair Buchan, told me that the shift of British interest towards
Europe was increasing the competition for places at the college from Europeans
and reducing the interest in the strategic significance of Australia’s
neighbourhood, with implications for the number of places offered to Australia.
He believed we should create our own Defence Studies College.
Final months of McMahon’s Coalition Government
It became clear as the months went by that the McMahon Government had
become hostage to its doctrinal attachment to ‘forward defence’ and to the
associated deployments in Malaysia and Singapore. This was exploited by the
Democratic Labor Party in particular, but also by an opportunistic Singapore
Government. That Government had earlier demanded rent for premises occupied
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by the Australians sent to defend them, as well as reciprocal use of bases in
Australia. When McMahon visited the two countries in June 1972, with an
election imminent, his mind remained in Australia. His principal interest seemed
to be to obtain a public affirmation, from his hosts, for use with the Australian
media who accompanied him in the aircraft and others back in Australia, that
both countries wanted our forces for the present. He seemed a rattled man. He
stumbled repeatedly while recording an interview for a Sydney radio station,
with John Bunting (the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department) and I
doing our best to point out his misstatements of facts or policy. He was
good-natured to his advisers and did not mind being corrected.
During the return flight, while the Prime Minister spent time at the back of
the aircraft with the media, I recorded in my diary:
Australia is now governed in almost continuous press conference. No
discussion of substance about the purpose or consequences on a matter
of foreign policy or external defence in this part of the world seems
possible without reference to how the press in Australia will react.
McMahon was like a bird hopping from branch to branch over a loaded gun.
He was invariably considerate to me. We met informally on occasions. I often
met Ministers at funerals burying their departed colleagues. On such an occasion,
and others, McMahon said he regretted being outwitted (‘kept in the dark’, as
he put it) in his wish to appoint me as Secretary when he had the Foreign Affairs
portfolio. But I could not honestly reciprocate his admiration.
In my area of administration there was drift and frustration. On 27 October
I entered in my diary:
The past week has seen some cases of an unnecessarily large number of
senior executives—in our case two Generals and myself—pursuing
enquiries or waiting about while more urgent problems burned because
of a … lack of a sense of the importance of things, the addiction to trivia,
and the plain confusion of mind which fails to communicate promptly
and clearly.
I suggested to Fairbairn that he should move to establish a review of the
organisation of the Defence Group of Ministers and Departments. Not
surprisingly, he said that McMahon would not want to open up such a
controversial matter. After Labor’s victory was announced on the night of
Saturday 2 December 1972, I obtained Fairbairn’s approval to give Barnard his
classified briefing at his earliest convenience. Even though uncertain as to the
policies I would be implementing (if still in the job), I recorded in my diary my
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Within hours of the announcement on Saturday 2 December 1972 of Labor’s
majority in the House of Representatives, I spoke by telephone to my new
Minister, Lance Barnard, in Launceston. He said he wanted me to continue in
office to assist him. Whitlam arranged with the Governor-General that he and
Barnard would share between them all the portfolios as a temporary measure
pending the Senate results, which would enable a full caucus to be formed to
elect the full Ministry.
In contrast with the vacuum in policy-making and the politically defensive
attention to trivia that had characterised the last months of the McMahon
Government, Labor deluged us with policy objectives and organisational changes.
In the first weeks the auspices were good for someone in Defence wanting to
serve the new Government’s policy with enthusiasm. I believed that I understood
their central defence policies, some of which I had long been advocating to their
predecessors with little success. But I could not know Labor’s intentions, as
distinct from rhetoric, in respect of the American connection. I was uncertain
as to how the Ministers in office would handle publicly declared policies of
disclosing, or possibly terminating, the activities of the United States in the
facilities shared with Australia at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. I hoped to dissuade
the Ministers from either course when they were given the facts to which, under
the strict rules that had been established by previous governments, they had
not been made privy when in Opposition.
Having spent Sunday looking over papers prepared on various changes
predicted by Labor, I took them to Barnard in Parliament House on Monday.
Shortly afterwards Whitlam joined the discussion, which picked up some matters
from my meeting with Barnard in October. Both declared that they would look
to me to help achieve Labor’s priorities.
In that first meeting the Ministers said they wanted the Service Departments
abolished and the Services put under the control of the Defence Minister. Without
any prompting the Prime Minister said he wanted me to use my authority to
achieve this for the Minister. My diary records that in the conversation Barnard
said he wanted to strengthen the role of civilian advice. When he went on to
say that he wanted to delegate more to the Department I counselled caution,
because there would be sensitivities in the Services.
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It was the beginning of a very busy three months. In my area of interest the
Government was encouraging and forward-looking. In that first week I was
given more policy directions than in the 21 months since Fraser had left the
Gorton Government. I (and other senior officers in Defence) did not suffer the
debilitating distrust of some of Whitlam’s Ministers towards their Departments.
Although Whitlam was giving most attention to foreign policy changes of a
declaratory nature that did not require approval by Cabinet or Parliament,
neither of which had yet met, he also spent time on Defence matters because of
the interconnection. He called me in on several occasions to hear progress.
In response to the stated intention of the two Ministers to reform the
fragmented Defence system, I had recommended that, before legislation could
be prepared for a merger after a necessary inquiry, Barnard should be given all
three Service portfolios. I also said he should continue to hold them after a new
Ministry had been formed because, if other Ministers were appointed, his
continued control of the Services would be lost.
Due to the workload, I recommended that the Supply Department be placed
pro tem under another Minister, with whom Defence could rely on continued
good cooperation. However, on this aspect Barnard thought otherwise, citing
his interest in controlling the Defence factories and their large workforce.
Other matters requiring urgent attention were the cessation of National
Service, and the notification to allies of the intended withdrawal of ground forces
from Asia. Various senior officers were involved in these tasks, particularly the
Secretary of the Army Department, the experienced Bruce White, and one of
my deputies, Eric Dwyer. To inform Whitlam without delay of the nature and
purpose of the joint facilities in which the Americans were involved fell to me,
assisted by the Chief Defence Scientist, Dr John L. Farrands, who could speak
with authority on the operations. Almost two hours were spent answering the
Prime Minister’s questions. We stated our view of the global importance of their
activities, given the then state of relations between the Soviet Union and the
Western allies, as well as their other beneficial capabilities.
These various encounters with the country’s new leaders led me to confide
to my diary some enthusiastic sentiments about the prospects of ‘changes to
come, ideas, constructive ideas, attacks on some myths behind which shoddy
ideas and careerism have been sheltered by conservative Ministers and the active
backbench’. These bottled-up sentiments, expressed in the purple prose that
comes naturally late at night after an exhausting day, did not spring from any
partisan adherence on my part to the Labor side of politics. Working at different
levels under the Curtin, Chifley, Menzies, Gorton and McMahon Governments,




My enthusiasm for the new regime was soon tempered when we experienced
in the first months the lack of concerns for confidentiality, rejection of the system
of security clearances, undisciplined public trespass by Ministers outside their
portfolio, and unwillingness or inability to control free-ranging Ministerial staff.
Labor’s reforms had to be fitted into the ongoing management of the Services,
and satisfaction of the daily requirements which do not wait upon changes of
government. Barnard had to cope with a deluge of decisions, while fending off
attacks on him from Labor’s left. He had still to absorb the content of the current
year’s defence programme and the forward projections into which any changes
would have to be fitted. We had to caution him against making changes in a
hurry before the consequences were understood—for example, acquiring new
fighter aircraft while the Mirages were still serviceable. There were election
promises that had to be implemented, such as the improved pay and conditions
recommended by Justice Woodward, along with some welcome industrial
principles for deciding these matters.
We felt ourselves fortunate to have an industrious and congenial Minister,
who sought advice from civilian and Service officers and who refrained from
premature announcements of decisions affecting Australia’s allies. This contrasted
with the actions of some of his colleagues, who were addressing démarches to
foreign ambassadors or publishing denunciations in language offensive to
American leaders. On 30 December I remarked in my diary (in mixed metaphors)
that ‘men unused to power flex their muscles, and crow like victorious cocks’.
Moreover, after we gave our sobering advice the Defence vote was spared the
spending frenzy spreading elsewhere, in the absence of Parliament and of any
effective Treasurer’s control. As my diary recorded: ‘“Come and get it” is ringing
out of Ministerial offices.’
Principles of pay-fixing got short shrift from some Ministers as they demanded
high salaries for personal staff. At the same time the salaries of all departmental
Secretaries were put on the same levels, presumably reflecting the demand for
equality among Ministers. We had the bizarre result of the Secretary to the
Treasury and the Secretary of Defence receiving the same pay as the Secretary
of the new and insignificant Department of the Media.
To bring about many of the changes, I handed responsibility to other senior
officers. Their numbers were not large. They had assistance from the Joint
Military Staff under Rear Admiral Bill Dovers. Manpower decisions were handled
by a deputy secretary, Eric Dwyer (who had been brought in earlier from the
Public Service Board) and by the three members of the Service Boards responsible
for personnel. Farrands (who later was to be appointed head of a Department of
his own) was put in charge of preparation for negotiating changes at the
US–Australian joint facilities. Financial programming under our unique ‘rolling’
system was in the hands of Matt Hyland. His task was to devise an integrated
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system applicable after the separate Departments had been abolished. Intelligence
assessments for the new strategic review were provided by Gordon Jockel,
formerly a senior Foreign Affairs officer. He was aided by Paul Dibb who, a
decade later, was to make a major impact on the force structure under Minister
Kim Beazley.
I retained for myself the last word on the new strategic assessments for the
Government and in addition, in consultation with the Chairman of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee, Admiral Sir Victor Smith, coordinated what was being served
up to Barnard.
Various international discussions also fell to me as early as the last week
before Christmas 1972 when Whitlam included me in his visit to New Zealand
to meet their new Labour Prime Minister, Norman Kirk. That journey had an
unintended consequence. Over the Tasman Sea, the Air Force’s BAC-111 lost
one of its two engines with a ruptured turbine. We limped slowly back to
Fairbairn. During the silence in the cabin that followed the ominous jolt that
shook the aircraft, when I and others were silently studying the height of the
waves not far below, our ex-Air Force Prime Minister seemed to be enjoying
himself, making quips up and down the cabin. It was later decreed that the
hazard to Ministers of trans-oceanic flights called for a four-engined Boeing 707
for the VIP flight. Its purchase was grafted on to the Defence programme,
although it had no combat priority.
One task that I could not delegate was planning the review that I was to
conduct into how best to integrate the Service Departments into Defence, along
with the defence industries and science laboratories, to give the Minister for
Defence effective control over the Services.
Consultations and plans for merging five Departments
In January 1973 I began preparing material for the announcement to be made
by the Government as soon as Parliament met in late February. In addition, I
needed riding instructions, in the form of terms of reference for the inquiry into
the desired integration.
To gain support for Labor’s intention Whitlam wished to publish the 1958
report of the Morshead Committee to the Menzies Government, which Labor
believed had much the same objective as theirs in 1973. This led to a somewhat
arcane discussion with the Cabinet Secretary, John Bunting, who explained the
convention against Ministers being given access to the Cabinet records of its
predecessor. Was the report a Cabinet document or not? Whatever the answer,
Whitlam, with his sense of propriety, decided to obtain the approval of the
Leader of the Opposition once he had been chosen.
The Government announced its defence reorganisation intentions in a
statement made by Barnard (conjointly with the Prime Minister) on 19 December,
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only days after taking office. The statement of some 2000 words, which I had
drafted, incorporated the Government’s intention to spread the workload by
appointing a person having Ministerial status in another portfolio as Minister
Assisting the Minister for Defence (a course that I recommended). This clumsy
and not wholly effective device to bring the load on a Minister to manageable
proportions had been used by the Menzies Government in 1960 (on my advice
on that occasion as well). Legal opinion had warned that the appointment within
a portfolio of a second Minister enjoying emoluments might be found to be
unconstitutional, in breach of Section 64 of the Constitution, with severe penalties
under Section 44 (iv) for the Member of Parliament so appointed.
Barnard’s press statement contained, in effect, the terms of reference that I
wanted. It is publicly available, both in Hansard and in the Tange Report, and
need not be reproduced here. In drafting it for the Minister I thought that he
should, for several reasons, confine himself to broad objectives, avoiding
precision about detailed organisation. Obviously any conclusions I might reach
would have to follow consultation with those already experienced in the daily
management of the activities of the Services and in the satisfaction of the essential
requirements of each Service (and they differed).
Unlike defence policy-making, this had not been the function of my
Department. Because the Services had the constant requirement of a steady
morale in meeting current and potential deployment demands, they needed
assurance that arbitrary solutions would not be imposed on them by a new and
unfamiliar Labor Government, and that consultations would be real. Politically,
the Government would need to safeguard itself in Parliament on these points.
The stated objectives were the creation of a single Department containing
the staff of Defence and the Service Departments (the Department of Supply
being left for further study, which accorded with my own request). The statement
said each Service would retain its own identity and exercise substantial delegation
of authority; some areas under single-Service control would be transferred into
central functional management in the Department; there was to be more effective
central military control of operations and related military activity; and there
was to be improved presentation to Parliament of the contribution made to
Defence by the activities of the Services, and their cost. In later years, as other
agencies developed programming of the kind pioneered in Defence, this was to
be labelled measurement of ‘output’.
As the Ministers had accepted my draft, the words identified virtually
everything that I had found deficient in the system in the previous three years.
Approval by the new Government was encouraging and established a political
signpost to the future.
How the statement was received in the Services I would learn only later.
With their minds occupied with the redeployments and force reductions (in the
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Army), along with the daily tasks of the units and formations around the country
and abroad, including Vietnam, there was likely to be less attention than we
gave it in the Department of Defence.
To start the process I called together the three Service Departmental
Secretaries. They were Sam Landau (Navy), Bruce White (Army) and Fred Green
(Air). I spent several weeks meeting them from time to time and seeking their
views on the shape of the future. I wanted to know how they functioned in
relation to their two-star colleagues in the Service Boards and much else, before
meeting with the Service Chiefs.
I did not expect that the Government would want the inquiry to examine
the command structures of the Services at the operational level, below the boards
to which the Departmental Secretaries belonged. This would in any case have
been outside my experience and competence.
Strategy for making the changes
Early in my consultations the Services had asked whether I would follow the
experience of other countries. Apart from great disparities in size, I reacted
firmly against this familiar lack of confidence in the ability of Australians to
create machinery relevant to their own constitutional situation without running
for tutelage from the mother country or any other. In any case the failure of the
British to reform their system was attested to by a former Secretary of State for
Defence and later Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. It seemed that we had
already made all Britain’s mistakes.
In his book At the End of the Day, Macmillan said:
The Act of Parliament which established the Ministry of Defence after
the war clothed the Minister with doubtful authority and gave him
insufficient means to fulfil even the functions which he was supposed
to carry out.
The similarity in Australia was striking when he wrote:
Their Lordships of the Admiralty, with their hierarchy of Admirals under
the First Sea Lord; the War Office with its Secretary of State and Army
Council; even the later-created Air Ministry again with its Secretary of
State—it was in these historic bodies that rested the real, practical control.
Moreover, the responsibility of their political heads to Parliament had
scarcely been altered by the emergence of the Minister of Defence.
When he became Prime Minister, Macmillan was still frustrated. In 1957 he
suggested to his Defence Minister, Duncan Sandys, the creation of a single
integrated Defence Department. ‘All through the spring of 1958 there was a kind
of smouldering fire in Whitehall.’ When a White Paper emerged in 1958 four
separate Ministers remained. A Chief of Defence Staff was created, but on the
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basis that ‘he was to have no control of his own’. Australia seems to have followed
this course. In 1962 and 1963 Macmillan tried again. In 1964 a reorganisation
established ‘the principle’ of functional organisations serving all three Services.
But, on my observation years later, practice was different. His frustration led
Macmillan to say in 1963: ‘If we have to decide between two possible courses
of action we must always choose the more radical.’
As I said earlier, I decided that gradualism rather than radical change was
better for a new and inexperienced Labor Government. Others might think that
the political judgement of the Prime Minister of Britain was better than mine. I
do not remember any cries for swifter change when I was preparing my report.
But there was plenty of opposition to the content of the changes.
Another British Minister, Alan Clark, had said publicly that in considering
proposals that came to him for decisions on new weapons acquisitions, he would
consider first to what extent approval would further the career of the applicant.
I began with a less cynical view of the motives at work in our Services. But I
wanted a system of testing that went wider than the operational preferences of
the applicant Service.
Defining the general objectives was relatively easy; but a replacement
organisation had to be one that could be worked cooperatively and efficiently
by Service personnel accustomed to procedures unique to each Service wherever
located throughout Australia and at overseas bases.
Gradualism would be needed to avoid any sharp break in the operational
state of the Navy, Army and Air Force. It would not be possible to foresee every
possible hitch, psychological or otherwise, that would affect the working together
of the senior personnel of the three Services in their support of the operational
commands. There would be a testing period for the acceptance by some of new
lines of authority, and acquiescence in new sources of material support. It would
be prudent to leave some areas untouched, at least for the present. Rather than
looking for complete solutions to be handed down from above (or from outside
as many in the Services might see the Defence Department), the better approach
would be, in my judgement, to create new organisations in the Department,
covering clustered functions, where rationalisation would become a
self-generating process.
The work of the advisers, then and later, was essential to the reorganisation.
We did not always agree. White, who knew the military way of looking at things
better than I, warned me against, as he put it, ‘opening war on too many fronts
at once’. But, personal conviction apart, I had been given a deadline for satisfying
a somewhat impetuous government’s demand.
As to that, I had to make a judgement as to how far the Whitlam Ministers
and Caucus would stand up to resistance that could be expected to any change
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I might recommend. I could foresee the kind of opposition that some changes
would draw from a core of members of Parliament likely to oppose any changes,
particularly by a Labor Government; from the Returned and Services League,
from the conservative press (fed by the disgruntled), and from the many who
held a sceptical view of the competence of public servants, particularly if the
much admired Services were to be made beholden to them in some respect. I
would be under the disadvantage, on that emotional issue, of the seeming lack
of awareness among them of the extent to which a conservative Menzies
Government had in 1958 already endorsed the essential place of civilian
Secretaries as one reason for rejecting the then proposal to abolish the Service
Boards. Indeed, the same unawareness of the accepted role of civilians existed
within the Services themselves, especially among personnel who were located
at some distance from Russell in Canberra.
The task, essentially, was to find a form of public administration that would
effectively support the military forces acting under Ministerial control in
conformity with Government policy and under scrutiny of the amount and
purpose of expenditures they incurred or committed for the future. I was not
asked to share with any military officer the management of the inquiry, and still
less that I carry the weight of a committee of three arguing about what areas I
should or should not explore in an exercise in public administration in which I
had accumulated some experience. I was simultaneously guiding an inexperienced
Minister through plentiful problems and recurring crises.
I needed advisers who understood the constitutional and administrative
principles to be embedded in the reformed system of Ministerial control. I
arranged that I be assisted full time by Bruce White, whom I considered to be
the most competent as well as the most experienced of the three Service
Departmental Secretaries.
Abolition of the Service Boards: Reasons
Integration of control of policy into Defence was not possible if the Service
Boards remained with the legal powers they possessed. Nor would it be possible
to give effective command of the Services to the senior military officer so long
as the legal authority of the Chiefs of Staff within each Service differed. In the
Navy, executive command rested in the Naval Board and not with the Chief of
Naval Staff. In the Army Department the Minister presided over the subordinate
generals who were members of the Board. Since it is axiomatic that Ministerial
decisions necessarily embrace some considerations that are never revealed—such
as party considerations, electoral advantage, trade-offs within the Government
and doubtless much else—the Army Minister adopted the device of absenting
himself if he foresaw that a Board item was likely to be submitted to Cabinet.
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Furthermore, the functions of some Board members would be lost, wholly or
in part, to whatever new directors of common Service functions were set up in
the reformed Defence Department, in accordance with the guiding principles.
As to accountability, the dispersion of authority among the 15 two-star officers
and their three three-star Chiefs made it difficult to establish precisely who was
accountable to the Minister for actions (or lack of them) in the Service. This was
important when things went wrong. Not the least challenge would be the
disappearance from the Board, after his Department was abolished, of the civilian
carrying the traditional and legal powers of a Departmental Secretary. What
would be necessary was to ‘boil down’, into a single formula applicable to all
three Services, the existing relationships of Service officers and Secretaries.
Much of my discussion with White, Landau and Green was directed to this idea
and to the practicalities involved.
All the Secretaries agreed that continuing three separate systems of controlling
expenditures and financial commitments, as required by the Audit Act and
financial regulations, had to be rejected. In April I had set up a more formal
system of consultation in the form of a Senior Consultative Committee, provided
with investigating staff, to advise me. Bruce White was its leader. The Service
Departmental Secretaries were charged with keeping the Chiefs of Staff informed
on where the inquiry was going. By September several sticking points emerged.
Direct discussion—The Secretary and four Service Chiefs:
Conclusions reached
While the Committee continued to meet—in about 17 meetings in all—I decided
I should sit down with the four Chiefs and deal with them directly. My report
describes the main matters that arose. In my discussions I gave way on some
matters recommended to us. An example was the idea of moving the Service
Chiefs of personnel into the Defence Department.
It was surprising that (as far as I recall) the Chiefs did not challenge my
intention to continue to keep strategic assessments under departmental control;
nor my intention to have departmental control of the staff examining Service
equipment and manpower bids, to ensure their conformity to strategic need and
to a balanced force structure. The challenge on the second was to build up and
remain continuous, as I shall later record.
All the Chiefs had the right to go to the Minister with any complaints; as far
as I know none did. It was helpful to me that my colleague as Chairman of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Smith, was trusted by Barnard. I surmise
that the absence of any complaint from him would have been reassuring to
Barnard that Service interests were properly considered.
For the Chiefs a major recommendation, with which they all concurred, was
that the chief military officer in the Department of Defence (already of superior
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rank) be given for the first time legal power of command over the three Services,
while providing that the Chief of Staff of each Service would be responsible to
the Minister ‘through’ the renamed Chief of Defence Force Staff. The
single-Service Chief would be acknowledged as ‘the professional head of his
Service’ and have command of it, subject to certain stipulations.
I took the opportunity to employ symbolism to reflect the concept that a
common purpose must govern the activities of the three Services. I restored to
usage the compendious title ‘Australian Defence Force’ which the 1915 Defence
Act had declared to be composed of ‘three arms’. Fraser’s 1970 statement, for
example, had not once used the term. In due course (after my time) the
commander had his title changed to the unambiguous ‘Chief of the Defence
Force’.
With the Department now planned to contain a commander of all the Services,
and the Service Departments and the Service Boards to be abolished, the three
Departmental Secretaries (or Chief Officers) would disappear likewise. The Audit
Act, and the many regulations stipulating financial controls, called for substitute
appointments. The history of Defence administration and the known views of
governments from both sides of politics clearly required that the function be
vested in the sole remaining First Division public servant—the Secretary of the
Department of Defence.
Whereas in each Service Board this officer operated in conjunction with a
three-star Service Chief and four or five officers at two-star level, I had to propose
an arrangement for relations between two individuals to share the administration
of the Defence Force. Some questions of principle had to be disposed of. I had
no hesitation in riding off course the idea that had previously surfaced in the
Army of having the Chief of Defence Force Staff solely responsible for
representing the Department to the Minister, converting a Department of State
into a de facto military headquarters.
But the Secretary could no longer have his powers and duties identical with
those of civilian Departments under the Public Service Act. Behind these
organisational challenges lay some deep-seated tensions in some areas between
civilians and Service officers carrying out their respective duties. I needed to
recognise this in proposing the new administrative arrangements—a subject to
which I shall return later.
In the discussions some Chiefs were more constructive (whether in support
or in criticism) than others. One I went to see privately in his office to remind
him that the Government’s call for reforms in the system called for ideas and
cooperation from him no less than from me.
Discussion gradually reduced the areas in contention. The Chiefs were
reluctant to accept abolition of the Service Boards, even though achieving a
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commander of the Defence Force with access to the Defence Minister. I held to
the view, already explained above, that their existence would be inconsistent
with the new line of command and, in addition, obscured accountability. Most
accepted the idea when they were reassured that there would be no objection
to their setting up their own advisory committees, when the Chief assumed
direct responsibility for activities previously controlled by their two-star officers
and for which they had been accountable to the Service Board.
There were reservations (particularly from the Air Force) about my concept
of some Service officers being appointed to serve under the Secretary in policy
positions in a ‘two-hatted’ arrangement—responsible to the Secretary in respect
of financial and other policy directions, and to his Service Chief in respect of
his operational priorities. One example I proposed was in the area of supply.
Another concerned the construction activities of the Services in their bases,
ports, airfields and training establishments. I argued that being answerable to
two persons was already a fact in the Services. Other issues debated are recorded
in the Tange Report.
With the disappearance of the Service Departmental Secretaries, it would be
necessary to establish the relationship between the Chief of Defence Force Staff
and the Secretary of the Defence Department, both housed together and
responsible to the Minister. My proposal was
that the Government distribute elsewhere the powers of the Boards
(including the power of administration of the Services and executive
command in the case of the Navy), thus permitting abolition of the
Boards. This can be done by the Minister for Defence retaining most of
the powers and functions given to the Service Boards by statute,
regulation or directive; and by delegating some of them through two
principal streams, one military and one civilian in the Department of
Defence. The powers pertaining to command, discipline and personnel
management of the Navy, Army and Air Force should be vested in a
Chief of Defence Force Staff and associated senior officers—whether
solely or collectively as may be appropriate.
The ‘two streams’ of administrative control became, when incorporated in
legislation in 1975, the so-called ‘diarchy’ at the centre of the organisation under
the Minister. As I shall show, it lived through opposition and misunderstanding,
and it administered the newly resurrected ‘Defence Force’ through several
decades that followed. At the time of writing, several modifications have since
been made by Coalition Ministers.
My conception of the way the system would work was that practices in the
relationship would vary according to the actual content of matters arising for
decision or report to the Minister. They could be predominantly military (such
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as satisfying training or morale concerns); or predominantly financial (such as
purchasing or contracting practices). One or the other of the two officers would
act, in effect, as primus inter pares, by taking the lead in formulating the decision,
with the other invited to concur.
Personalities would affect the relationship, as they always had done in past
associations among those sharing authority. It would be for Ministers to take
this into account when selecting individuals for appointment to the two offices.
I recognised that the obligation on the Secretary to support the Services
needed to be confirmed. It would not be sufficient to rely on what new legislation
said. Legislation allots authority, but does not specify in what ways it is intended
to be used or not used. (This was later confirmed after reading the stark legalese
of the 1976 Defence Reorganisation Act.) I proposed that the Minister issue
directives to the Secretary stating the responsiveness expected of various parts
of the Public Service structure to meet the priorities of the Chiefs; and requiring
that duty statements reflect the duty. All integrated Service officers would
continue to be subject solely to their Chief in respect of discipline. The Chief of
Defence Force Staff would have his functions and responsibilities spelled out in
regulations.
I now turn to some observations on the general question of civilian–uniform
relations in our defence system.
Civilians and Service Officers: Their relative authority
My experiences in earlier years, as already described, indicated to me that the
role of civilians would be an issue underlying the response of the Chiefs to my
proposals. It is not that attitudes to civilians were identical. The Navy followed
the historical Royal Navy tradition of trusting civilians to look after their finances
and help in the processes of accountability to Minister and Parliament. The Air
Force had few hang-ups about using civilians in subordinate positions on the
ground, but subject to an attitude shared with the Navy. That was that civilians
should not intrude into specifying what ships, aircraft and weapons systems,
and in what numbers, they set out to acquire. I was aware that the Air Force
had cause for dissatisfaction with the inability of the civilians in the computer
services area of the Department to satisfy their need for reliable records on their
enormous inventory of stores.
The Army view of civilians (other than those in subordinate jobs in the
commands) was more combative towards civilians in analytical and
policy-advising positions—with an expansive view of the role to which Army
officers were entitled. Perhaps the explanation for these differences lies in the
milieu in which each operated. The possibility of civilians sharing sea-going or
flying duties does not arise. The Army administers supplies and personnel in
multiple locations throughout Australia and has relations with local authorities.
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I recall a good-natured exchange with my colleague (and friend) General A.L.
MacDonald, when I observed that the Army seemed to think they could do
anything that a civilian does. He replied amiably: ‘Yes! And they often do.’ This
reply omitted to say that each answers to a different authority, one of which is
Parliament through the chain of accountability.
The Army’s officer corps had the weight of numbers (as many as the other
two Services combined); and the advantages of an education system that produced
more liberally educated officers at tertiary level than did the other Services,
which specialised in engineering and technologies. Indeed there were some
officers who left the Army to become prominent scholars. Some Army officers
seemed to be less interested in principles of accountability than in the question
as to who would exercise the power of decision in any changed arrangements.
Historically, the strength of the Defence Department had, over and beyond its
once-a-year control of broad expenditure levels and its survey of major
equipment proposals, rested on whatever capability it had in reasoned argument.
The persuasive strength of this had not easily prevailed against resistance backed
by the legislative authority possessed by the Service Boards. Moreover, all
Services used unattributed backgrounding of sympathetic journalists to ventilate
their chagrin about Defence denials—a technique in public pressure that I was
not willing to use myself.
I expected this customary attitude to continue. Entrenched attitudes in
institutions are slow to change. Fairhall’s injunction ‘to think defence’ rather
than single-Service interests made slow progress in the Army in such matters
as accepting credible threat scenarios that foresaw maritime challenges rather
than those that justified Army claims for more manpower. This situation was
exacerbated, in my view, by the remarkable lack of understanding that I detected
in each Service about the needs and problems of the others.
An occasion arose for me to address Army attitudes in a Chief of the General
Staff Exercise (under Lieutenant General Sir Mervyn Brogan) in August 1973,
as I was heading towards making definite reform proposals. I opened my address
as follows: ‘What I want to do tonight is to promote some discussion on where
you and I fit into the scheme of things.’ I went on immediately to refer to the
service-civilian relationship, which had fundamental importance and yet, as I
said, ‘was subject to much prejudice, ignorance and a degree of ribaldry’. There
were differences in ethos or credo, in attitude to government, in work-style,
and in a willingness to explore the ramifications of complex subjects; ‘but the
differences are sometimes trivialised and vulgarised by civilians and Servicemen
alike’.
I also spoke of the grip on the Services of the experiences of the Second World
War, while parliamentary committees went back even further—five and a half
decades rather than three as a guide to equipping the Services. In speaking thus,
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I also paid respect to the great traditions of the Services that were embedded in
our national history.
On a more personal note, addressing the problems that the Department of
Defence continued to have, I condemned as a failure of courage that practice of
seeking approval from Defence of bids for technology suited to a superpower,
leaving it to civilian officials in the Defence Department to propose a more modest
and adequate alternative.
The Bulletin reported an indignant reaction: ‘That would be the most highly
offensive address I have listened to, said one General to another.’ A well-disposed
Major General, who did not share this indignation, later told me that the visiting
American Chief of Army had whispered to him: ‘This is war.’ Whether it would
have been more persuasive if it had been less challenging is a matter for
judgement. But, as I doubted whether much of what passed between the Secretary
and the Chief of the General Staff in our consultations went far into the rest of
the officer corps, an audience of so many senior officers had to be made use of
to create awareness of changes to come.
Ministerial acceptance of the Recommendations
My consultations drew to a close in late November 1973. With the deadline
imminent I was able to report that the several Chiefs ‘agreed that the organisation
is workable subject to reservations … recorded on certain points’ and, in the
case of the Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Naval Staff, subject to their reservations
being satisfied. We all agreed that experience might call for further changes. I
took the lukewarm endorsement by the Chiefs as sufficient to warrant
recommending the plan to the Minister. In early December, Barnard met with
the Chiefs (and me) to hear any objections they might have. Again the
preservation of Service Boards was raised, and I repeated the arguments about
inconsistency with the new structure. The Minister gained the approval of the
Foreign and Defence Committee of Cabinet, and subsequently of Cabinet itself,
with an exception concerning the Department of Supply.
The functions of the Department of Supply, extensive and employing a large
staff, had, in Barnard’s initiating statement, been left (as I had recommended)
for later study and decision. My report recommended that those activities central
to defence policy control (such as procurement, contracting of acquisitions and
related industry participation and the Scientific Service) be brought into Defence.
Management of government factories and other matters I considered optional,
though at risk of overloading the Minister if retained. Cabinet decided to put
the factories under a separate Minister. I surmised that direction of factories to
start producing in areas other than Defence was attractive to a socialist
government, and perhaps the unions.
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After release of the report, and in the flurry of public criticisms from various
directions, it emerged that the Chiefs did not carry all their dispersed regional
commanders with them. Some made public protests, the most prevalent being
the claim that ‘civilians have taken over’. I believe that not only did they not
understand the careful distribution of authority that had been drafted, but also
the already existing role and authority of the civilians in their own Service
Boards. Nor, in some cases, did they understand the established functions of the
Defence Department.
Only then did I recognise the limitations of relying on the Service command
system to inform subordinates, rather than to issue orders to them. I had wrongly
supposed that the careful explanations made during the top-level consultations
would be passed down the line. In the event it seemed to me that officers far
removed from Canberra, with no previous experience at the policy level in
Canberra, were being driven by what they read in the local newspapers and by
the rather jaundiced Australian view of public servants (whether state or federal).
The Department was not equipped to engage in a public information
programme. Eventually a team of officers from the three Services was sent to
explain the intended structure to personnel in the commands around the country.
Throughout my term as Secretary I had given addresses at training courses to
explain the role required of the Services to conform to the practices of responsible
government in a parliamentary democracy, as well as discharge their mission as
fighting forces. Given the normal rate of discharges from the Services on age
grounds, the impact was probably small. The weakness of understanding of
these matters led me earlier to arrange with the then Chief of the General Staff,
A. MacDonald, to incorporate some material of this kind in the Army’s staff
course for its majors. However, the solution required Service leadership from
the top.
Members of Parliament and others: Reactions in Parliament
and elsewhere—extent of command power
My proposal for the establishment of a number of committees containing
representatives of the Services and civilians from the Department came under
particular criticism. They were seen as time-wasting ways of frustrating decisions.
It was ironic that what I had intended as reassurance that decisions by, for
example, an officer of a particular Service, placed in charge of an area of policy,
would not be taken without consultation with another Service affected, would
be so misrepresented. I had in mind the longstanding rivalry (and occasional
outburst of antipathy) between the Air Force and the Navy that I had witnessed
in the past. In the event, I decided later that one or two committees were
superfluous and did not set them up.
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Probably the most extravagant public criticism came from Professor T.B.
Millar. Millar was a Duntroon graduate who had retired to academic life with
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. I doubt that he had had experience at the level
of Army policy-making and higher administration.
I do not recall any criticisms of my report from my former Minister, Malcolm
Fraser. In the Senate, doubts about the intrusion of civilians into command
decisions were taken up by the Opposition. Some were concerned about military
command being centralised and remote from the battlefield. Much was made of
past campaign experience (in which some Senators had been involved 25 years
earlier). The Minister did not give the obvious answer that the arrangements
left open the delegation of command.
The official definition of command issued by the Chairman of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee was as follows:
Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using
available [my emphasis] resources and for planning the employment of,
organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for
the accomplishment of assigned duties. It also includes responsibility
for the welfare, morale and discipline of personnel under command.
This was read by some as requiring unqualified control of resources needed
for military action. One simple fact tended to be overlooked by speakers on both
sides of the Parliament and by public commentators on the new organisation.
Military command cannot extend to resources that the military do not already
have. Yet much of policy activity in Defence, and control by the Defence
Department of commitments falling on future budgets, involve requests from
the Service Chiefs and not resources in their hands. When the Chiefs express
their view of future needs, it comes to Defence in what, in the jargon, is called
‘bids’. Examination of the cost-effectiveness, and conformity to other standards
in the use of taxpayers’ money, is exercised by suitably objective civilian and
military officers. This was supposed to be the practice in Service Boards, whose
members included a sole civilian who was outweighed by the uniformed
petitioners from the various commands. The flaw was the absence of a test of
overall Defence effectiveness. This was what the Defence Department, with its
limited legal authority, was supposed to remedy.
I did not think it needed to be said that the nearer our commanders got to
an actual battlefield, external supervision of their use of resources was bound
to be modified. Yet much was made of the view that the recommended
organisation was designed for peace and not for war. It was, in my opinion, very
unlikely that in 1973 the public and Parliament would agree to a command by
the military of money and other resources applicable in a time of war. What was
needed was an organisation capable of adaptation, but not necessarily with the
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immediacy to meet a war without warning. Some doomsayers saw such a war
as a possibility in our strategic environment in the 1970s. It was a view that
suited the Services wanting more resources. It was not a view shared by me or
by those making considered strategic assessments for the Government based on
massive sources of information.
Nor did the critics acknowledge the intended use of Ministerial directives to
provide safeguards for the Services from a so-called ‘civilian takeover’. One such
critic who gained media attention was the former Director of Naval Intelligence
and then Member of the House of Representatives, later Senator, David Hamer.
Writing in the Melbourne Age he depicted the Defence Department as having
had limited functions in the past and having only recently acquired some increase
in authority, leaving the implication that this had been done by the Department’s
officials. He chose not to acknowledge that Ministers of his own party had
recognised the deficiencies in oversight of the Services, and had not shared his
disparaging assessment of the professional capabilities of public servants.
Some objectives not achieved
There were other reforms canvassed in my Report which did not come to full
fruition. This was partly due to my belief that the civilian side of the Department
should not enter into the promotion and appointment practices in respect of the
uniformed members of the Services—for reasons of respect for military leadership
and for the unique relationship between officers and the rank and file in a
fighting Service which were the foundation of morale. The Report suggested
areas needing examination by the occupant of the new position of Chief of
Defence Force Staff in exercise of his newly acquired power of command. In the
event, reforms were few (for reasons that I shall return to later). One example
was the failure of the Services, more particularly the two that are oriented to
use of complex technology, to fill the posts they were offered in the Defence
Department with people possessing, in my judgement, the requisite qualification
for the intellectually demanding judgements needed for policy advising. I noted
that one Service in particular had a promotion policy that advanced officers with
past prowess in combat who could not meet this test. The Air Force had a practice
of not promoting to two-star rank officers other than pilots (unless filling the
chief engineer’s post). The result was the loss, through compulsory age
retirement, of men qualified for defence policy advising. The exhortations of
Minister Fairhall in the late 1960s were not having the intended results.
Intervention from Defence was needed in other areas in the moulding of a
Defence Force out of disparate Services. Establishment practices differed, as did
job evaluations, particularly among the many engaged in technical work.
Manpower, beyond his control, was a substantial element in the budget that the
Secretary of Defence was responsible for preparing.
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A Chief of Staff and a civilian administrator look at Service personnel selection,
education, training and promotion from different perspectives. The overriding
objective is to satisfy the Service Commander’s need to have capable leaders of
operational activities in war. The civilian adviser to Ministers has the lesser
concern of wanting some Service officers to be available with ability to participate
in strategic assessments or to assess the cost effectiveness of equipment proposals
from Services other than their own; or to judge the risks and advantages of
contracting with foreign manufacturers and much else. Such tasks call for
analytical capability, fostered by education, as well as proven good judgement
and willingness to overlay objective and critical judgement upon their single
Service loyalty. The number of positions is small but, because of the unavoidable
Service requirement to rotate its personnel, a large number of potential appointees
are required throughout the Service at all times.
Streaming of some officers into continuous advising on strategic policy or
force structure analysis might not be acceptable, for reasons of morale in which
combat leadership rather than desk-bound achievement would command respect.
However, I detected no effort to examine this or alternative means of improving
the quality of officers available for this area of Service responsibility. It was
disturbing to see training courses presented as a substitute for education, and
confusion between training (skill in doing things) and education (ability to
think). There were also some questionable standards in the free use of the term
‘graduate’ for some Service courses of study.
I was aware of (and opposed to) the Service demand that each Defence
Department posting be rotated among the three Services, irrespective of the
quality of people presented for appointment. Value systems for the bringing on
of these officers differed from Service to Service. A clue to differences is
suggested by noting which Service produced occupants of the top position of
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and its successor positions in later
years. I considered and described the rotation practice as mindless. But ultimately
I thought it was for Ministers to direct the Services to raise intellectual standards.
In this I was disappointed after Fraser had strongly stated the need for an
Australian Defence Academy at tertiary level. Resistance delayed its achievement.
Few Ministers after Fairhall and Fraser were interested in this matter. Ministerial
objectives can be frustrated by rigid Service practices, or perhaps by poor
communication. I recalled Casey, a Minister with great regard for the Services,
prevailing upon a Defence Minister in the 1950s to appoint Service Attachés to
diplomatic missions in Asia as a way of developing better understanding in the
Services of the new environment of Australia’s important independent neighbours
where they might have to be deployed. I discovered that the Services, far from
preserving and spreading the experience of Asia by officers appointed in this
way, in most cases sent officers not eligible for promotion and destined to retire
from the Service when their two-year posting was finished. I suspected that
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some appointments were intended as a reward rather than a task (while other
officers performed admirably).
Interim arrangements—changes needed in the Department
It was necessary to put aside changes that could only be made when the
legislation had been promulgated. But it would have been disastrous to leave
matters in limbo for a year, while staff remained uncertain of their future and
the disaffected in the regional Service Commands (where most outspoken criticism
resided) encouraged the various lobby groups to try to force a re-think on the
Government. Accordingly we developed a plan for an interim reorganisation,
to be put into effect in chosen areas as soon as staff could be found. While the
preparation of my report had imposed a burden on a few (mainly me), the
preparation for full integration and reorganisation involved massive changes in
legal authorities, preparation of duty statements, directives, documentation
setting out chains of financial control and much else. The burden on civilian
and military staff in the Department during 1973 was substantial. All of this was
superimposed on the normal daily activities of the Department (budgetary and
otherwise), as well as various requirements arising from our international
associations described elsewhere in this memoir.
Until such time as the new command arrangements became law, the Services
continued to be governed by their Boards and, the positions of Departmental
Secretaries having been abolished by an impetuous government decision (referred
to elsewhere), I had to accept their former responsibility. For practical reasons,
I obtained approval to have the three individuals appointed as special deputies
to act as my agents on the respective Boards.
Once the new Act was promulgated, each of the Services had to review and
change its command structure. It was necessary for each Chief, now in sole
command and made entirely responsible for what went on in his Service, to have
the backing of specialist advisers, revised lines of command and, perhaps most
importantly, effective arrangements for coordination and cooperation. For
example, the Air Force, because of its highly advanced technology and given
the vulnerability of air safety as well as combat readiness to any shortcomings
in the association of engineering maintenance with the supply function and its
vast inventory, had some perplexing problems to address. In the Air Force and
in the other Services, time had to be allowed for careful review by suitable teams
during 1975. The absence of any immediate threat made it possible to proceed
slowly.
While awaiting the passage of the reorganisation legislation, I went ahead
with changes not dependent on legislation. There were also changes in the top
military staff due to retirements. Admiral Sir Victor Smith retired after five years
as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, being replaced by General Sir
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Francis Hassett (who became the first Chief of Defence Force Staff in 1976). He
was followed by General Sir Arthur MacDonald, and he in turn by Admiral Sir
Anthony Synnot (who was my co-administrator when I severed my connection
with Defence in August 1979).
I made changes in the civilian staff. An early objective was to get effective
control of the tasking and priorities of the Defence scientific and technical
laboratories. This purpose was assisted by the energy of Farrands as Chief Defence
Scientist, who also contributed more than his predecessor (Wills) to defence
policy decisions.
Much of their work was of the highest quality in the opinion of the American
and British with whom they shared much advanced and innovative research.
Yet some parts of the system had grown up primarily serving the production
and repair activities of defence factories when all were part of the Supply
Department. They tended to act for the Services as problem-solvers, and the
connection with the policy objectives of the Department of Defence was tenuous.
The appointment of a Chief Defence Scientist in the Department had been one
of the half-baked reforms of 1958. Without any control over the laboratories
dispersed around Australia or any organic link with the fast-moving technologies
and new research findings, the occupant of the post in Canberra had become a
rather detached science guru, expected to offer off-the-cuff opinions on weapons
acquisitions and maintenance problems. Under my changes he was given new
line authority, through appropriate procedures; and in later years there were
more radical changes to the management of this important part of our national
defence capabilities.
I also drew some of the scientists into becoming analysts in Canberra in the
enhanced role of systems analysis of Service bids for new weapons systems and
platforms.
Managing the Department—The 1973 political environment
I now return to the early days of the new Labor Administration. There were
many unexpected problems to deal with while simultaneously developing the
reorganisation.
For example, a January 1973 publication of some classified information roused
interest in the attitude of Ministers towards security in the context of its belief
in open government. A classified minute of the Defence Committee appeared in
the media. In some sensitive areas public servants were feeling concern about
the willingness (or ability) of Ministers to control the activities of private office
advisers who were enthusiastically taking it upon themselves to implement
open-government policies. Barnard’s staff, consisting of Clem Lloyd, a long-time
adviser during his Opposition years, and Brian Toohey, a self-assured journalist,
exhibited distrust of the Department’s loyalty to Labor’s mandate—or perhaps
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its understanding of it, particularly in respect of matters under attack by the
Labor Left, of which the American defence connection was a prime example.
There was a related problem. For the first time in my experience, a Department
could not be sure that submissions and reports sent to the Minister actually
reached his desk. When, as I shall relate, both of these appointees departed, I
was told of papers having been sidetracked in this way.
There was a certain irony in this, given the propensity of those suspicious
of the Public Service to accuse us of withholding information in order to serve
some agenda or policy bias of our own, a charge which in my case at least was
as baseless as the alternative, which was that we set out to confuse Ministers by
‘snowing’ them with a surfeit of paper. The Labor movement is notorious for
inventing conspiracies perhaps because, as I have heard its critics say, it
sometimes organises them against its own.
We were entering an era when people with ideological convictions, but with
no experience of the problems and constraints that fall on Ministers of any party
when they enter Cabinet, were setting up as rivals to seasoned departmental
advisers. Later administrations learned to make room for both sources of advice.
It was beneficial for career public servants to be relieved of such tasks as
preparing material for Ministers to discredit political opponents. But no precepts
were laid down: Whitlam was content simply to issue a minatory direction to
Departmental Secretaries not to issue instructions to Ministerial Staff. What was
needed was a policy modus vivendi. Fortunately in our case, Barnard’s later staff
replacements established harmonious relations with his Department.
Disclosure of the American presence—Conflict with Labor
Left
In the early days there was pressure on Barnard from two directions on the
subject of American activities on Australian soil. There were demands for
disclosure of the nature of certain installations while, on the other hand, the
Americans wanted reassurance that defence activities important to them
conducted in cooperation with Australia would not be nullified by disclosures
from which the Soviet Union in particular would be the beneficiary.
After examination, it was shown that not all American activities required
secrecy and Barnard was able to describe them to Parliament. Two installations
were in a different category.1 They had the highest significance in the nuclear
standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. They were the Joint
Defence Space Research Facility at Pine Gap near Alice Springs, and the Joint
Defence Space Communications Facility at Nurrungar near Woomera in the North




Physical isolation from hostile intercepts, and from monitoring of the
downlinks to the satellite dishes that later became a prominent part of the
landscape, along with an available airfield and housing, were considerations
which led the original exploring parties to recommend these sites. For the
Americans, the trustworthiness of its Australian ally was doubtless vital in their
final decision to select Australia.
Whitlam’s and Barnard’s conflict in Parliament with the Left, and with the
Party at large, deepened in January and February 1973 over the Government’s
modification of its pledged withdrawal of all Army units from Asia. Publication
of an explanation, which breached security, of a secret intelligence activity
added a problem of a different kind. Having been told that the ground forces
in Singapore contained an unacknowledged signals intelligence unit for which
there was no immediate alternative site, the Ministers decided to retain 600
troops there. The decision and the reason found their way into the media without
acknowledgment of the source. The Leader of the Opposition (Billy Snedden)
surmised that the Prime Minister had given an off-the-record briefing. Whatever
the source, there was an added reason for Australia’s intelligence partners to be
concerned as they watched for signs in the new Government of a slackening of
protection of the information they entrusted to Australia. That extended beyond
classified intelligence to weaponry, operational techniques and much else.
Calming their anxieties—usually but not always unfounded—was to occupy
me at various times during the Labor regime.
The Department had now to help the Minister contend with further troubles
within the Labor Party over the American defence connection in general, but
directed particularly at the Government’s announced refusal to disclose what
went on in the Joint Facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. My own attention to
these serious policy matters became complicated in late February and early March
by a distracting political storm over an inherently less important matter—the
alleged treatment by me of Barnard’s office staff—to which I shall return later.
Suspicion had built up in the Labor Party while in Opposition, as it had in
various public interest groups, over these facilities about which Labor leaders
had been denied any information to justify the secrecy covering them. Labor
Ministers were able to point to the contrasting treatment of the Coalition leader
when in Opposition. In my External Affairs days in the 1950s, the then
Government rejected suggestions from time to time that Labor’s then leader
(Evatt) be ‘briefed’. The idea of an Australian equivalent of Britain’s Privy
Councillor’s oath to respect confidentiality on matters of state had been canvassed
but not proceeded with. Ironically, such a briefing offered on one occasion was
turned down by Labor itself as potentially muzzling them from opposing policies
that deserved to be attacked.
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There were troubles, too, within the Labor Ministry when, following
discussion with Departments, the Whitlam/Barnard leadership adopted the
longstanding practice of confining access to certain high security matters to
Ministers who had a demonstrable ‘need-to-know’ relevant to their portfolio.
The demand for equality among Ministers put this in contention by those left
out. In December, at a meeting called by the Prime Minister, I witnessed an
invasion by several Ministers not invited because the defence subjects for
discussion lay outside their portfolio responsibilities.
Newly appointed members of a Ministry that had never had the responsibility
of preserving the confidences of allies, or of knowing what their content was,
would understandably resent being kept in the dark while others (including
officials) were not. They were touchy too. Barnard told me that there had been
a reaction from some Ministers when they saw that a submission of mine had
innocently suggested that a certain question ‘would be for future governments
to decide’. ‘Predicting—maybe even plotting our downfall!’
A decision on the Government’s intentions towards public disclosure on
security matters came to a head when the two leaders addressed the demands
for release of information about what came to be called ‘American bases’ and,
from some quarters, their expulsion from Australia.
The Joint US–Australian Defence Facilities
One of my first actions after the 1972 election had been to arrange for the Prime
Minister and Minister to be informed of the nature, purpose, and capability of
the activities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. For the purpose of this memoir I can
find authority, and the degree of detail permissible by way of explanation, in
official announcements made by the then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, and the
Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, in the 1980s.
As recorded earlier, the Chief Defence Scientist, Dr John Farrands, and I were
privy to the operations. In addition, each of us had paid visits to the sites at
various times and had been given demonstrations of their capabilities and of the
type of data collected. I had been given assurances at the site that activities in
Australia were not made targets for information gathering and had heard this
reinforced when accompanying Ministers in high-level meetings in Washington.
The Hawke statements in 1989 declared that ‘among the functions performed
are the provision of early warning by receiving from space satellites information
about missile launches and the provision of information about the occurrence
of nuclear explosions’. The statements went on to refer to the existence of ‘other
technical functions’, disclosure of which would damage both American and
Australian interests. In October of that year Defence Minister Beazley enlarged
on the advantages of the data derived. Hawke had stressed, and Beazley now
repeated, the contribution made to achieving current and prospective nuclear
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force reductions by the assured verification that agreements on this, and bans
on nuclear testing, were being honoured. Without such verification, no American
commitment to force reduction would get through Congress.
Beazley declared in addition that the Facilities contributed most significantly
to the avoidance of a catastrophic war (something in my opinion even more
fundamental than preserving promises to disarm). By way of explanation, Beazley
pointed out that there was danger in either side miscalculating the other’s
intentions and getting in first by initiating a nuclear attack. Because of that,
‘early warning systems take the guesswork out of the situation and greatly
diminish the interest that either side could possible have in initiating nuclear
war’. Warning of a launch (along with other means of tracking the location of
impact) would give time for a retaliatory launch against the attacker.
Later statements specified the different roles of Pine Gap and Nurrungar
while nevertheless declining to publish details of operations and methods.
Fifteen years earlier we were not in a position to claim the existence of all
these advantages when advising our Ministers. To be certain that possession of
the early warning capability would deter a first strike rested on the assumption
that the knowledge had been convincingly conveyed to the Russians; and
Australia was not a party to the dialogue between the two superpowers.
Moreover, Leonid Brezhnev’s Soviet Union was exerting unrelenting pressure
both in political propaganda in Europe and in nuclear deployments at that time.
Arms control agreements were not in place. Some arguments justifying the
Facilities, of a kind that would mollify if not satisfy opposition in the Labor
Movement, were therefore not available to Whitlam and Barnard. As to the value
for deterrence of the Soviet Union, we officials had no independent evidence
that the early warning capability had been conveyed to them. In effect, we had
to accept American assurances to us of the vital importance of the data, without
any comprehensive understanding as to what effect it was being used. In my
advising, I accepted that the United States would not itself initiate a first nuclear
strike—a view not universally shared within the Labor Party.
Our knowledge of the data being collected satisfied me that it would be used
by the United States to maintain its military capability of matching the Soviet
Union’s advances. I saw the preservation of this capability (what in the later
Hawke years was described as ‘strategic stability’) as the principal benefit to
the security of Western democracies.
There was another dimension—ANZUS, under which the Facilities agreement
with the Americans had, in its terms, been declared to rest. No alternative sites
could be said to be available. I believed that unilateral steps to terminate the
agreements would have profound consequences for the American interpretation
of what we were entitled to expect from them under the ANZUS Treaty, and for
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our standing as an ally; and that this in turn would alter the perception in [the
region to our north]2  of the strength with which Australia could be defended.
In the briefing of Ministers, I do not recall any necessity to labour these
points.
As regards my own convictions as an adviser, then and later, I should add
that the value to Australia, beyond the contribution that we were making to the
nuclear balance, was far reaching. Our scientists learned for the first time of
techniques of using space phenomena to study terrestrial objects in detail. To
apply the data to practical applications in our own decision-making was more
difficult, because the Americans in contrast had a vast machine in which to
correlate the input from the Facilities with other sources that they possessed.
We believed we were told all that we needed to know. There was a valuable
inflow of highly sensitive material to our system not confined to this subject.
A complete balance sheet of the benefits gained by Australia by allowing
Australian sovereign territory to be used in this way would require us to look
beyond Pine Gap and Nurrungar. It would require bringing to account the strong
flow of information received on a preferential basis about American tests of
weapons systems, sensors and their software used in our own equipment
decisions, and for which there was no substitute at that high level of technology.
Beyond assessing the value to us of the ANZUS alliance lay the great policy
question as to how far Australia was ready to make this contribution to the
global security of the Western democracies while the Soviet threat was unabated
and, in some respects, becoming greater with the deployment of new nuclear
missiles targeted against Europe. It was this contribution which some of the
protesters breaking down the fences at Pine Gap were wanting to halt.
In reporting all that we knew to the Ministers in private briefings, we were
in a position to enlarge considerably on the matters which, as I have said, Hawke
was later to describe enigmatically in public as ‘other technical functions’.
The Ministers decided to accept the continued presence of the Facilities,
subject to the Americans agreeing to greater participation and observation by
Australian personnel, and to recommend this course to the Labor Party.
They remained shackled by the limited amount of information they could
disclose in order to satisfy party and public. As administrator of a policy of such
national importance, my task was easier. Primarily, it was to preserve secrecy
and to reassure our allies on the point. Over and above guarding against wilful
breaches of security, my experience told me of the necessity to prevent leakages
of secrets from carelessness or from people with an urge to parade their unique
possession of information. Potential risks of this kind had increased with the
influx to positions of trust of people openly scornful of the security practices
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thought to belong to outdated Coalition party attitudes towards informing the
public.
Keeping secrets requires some drastic practical measures which attract
criticism and no doubt accusations of excessive zeal. I took a highly restrictive
view of those entitled to know the unpublished functions of the Facilities. If
Ministers had to be informed of developments in writing, I conveyed it personally
by hand, declining to use the customary procedure of trusting Ministerial staff
to place material before a Minister.
My objective was not secrecy for its own sake. It was to prevent the Soviet
Union learning about a vital intelligence activity by reading the newspapers
simultaneously with the Australian public. Within the Government there had
been a strictly limited ‘listing’ procedure. Most of the Public Service was
excluded, including members of my own Department and Foreign Affairs except
at the very top. I kept personal control of any discussions with the Americans
that developments might make necessary. Barnard approved the list and the
procedure I was following when he was preparing his statement to be made to
Parliament on 28 February 1973.
There was a concurrent need to get Ministerial acceptance of the practice of
resisting media probing into defence secrets by cumulative speculative gambits.
Whitlam readily agreed, and announced, that it would be settled policy ‘neither
to confirm nor deny’ speculations about defence secrets.
Apart from damage to our interests that might follow unauthorised revelations
on matters in which the Americans (or the British) were concerned, I formed the
impression that it was a matter of honour for Whitlam to ensure that
arrangements legally made under undertakings of confidentiality were
implemented. Equally I thought there was a touch of naïveté in his respect of
the sovereign rights of the Republic of Singapore when he terminated an
Australian intelligence unit operating out of that base.
The Americans took precautions to avoid speculation when any senior official
in their intelligence community visited the Facilities. On the other hand, it was
possible to be open about the visits of defence officials. I myself accompanied
the then Deputy Secretary for Defense, David Packard, on such a visit when he
demonstrated in this way the strategic importance to the United States of the
Pine Gap Facility.
Australia could claim to have been highly successful in maintaining secrecy
in those years. Later some speculations by academics eroded the secrecy.
Limited disclosure on Pine Gap and Nurrungar
For the Ministers, the pressure from the Labor Party, the media and interest
groups for more information remained. In the Department we found it difficult
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to find new suggestions to offer, given the constraints. The best I could suggest,
without injury to the truth, was for the Government to declare that ‘neither
station is part of a weapons system and neither station can be used to attack any
country’. This formula was used by Barnard in the February statement to
Parliament. (Beazley’s statement 16 years later was not very different, although
he was then free to add much more).3
In his statement Barnard listed all the installations in which US activities
were conducted. He described the functions of several installations that were
contributing to the monitoring of conformity to the Test Ban Treaty.
As to the Pine Gap/Nurrungar twins he said that, in the light of what Labor
now knew, they would want to make some changes; but they were governed
by treaties that gave them current tenure. We would protect them from
unauthorised disclosure; and he declared that, more widely, Labor would protect
all classified information entrusted to us by the United States, Britain and others.
He certified that ‘the details of the techniques employed, and of the data being
tested and analysed at the two stations must be kept highly secret if the two
stations are to continue to serve their objectives’.
He went on to offer a political palliative. Members of Parliament must have
a special right of access to the two installations, which will enable them ‘to see
something of the nature of the operations’—all subject to orderly procedures.
In passing, he said that ‘only the very few people directly associated with the
central execution of the defence programmes of the United States and Australia’
would have greater access to information.
His words confirmed publicly that the limitation that I had exercised on
dissemination of information in the Departments and Services would continue
under Ministerial authority.
There ensued a visit to me by a team of American officials, led by Ambassador
Walter Rice, expressing concern about the consequences for security of disclosure
of further details about the operations of the Facilities. They complained about
the intention to allow visits by Australian Parliamentarians when there was
uncertainty as to what seeing ‘something of the nature of the operations’ would
mean in practice. I had the Minister’s authority to tell the Americans that access
would not be unlimited and that their secrets would be protected. I was not able
to predict how little interest our politicians later showed in visiting the sites.
But I had to speak bluntly to the visitors following some remarks to me about
the erosion of American rights and the lack of an equivalent right of American
Congressmen to pay such visits. I said that ‘they would be a long way from their
electorate whereas some of our members of Parliament would not be’. Our




I have observed that American engineers responsible for the brilliant
technologies of the stations working in outer space, like those in the US Navy
on occasions, were not always sensitive to the political facts of life in sovereign
states. Moreover, confidentiality about the Facilities was sometimes eroded by
leakages to journals in America, probably as a result of much of the research
and production of equipment being contracted out to private industries.
When Caucus was shown the intended statement, there was, according to
press reports (including one by Toohey, Barnard’s lately departed Private
Secretary), a storm of criticism and a heavy vote of opposition which delayed
presentation to Parliament. It was reported that only the strongest intervention
by the Prime Minister saved Barnard from having the plan repudiated. A prompt
offer by the Americans to discuss changes helped, I was told, to placate the Party
critics.
Labor’s problem with the North West Cape Naval
Communications Station
Review of some of the other arrangements with the Americans remained
unfinished business in 1974. The United States Naval Communications Station
was controlled and manned exclusively by Americans. They enjoyed some
privileges, although not as many as those they had sought when negotiating
with Sir Garfield Barwick (the then Minister for External Affairs) in 1963 to
establish the radio relay station with a very low frequency capacity to
communicate with submerged submarines. Then Barwick gave the Americans
an authoritative (and cheerfully didactic) lesson on the Federal Constitution and
on State jurisdiction. When the US Navy spokesman plaintively explained his
need to avoid giving the Portuguese a precedent for an agreement limiting
American rights in their territory, Barwick had bluntly said: ‘Brother! This is
not Portugal.’
I confess to having in later years no great understanding of Labor’s objections.
None of the rights given to the Americans seemed to prejudice Australian
security; moreover, the Station enabled us to communicate with our own
submarines in the sea depths. American declared policy renounced any intention
to launch a first nuclear strike and the Labor objection seemed to me to have
much to do with symbols, and with their objection in 1973 to the provision that
the agreement ‘did not carry with it any degree of control of the Station or of
its use’. Labor, when in opposition at the time, had declared this to be an
infringement of Australian sovereignty. More substantial was the question of
whether we were offering the Soviet Union a nuclear target. This issue, whether
a probability or not, would remain an indeterminate question of high policy at
the political level (Beazley offered an answer in the 1980s). Barnard was able to
obtain agreement to have more Australians working in the Station. The Americans
held out, reasonably in my opinion, against Australians being privy to the
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contents of their coded commands (the practical value of which was uncertain
since not all commands would pass though this Station in a threatening situation
because of deliberate redundancy in the American control system which had
multiple channels).
While Barnard was in office, some changes were made giving Australians a
greater role. In later years, when Labor was in Opposition, arguments revived
about the possibility of the Station being the channel for American strategic
commands to direct military action for objectives that Australia did not approve.
Bill Hayden referred to fears of a shift in American naval strategy, from
preserving stable deterrence of the Soviet Union to the adoption of a warfighting
role for its nuclear force, in which Australia would have no say in the use of our
territory for relaying commands which might have cataclysmic consequences.
This argument was resisted by the Fraser Government when in power; yet the
most convincing rejection came from Labor itself in the 1980s. Labor’s Kim
Beazley then pointed out that any such major shift in American strategy would
require, as a prelude, a far-reaching restructuring of that country’s capabilities,
open to be observed by us and everybody else. He and the Hawke Government
strongly endorsed Australia’s contributing to a stable superpower balance.
Beazley said:
The Naval Communications Station at North West Cape supports the
most invulnerable leg of the triad, the submarine-based missile force.
These weapons are the final guarantor of deterrence. Any threat to the
vital communications links to these submarines would undermine the
security and effectiveness of the submarine-launched missiles they carry.4
Hayden’s warped dissatisfaction with the Station led him into an attack on
me personally that seemed to be the product of his misunderstanding of its basic
purpose. Prime Minister Fraser having approved the briefing of the Leader of
the Opposition, I had been instructed to inform him of all sensitive and secret
activities involving intelligence gathering. This I did comprehensively in the
Department’s office. Later, Hayden complained to Killen that I had failed to
inform him about North West Cape (which was not an intelligence operation).
His letter became public and appeared to make a case of untrustworthiness on
my part. I was incensed at yet another slur on my integrity, this time under
parliamentary privilege. I told Killen that I did not think that my duty extended
to conducting such briefings again unless the Minister was present to certify in
Parliament, if necessary, that I had not been misleading. I was not sure that I
ever got a response from Killen—which is one way of disposing of a nuisance.
The Lloyd affair—Barnard’s rebuke of Tange
The British Government’s new Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, included
Australia in a tour of Southeast Asia. I felt that his visit in early 1973 would not
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be entirely welcome so early in the life of our Government, and might rouse
fears of ‘heavying’ by a major defence power. But Carrington was received
cordially by Ministers. His purpose was to ascertain whether Australia would
continue to hold to its commitments under the Five Power Defence Arrangements
with Malaysia and Singapore alongside Britain, entered into by the Whitlam
Government’s predecessors. Uncertainty had been created by the announced
withdrawal of Army units. Britain’s intentions would be affected by those of
Australia. After the consultation with Barnard, and their frank discussion of the
outlook, Carrington publicly declared himself to be well satisfied.
For my part, I had renewed a longstanding friendship which went back to
1956 when Carrington was appointed British High Commissioner to Australia.
His young family and mine shared outings and picnics in Canberra, and we kept
in touch afterwards. More recently he had stayed several days with me in the
Australian residence in New Delhi, in preference to the British residence (and
demonstrated his duck-shooting prowess in lakes in the Punjab). But his visit
had some less pleasant consequences for me.
Lloyd alleged that my administrative arrangements for the conference with
Carrington prompted his resignation from Barnard’s office and, with the help
of sympathetic friends in the press and in the Labor movement, he stimulated
a sustained attack on Barnard. The focus was on Barnard’s supposed inability
to control his Departmental Secretary and on my allegedly exceeding my duty.
That blended well with the conviction in Labor Party Left circles, particularly
the Victorian Left, who alleged that I was a kind of Menzies relic, subservient
to American defence interests and incapable of supporting Labor’s platform.
In fact, what was to blame was confusion in communication and, on Barnard’s
part, an extraordinary (and, to me, inexplicable) lack of contact between Barnard
and his employee, who was sitting outside his office when he was in Canberra.
The sequence of events had been that Lloyd (without, I was told, seeking
any authority from his boss) applied to my staff to be included in the group of
advisers to sit behind Barnard in the talks with Carrington. When I learned of
this, Barnard was in Launceston, where he remained for several days, contactable
only by telephone. I spoke to him, saying that I thought it unusual to include
a Private Secretary; and that this one did not carry the security clearance needed
in the event that certain joint intelligence arrangements came under discussion.
After saying that he had had in mind someone other than Lloyd, Barnard agreed
to drop the idea of either attending. In consequence I told my staff to tell Lloyd
he would not be included. Thereafter, both the Minister and the orchestrated
critics in Canberra took offence at my giving a direction to one of his personal
staff. Barnard later changed his mind and one of his staff did attend. To avoid
public argument with my Minister, I wrote a minute recording my view of
events. I began by including the pointed words, ‘you decided the composition
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of the group of advisers to attend the Ministerial Defence Conference’. To assist
him to justify publicly his own misunderstanding of the course of events, I
included the word ‘apologise’. Neither then, nor as I record the events now, did
I believe that I had anything to apologise about.
But the storm blew right out of the teacup when the Opposition (with no
thanks from me for their helpfulness) initiated several days of questions about
the ill-treatment not of Lloyd but of Tange. They lent on the remark by Barnard
that he had ‘reservations’ about my report that he had tabled in the House. It
was a new experience for me to be the subject of multi-column headlines in the
major dailies. I accepted the judgement of the shrewd Alan Reid that I was not
the important target, but a scapegoat in the continued campaign against the
Barnard/Whitlam leadership and their softer line on defence cooperation with
the United States.5
As the Canberra Times observed on 8 March 1973: ‘Sir Arthur has to put up
with the occupational hazard of being the silent partner in a difference with his
Ministerial superior.’ In fact I remained silent and refused all the many media
requests for an interview.
On 8 March the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Doug Anthony, had, I have
no doubt, my interest in mind along with an obvious political motivation, in
calling on the Prime Minister to speak to me to ascertain the facts and to clear
the name of (as he said) ‘one of Australia’s most experienced and highly regarded
public servants’. But more reassuring for me, as I needed the trust of the
Government so that I could get on with so much unfinished business, was to
read that the Prime Minister, in confirming in his statement in the House his
total confidence in his Defence Minister, also foresaw his Minister putting to
use the talents he attributed to me. That evening, Barnard told a (possibly
disappointed) television journalist that he did not want a new Permanent Head.
I addressed a minute to Barnard saying plainly that, after so many days
without a face-to-face discussion, I would like one now. He then confided to me
some details of difficulties of his own during his association with Lloyd—a
confidence that I have no intention of breaching. It seems probable to me that
Lloyd, a man of some intellectual substance, had some difficulty, emotional and
otherwise, in translating from the calm of an adviser to a political leader in
Opposition with no responsibility for national affairs, to a position requiring
some response to the high national policy issues for decision swirling past him
to his employer’s desk. He later joined the staff of a University where I
understand he gained respect for the quality of his research and writings.6
Redefining the threat basis for Defence planning
During my years as a member of the Defence Committee, I had observed how
much ambiguity lay in the single word ‘threat’. Some (in Parliament and in the
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Services) would see a ‘threat to Australia’ in a military build-up or threatening
posture to neighbours by a Communist power distant from Australia. Others
looked for evidence nearer to the territories and seas in the approaches to
Australia. A consequence of this confusion appeared in concrete form in sharp
differences in the debates with the Services about the strategic relevance of the
weapons systems and weapons platforms they sought approval to procure.
Historically, under the Menzies and succeeding conservative governments,
the idea had lingered on that any shot fired in anger around the world was a
potential threat to Australia—not necessarily to Australian territory but to
‘Australia’. This view had its origins in our earlier acceptance of collective
security and commitment to Imperial defence planning and action. A corollary
of this belief, which had profound effects on how we spent our defence budgets,
was that threats could arise without warning. It was a belief deeply embedded
in the Services, where it provided a rationale for their training and their claim
for only the latest technology.
As already indicated, we addressed this subject in the 1972 Defence Review.
Early in the 1970s analysts in the Joint Intelligence Organisation, headed by
Robert Furlonger and his successor in 1973 Gordon Jockel, were exploring
another aspect of threats—their imminence. This entailed whether making
assumptions about what the strategic situation would be in the 1980s was
justified. Because of the hazards of predicting the future, ‘futurology’ was scorned
by many as vaporous speculation, providing no sound basis for protecting the
country. Yet the fact was that calculations of the future were implicit in every
decision made by Cabinets and Service Chiefs and in all policy advice about the
procurement of long-living capital assets, and even in the direction of training
which, if strategic requirements changed unexpectedly, could only be redirected
with time. Australian practice kept ships in service for 25 and even 30 years;
and aircraft almost as long. While the systems they carried could be modified if
international events called for it, past decisions heavily committed the future.
Moreover, you cannot easily change the location or capabilities of static bases
like an airfield, naval repair facilities or even Army training bases. They rested
on past assumptions about where threats would need to be countered.
As Barnard prepared for his first budget in 1973, he asked for a review of
Australia’s strategic prospects and of the probability of threats to Australia
occurring. At the time there was confidence that nuclear deterrence was effective.
Labor had made clear its intention to focus Defence objectives on the defence
of Australian territory (without necessarily renouncing deployments outside
Australia serving that purpose). It followed that a strategic review should not
be devoted to analysing outbreaks of violence or a build-up of forces in locations
remote from Australia, or involving the balance between the superpowers where
Australia’s military capabilities would not be significant. Indiscriminate findings
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of ‘threats’ needed to be curbed. Drawing on analysis by the Joint Intelligence
Organisation under Jockel, we persuaded the Defence Committee to present a
threat assessment which addressed more specifically than before the time it
would take for development of a threat of a kind and intensity to require a
significant Australian military response. This judgement should be the foundation
for many current decisions on such matters as stockpiles, factory capacity and
the timing of weapon repair or acquisitions.
Malaysia and Singapore had developed strength and confidence was growing.
The assessment found no immediate threat to the territory of Australia. It foresaw
that this situation would be likely to remain for 10 years, extending even to 15
years, while recognising that there had to be uncertainty about those final years.
The Report acknowledged that this uncertainty left a problem in making decisions
in some elements of the force structure, because the acquisition of some
equipments (and personnel skills to operate them) had a particularly long
lead-time.
It was a bold new assessment in the face of past findings of threats worldwide.
When Barnard announced his acceptance of it, there was an outburst of criticism,
and some derision. Some academics (Professor Tom Millar being one) attacked
the predictions. Some sought to refute the finding by measuring the lapse of
time between the end of war somewhere and the outbreak of another somewhere
else, producing what I thought to be a worthless and irrelevant contribution to
deciding what we needed for this continent located in the Southwest Pacific and
our nearer Asian environment. Faith in Australia’s subjection to the ‘peace is
indivisible’ notion of global involvement was still with us.
A concept growing out of the revised threat assessment was that there would
be adequate warning time to prepare, provided we made full use of all the
intelligence and surveillance resources, and of Foreign Affairs advice and that
of allies. ‘Warning time’ lasted many years as a doctrinal basis for testing
proposals for equipment and personnel growth. In later years, I understand it
was displaced by recognition that some small-scale but testing threats to our
territory or to other external interests could come with little warning. This led
to a major shift of military units northwards and in other ways.
Under the revised threat estimate, some reductions were made in Barnard’s
time in defence industry production and in the holding of stocks. But, in respect
of major defence equipments, some questionable replacement decisions won the
day. For my part I later felt I should have opposed the replacement of the aged
Centurion tank, given the difficulty of foreseeing a theatre requiring its
deployment. It is not only politicians who are cautious about surrendering an
area of unique expertise and training: the aircraft carrier was to be a later cause
célèbre. As regards the tank, senior Departmental analysts were influenced by
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the seriousness of what would be an irretrievable decision to terminate the
Army’s possession of this special operational expertise.
The Department’s analysts had difficulty in finding a basis upon which to
assess the Navy’s claim to replace its light destroyer fleet progressively with the
same numbers, but with enhanced modern firepower and surveillance
capabilities. The generalities of the Strategic Guidance paper, set beside a
government policy of concentrating on defence closer to home, were little help
in assessing the need for capabilities to operate in far distant waters. The decision
to replace the light destroyer project with the American-developed patrol frigate
was a decision based not on strategy but on the risk that the complexities of
marrying advanced sensors, firepower and hull design without unacceptable
delays might be beyond Australia’s capabilities.
Barnard in Opposition in 1972 had criticised the continuing growth during
the planning in the size of what had set out to be a light destroyer. He had called
for a new programme of patrol boats for coastal protection.
The problem of deriving a statement of military requirements from the
generalisations of the Strategic Guidance document remained throughout the
Barnard–Morrison period, and continued under Killen when the Fraser Ministry
came to power.7
All the Chiefs complained that the Department gave them only the somewhat
abstract findings of the periodic ‘Strategic Basis’ document, drafted by Defence
and Foreign Affairs officials and endorsed by the Chiefs in the Defence Committee,
as their Bible.
It was certainly not as precise as the Ten Commandments. I could see the
Chief’s problem, but I believed that it was beyond the experience and the
responsibility of public servants under my leadership to propose what formations
and equipment, in what locations, the Army should have; or whether the
divisional structure should be retained; or the most suitable locations for the
assets of the Air Force; or which ports justified countermine measures or new
berthing facilities; or at a more general level, the preferred emphasis as between
air to surface capabilities, as against air superiority or sub-surface means.
This area was, in my opinion, one for action by the Chief of Defence Force
Staff. But it was largely unoccupied territory up to the time of my retirement
and, as I understand it, remained so until the 1980s. Then, under a perceptive
Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, a civilian public servant was charged with the
task. Dr Paul Dibb brought to bear his accumulated experience of dealing with
all three Services, his grasp of strategy and his experience in intelligence
assessments. In addition, he had a much needed persuasive personality. The
Dibb Report of March 1986 was accepted broadly by the Hawke Government.
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Barnard’s negotiations with Washington
Towards the end of 1973 Barnard made an extensive overseas tour. He included
Washington, a visit to which is essential for any Defence Minister. In his case
it was to set down some anxieties and negotiate some changes in certain
agreements.
Before the visits in January 1974 for discussion with US Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger and the Pentagon, Barnard had already arranged some changes,
readily conceded, with the newly arrived Ambassador, Marshall Green. Green
was a unique appointment—the most senior career man to occupy the Embassy,
having been an Assistant Secretary in the Department of State. Some close to
him let it be known that the more important post of Japan would have been his
preference. Previous American Ambassadors had owed their appointment to
favours to the political party of the President—usually money but in the case
of William Battle in the 1950s, friendship with John Kennedy. Battle had been
one of the few exceptions to a line of unrelieved mediocrity in occupancy of the
post. Green was certainly not in that category, but his appointment was no
compliment to Australia. Green was sent because of apprehension about
Whitlam’s policies and Nixon’s resentment at the statements of some of his wilder
Ministers.
In the event, I doubt that much calming influence on Washington was needed
from Green once Whitlam made his intentions clearer. Indeed one high-ranking
American told me that Green was given to sending somewhat alarmist reports
to Washington. This of course is a fairly normal practice of competent
trouble-shooters who are disappointed by the meagre trouble upon which to
apply their skill. Nevertheless, when the man to take over as Acting Prime
Minister during Whitlam’s frequent absences abroad, Dr Cairns, became the
new Deputy Leader elected by Caucus, one can assume some heightened concern
based on his earlier statements on American policies.
Barnard was received in Washington with a cordiality that probably owed
something to his status as Deputy Prime Minister. I did harbour a cynical
suspicion that the Americans were out to impress (just as in earlier days we had
seen lavish and generous British hospitality as a form of ‘duchessing’ of
Australian Ministers). The Americans in official talks are business-like and not
given to time wasting. Their day starts early and ends late; and the superpower
has a stream of official visitors. But their entertainment in elegant historic venues
is stylish and generous (but with a bias towards fruit juice as a beverage). US
Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger attended a reception for Barnard, which
I was told he rarely did for such visitors.
Following the preliminary work with Green in Australia, Barnard and
Schlesinger agreed on changes wanted by Barnard in the North West Cape
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agreement, limiting the land occupied and appointing an Australian Deputy
Commander.
There was a good airing of views on the international security situation, and
clarification of one Australian action that worried the Americans. Australia had
suspended visits to some ports by American nuclear-powered warships. (Whether
they carried nuclear weapons was a separate matter and in any case not for
discussion, because of the American policy of declining for security reasons to
confirm or deny the presence of such weapons in any particular location.)
The suspension was intended to last until Australian scientists had surveyed
the ports to ascertain what berths (or what ports) occupied by such ships
contained a risk to vulnerable populations (or institutions such as hospitals) in
the event of an accident (such as collision) that released irradiated matter, such
as steam, into the atmosphere. We were not fobbed off by the US Navy, present
at the talks, continuing to tell us disingenuously that they berthed their vessels
without hesitation on the Hudson River alongside Manhattan Island. The
characteristics of wind direction and some other factors were unique to each
location and each needed to be assessed as a prerequisite to giving a safety all
clear. The chances of accident were remote but the assessment had to be made
and reported to Parliament.
Barnard explained all this, but I thought I detected some scepticism in
Schlesinger (who had formerly been in charge of American nuclear energy
programmes). I took him aside privately to assure him that Australia’s new Labor
Government was not in this matter moved by some obscurantist fear of nuclear
power generation as such, or confusion with nuclear weaponry. We had a
Parliament to be satisfied by Australian rather than American scientists. This
was a political reality in Australia. While Schlesinger said teasingly that he
suspected there was a bit of obscurantism at work, he did not pursue the
American objection to our suspension of visits.
But not so the US Navy—or at least part of it. Approaching the lunch table
I was accosted by the formidable and testy Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, creator
and guardian of America’s devastatingly powerful sub-surface nuclear strike
capability, and notoriously defiant of control by his nominal superior, Chief of
Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt. The Admiral abruptly dismissed
my explanation about the need to satisfy Parliament in our democracy saying
that, if we did not want the US Navy to defend Australia that was fine by him
and, as a coup de grace, after listening to us he saw no reason why they should
be shouting us lunch. As between umbrage and laughter, I thought the second
was the better.
But Schlesinger was more diplomatic than his blunt sailor. Barnard was able
to reach useful understandings on other subjects as well. They included
clarification of the agreement on the Naval Communications Station.
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Barnard had further exploratory talks about the acquisition of the American
patrol frigates—the first launching of which was late in 1979.
Barnard made two other journeys overseas. With a need in prospect to order
a replacement for our front-line fighter, Barnard decided to examine Sweden’s
Viggen. It was not high in the Air Force’s preference. Perhaps sympathy with
the country’s Social Democrat Government may have been an influence, just as
the Labor Government felt some affinity with West Germany’s Social Democrats.
While in Sweden I was offered a flight to neighbouring Denmark to visit my
distant relatives but put the temptation behind me. Barnard visited some other
defence plants in Britain.
He took on this long flight a BAC-111 aircraft from the VIP flight. Given its
seating capacity he was able to include wives of officials and his own family.
Despite our exclusive occupancy, it was not a restful flight. The machine was
restricted to about four hours in the air and it landed us in odd places at odd
hours for refuelling. By a similar flight, accompanied by his officials and their
wives, Barnard visited Indonesia to deliver a patrol boat and later visited the
Air Force units at Butterworth and other places in Indonesia as we returned to
Australia. Barnard treated his senior officials and uniformed officers like family.
Other decisions for Barnard
Following Barnard’s return from the United States, the formalities of a revised
North West Cape agreement with the Americans were concluded. He announced
several decisions: the intended location near Duntroon of a Tri-Service Academy
originally endorsed by Fraser as Minister but put aside by the Gorton
Government; the revised threat assessment that I described earlier; and the
intention to adopt my recommended reorganisation after preparation of draft
directives, arrangement with the Public Service Board and preparation and
eventual passage of the necessary legislation.
Labor’s new settings for its defence policy were now in place and were, in
my view, a formidable achievement after 18 months in office.
There were other decisions reflecting Labor’s social philosophy. The civil
defence organisation was converted into the Natural Disasters Organisation for
relief work in the community as required. Army support for school cadets was
terminated (readily accepted by us, as this charge on the Defence vote showed
no evidence of later delivering recruits).
He was keen to revitalise the volunteer Citizen Military Force. He established




New problems for the Defence Department under Labor
Some unpredicted decisions by the Whitlam Government had created practical
problems in organisation—particularly the sudden abolition by Whitlam of the
Service Departments which had been headed by Barnard as a temporary measure.
The action had the consequence, presumably unforeseen by Whitlam, of
removing the Secretaries from the Service Boards, leaving direction of each of
the Services solely in the hands of uniformed officers. In due course the
Secretaries were relocated outside Defence, save for Sam Landau. I commented
in Chapter 1 on the inadequacy of reporting to Canberra on defence policy
debates in Congress and elsewhere. Indeed I had felt in earlier External Affairs
days that the Americans served their Australian ally well enough with their
views and their information about third countries, wanting no doubt to win our
support where it mattered. But we were not doing enough independent studies
on the Americans themselves. I never seemed to have enough embassy staff to
remedy that deficiency. A similar situation existed in Defence in the 1970s. We
needed to read the potentialities for change in American strategic policy and
posture. Pentagon sources, cooperative in other areas, were unlikely to offer
speculative opinion or forecasts of changes of this kind. In addition, we needed
more contact with divergent views in Congress and in the think-tanks that are
influential in the United States. Few Service officers were equipped for this kind
of enquiry and judgement. More often than not they seemed to approach the
Pentagon as a place for sharing operational and professional interests, and for
keeping alive past associations in combat.
This attitude seemed to be reciprocated by the Pentagon because, when I
nominated Landau to be Defence Attaché, there was an indignant protest and a
threat not to cooperate with a civilian. I insisted on keeping Landau in the post.
But his wings were clipped. Fortunately, Defence needs were met to some extent
by some Foreign Affairs officers with particular aptitude in this field who
happened to be in the Embassy.
Reforms of varying merit were being applied throughout the Public Service.
We had to fight off some that showed ignorance of Defence requirements. One
was the planned creation of a centralised government purchasing agency for the
purpose of exploiting the Government’s muscle against suppliers—a project
with an ideological flavour, pitting the Government against the private sector.
A report by a business adviser commissioned by the Government confused
procurement by identifying it with the act of purchasing. Doing so (in the case
of Defence) failed to accommodate the various elements that entered the
procurement process and selections, preceding the purchase contract with a
supplier. Big ticket items such as aircraft, ships, sensors, and fire control systems
are not bought ready made like motor vehicles on a display lot. Procurement
involved an iterative process between an officially approved Defence requirement
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and the equipment suppliers who showed themselves to be technically capable
of producing in a required time scale, with an assurance of maintenance feasibility
and much else, in a process involving hundreds of defence experts. Some worked
almost as part of the production process in the United States or Britain or France,
particularly on the modifications that the Australian buyer required because of
the unique atmospheric or geographic features of the continent. There was no
such capability elsewhere in the Public Service; and the concept of an adversarial
relationship between supplier and purchaser confined to price is inappropriate.
But several years later in 1978 the then Minister, James Killen, announced
the scrapping of the system and the restoration of Defence control of procurement
processes. His explanation (in succinct terms not always employed by Killen)
was as follows: ‘Presumably my colleagues opposite reasoned that a civilian
Minister, having nothing to do with the defence portfolio, would accept
responsibility to the nation for whatever results in war, this socialist apparatus
would impose on the Services.’
We had difficulty with the Commonwealth Auditor-General’s failure to
recognise that some procurement of high technology still in development required
management of the inherent risks, which he should judge on that basis rather
than simply calling into question the costs implicit in delivery delays as a result
of unforeseeable problems in the development process. That said, prudent
supervision by the Department of Defence required it to judge when a Service’s
ambition to acquire the highest technology used by major allies (rather than, as
they would say, ‘buying obsolescence’) involved unacceptable cost risks. Debate
on this issue in the Department’s policy committees was frequently heated, and
was a major contributor to the recurring complaint by the Service users of
interference by the civilians. To deplore such Service-civilian tensions as
avoidable missed the point. The issues required that there be tension, provided
it was constructive in purpose. What was needed in those early days of
invigorated Defence Department authority was respect for the different criteria
brought to the discussion, and tolerance of people doing their duty.
Unfortunately, these emollients were often absent in the debates during my time
as Secretary. There were personality faults on both sides.
While we were engaged and stretched to the limit in managing the ongoing
programme, and while I was personally tied up in devising Defence Force control
for the Minister for Defence, a major investigation of programmes and priorities
in the civil Departments was underway. The individual who had much to do
with recommending and planning for Whitlam was H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs. This
remarkable man served Prime Ministers on both sides of politics and was, in my
estimation, the greatest of all those who served the national interest in several
capacities, all of them outside of politics. This admiration had been first forged
when I had earlier been his subordinate in various international endeavours.
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Those investigating the Departments called me up for an investigation. Coombs
was not one of them. They were mainly members of the new breed of Ministerial
advisers/promoters. Typical of the culture of the times, several were consuming
beer while asking their questions (and in one case wounding my vanity by
declaring that my opinion would not satisfy an economist). I explained our
in-house process of reviewing against policy criteria, the Service and defence
factory programme. There is a suggestion in Coombs’ autobiography that he was
not satisfied by whatever he learned from his advisers in this process (and I was
not invited to meet him directly).8  His memoir reflects his chagrin at not being
able to examine whether Defence priorities were adjusting to the new strategic
outlook (which of course was precisely what we were doing for Barnard). Coombs
had John Stone, one of Treasurer’s most competent investigators, as his axeman,
but lamented that, like other Treasury officials, Stone was reluctant to target
Defence’s programmes. My own reflection, on reading this in later years, was
that Stone understood that there was no quick fix in Defence, comparable with
cutting fertiliser subsidies or business tax concessions—much simpler than
making judgements about the relevance to policy of Service activity. Moreover,
Treasury had long been a member of the Defence Committee. We were spared
educating the Task Force on these matters, while I was myself at the time
absorbed in pulling together the ramshackle system of financially managing
Defence activity. Labor’s Defence budget in 1974–75 made the first step to
conform to the new strategic review that had preceded it. In my career I have
had few such reasons to be grateful to Treasury.
Reshaping the force structure under Barnard
The new doctrine of the timing of threats, and Labor’s emphasis on the defence
of the Continent, started a process of change in the structure of the Defence
Force. But it was slow and hardly radical. There was resistance at different levels.
Politicians in office are reluctant to mothball low priority equipment when the
Opposition and media will protest about loss of jobs. When they had been a long
time in office, as the Coalition had, they might be admitting past procurement
mistakes of their own.
The Services, for their part, continued to table requests to replace whatever
equipment they possessed with technologically advanced equipment being
developed by the Americans and Western Europe to match the Soviet Union.
The beguilingly innocent expression ‘up-date’ was part of the Service jargon.
There being no incentive for a Service to drop out of competition with the other
two for a place in the programme, only effectively disciplined priorities in a
programme endorsed by the Minister could, if wisdom and foresight prevailed,
mould the components into a force called for by the endorsed strategic outlook.
Along with his second budget in July 1974, Barnard presented Labor’s first
five-year Defence Programme for the years 1975–79. He endorsed the
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methodology of the system initiated by his Coalition predecessors. There remained
the passage of the reorganisation legislation still in the hands of the draftsmen.
Even without it, the authority belonging to the Minister for Defence was now
beyond question; but the interpretation of the processes for deciding the
priorities, along with subjects such as continuity in management of each of the
major weapons procurement projects, remained to be dealt with.
As to the content of the budget, and of the new programme beyond it, the
share of the Defence Vote going to manpower continued to rise under Labor’s
expansionary decisions on pay and to conditions of service, and the increase in
the regular Army, which had consequences for other elements of the programme.
Capital expenditure—the foundation for the future—remained low in the budget.
It was possible to move a greater share into Defence facilities around the country.
As an example it was necessary, because of the paucity of effective port facilities
along our vast coast, to give the Navy adequate facilities for berthing and
provisioning for its short-range vessels patrolling the north and northwest. I
had myself observed, during a visit to Cairns, the inadequacy of the berths
adjacent to a mangrove swamp and of the on-shore facilities placed in a Chinese
laundry.
While preparing for the 1974 budget and in later months, contacts with
colleagues in other Departments made me aware of the disputes and constitutional
crises developing elsewhere. They included the so-called ‘loans affair’ and the
disquiet over the fiscal profligacy of the Treasurer, Dr Cairns, as inflation grew,
while he remained determined to finance all of Labor’s social objectives. In
contrast, Defence, while subject to the various experiments imposed on us that
I have described, was sheltered from the acrimony developing elsewhere,
particularly as the assault from the Labor Left abated. Our discussions were
internal to the portfolio and involved few Ministers other than our own to bring
them under control. Whitlam’s support of Barnard was an advantage for what
we hoped to achieve.
As for myself, I did not try to ingratiate myself with Labor Ministers and
had not done so when they were in Opposition. Some Public Service colleagues
were more ready than I to try to demonstrate their political sympathy. Unlike
others, I declined to attend Labor Party conferences. I had acted similarly when
the Coalition Ministers were in Government. I believed that talking to unofficial
groups of private Members of Parliament to satisfy the dissatisfactions of Caucus
with their leaders was not a requirement of a public servant. I recognise that
being so stiff-necked added to a reputation for aloofness and denied me the
opportunity to dispel false ideas about my being wedded to the policies of the
previous Government.
Barnard’s budget statement described equipment decisions that reflected his
view of where our strategic interests lay. He told Parliament that we needed to
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pay primary attention to ‘the surveillance and patrol of surrounding maritime
areas’ along with concepts and doctrines and the build up of forces with ‘a better
capability for independent actions in our own neighbourhood’. The Navy was
to get more patrol boats, and the Air Force acquisitions relevant to the objective.
Under this programme, the Navy’s prospect of acquiring a blue-water modern
aircraft carrier disappeared over the horizon on a reckoning of absence of strategic
need. (Its champions nonetheless were to be rewarded a decade or so later.)
The July 1974 defence debate was notable in two ways. One was the
participation of the Leader of the Opposition, Fraser, to criticise the withdrawal
of concerns for events in distant places. His shadow Defence Minister, Killen,
provided more entertainment than content on the Opposition’s policy intentions,
save for a warning that the new defence organisation would have to be scrapped
in war. There remained the differing emphases—on the one hand on capabilities
needed for the ultimate defence of the continent; and, on the other, those needed
for deployment in support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations area
and other places where security was deteriorating. With hindsight, it can be
said that Fraser’s insistence on the need to deal with distant threats (consistent
with his views in 1970) was a forewarning of what to expect if he became Prime
Minister. But I cannot claim to have given Opposition views much attention
when immersed in steering Labor’s programme, with no expectation of them
losing office in the short run.
It was satisfying to me that the Coalition no longer based the case on the need
to attract the support of the Americans under ANZUS. The idea of a more
self-reliant attitude, and the expectation of acting alone if necessary, seemed to
be taking hold. For example, Bill Morrison (shortly to become Minister) drew
on the 1972 Defence Review issued in Fairbairn’s time to urge acceptance of the
responsibility for defending the continent as the priority.
The Darwin cyclone
Labor’s Natural Disasters Organisation was tested by the devastation of Darwin
by Cyclone Tracy in December 1974. In support of the organisation, the Navy
mobilised and transported supplies for reconstruction of the city and relief of
its stricken and homeless citizens. The head of the Natural Disasters Organisation
(Major General Alan Stretton) flew north and took control during the serious
disruption that followed the violent winds and new flooding. Defence doctrine
had assured us that the country was immune from unforeseen military attacks
by an enemy. But Nature was not so predictable. Ministerial support and
directions were made difficult by the dispersal of Ministers around Australia
for the Christmas break and the absence of the Prime Minister abroad. Senior
administrators (Service and civilian) were absent from Canberra. I myself was
recalled from my mountain retreat by a message shouted across the river by a
neighbour who had been telephoned. Legal authority for orders that had to be
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made affecting people and property in Darwin was obscure, but Stretton
overcame this problem by force of personality.
Vice Admiral Synnot and I concerted in Canberra in conveying to Stretton
whatever advice or instructions were called for. Among other things, we sensed
that Stretton’s success in restoring reasonable order and confidence among the
shattered population had imposed a stress on him. We made a point of being
present at the airport when his flight south eventually bought him home (after
a decision to stay overnight with the acting Prime Minister, Cairns). He later
made his record of events, writing a book and by deciding to publish it while
still in service.9
A retrospect on Barnard
It was one of Barnard’s achievements to carry through radical changes in the
control of the Services with so little resistance or evidence of animosity. (Where
such animosity existed, it had been directed to a different target.) His success
can, on my estimation, be attributed to the response by his subordinates,
particularly the Services, to attractive elements in his personality. He was not
forceful in stating his views, indeed sometimes rather inarticulate. But the former
Tasmanian schoolteacher showed evidence of a strong moral code and respect
for propriety (which contrasted with the antics of some of his Cabinet colleagues).
He relied on his advisers. He showed courtesy and respect to senior Service
officers that perhaps attracted a loyalty to him beyond the requirements of duty.
He recognised his limitations. He came into office volunteering candidly to me
his own and his Party’s lack of administrative experience. This shortcoming did
unfortunately reveal itself in his strangely inept management of his two private
office assistants and his unawareness of what they were doing. He was vacillating
in those early days.
In Parliament he was not a striking speaker, somewhat handicapped by a
hearing disability from his days as a gunner in the Second World War. He
needed, and received, the support of Whitlam in resisting the campaign from
the Left against them over the American connection—in the media, in Labor’s
policy forums, in Parliament and, as he told me, sometimes in the Cabinet.
Reliance on public servants by Ministers is sometimes misrepresented to their
detriment. Barnard brought to his portfolio a range of ideas for change. I should
note for example that before receiving my advice that I have been describing,
he had earlier published proposals for integrating the Service Departments and
giving the Services better direction. On the strategic front he had argued for a
withdrawal of forces from Asia and for the contention that ‘Australia’s strategic
frontiers are the natural boundaries’ (contained in a Victorian Fabian Society
pamphlet in January 1969). Whatever research assistance he might have had,
he himself clearly articulated orally these thoughts to me several years later
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when giving me my riding instructions to come up with concrete proposals and
objectives.
It is noteworthy that so much of the Barnard/Labor reforms were kept intact
during the eight years of Coalition Government that followed Labor’s loss of
office in 1975.
Barnard chose to leave for his diplomatic appointment as Ambassador to
Sweden after he lost the deputy leadership and before the 1975 crisis which
overcame the Government. His successor, Morrison, was not so fortunate.
Some of the early confusions of the Whitlam reign, over objectives and
sometimes facts, from which Barnard was not immune, stemmed from the new
Government’s impetuosity and passionate zeal for reform (some would call it a
lack of understanding of what governing the country requires of Ministers
beyond conforming to the letter of the Party’s platform). A more relaxed timetable
(requiring confidence in winning a second term of office) would have avoided
some of the tensions and disputes. With more time the reorganisation in Defence
could have been more comprehensive, using additional investigators, and could
have left fewer problems for the future, whether in the military organisation of
the Services, or elsewhere in the defence production and procurement areas that
were shut out by the timetable given to me and which had to be left unattended
while Barnard and his adviser concentrated on what was achievable.
Whitlam’s Royal Commission: Enquiry into Intelligence
Services
In 1974 Whitlam had decided to appoint a Supreme Court Judge (Mr Justice
Hope), with the powers of a Royal Commissioner, to examine the country’s
Intelligence Services. It was no surprise to have the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation investigated in view of prevalent doubts, not confined
to the Labor Movement, about whether its procedures and judgements on
individuals had always been consonant in the past with respect for the rights
of the individual. I had had doubts and inadequate responses from the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation 20 years earlier, when I was Secretary of
External Affairs.
I thought it a perplexing judgement on Whitlam’s part to authorise a person
eminently equipped for a judicial finding on matters touching the rights of
individual Australians, to investigate and make recommendations on the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence about other countries where the
individual rights of foreigners were not an Australian responsibility. Problems
of organisation and control did exist, and there was a case for examining whether
there was efficiency in responding to the actual needs of Ministers, officials,
and the Services. These were questions of public administration and not judicial
findings, save for the question of conformity to law (and the Crown had its own
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legal advisers to call on). But this confusion did not deter the Prime Minister,
and I heard no evidence that he sought from experienced senior officials advice
on the terms for a government-organised enquiry. Politicians find solace in Royal
Commissions whose findings are unlikely to do them harm politically, and their
appointment silences the critics. When the Hope Report was issued, Whitlam
was out of office. I would hazard a guess that some of its findings (to which I
return later) would have been uncomfortable for some members of his Party had
he been in office and required to accept or reject them.
From my earliest time as Secretary in External Affairs I was carried by my
then Minister, Casey, into contact with allied Intelligence Services, meeting their
Chiefs in London and Washington, and listening to Casey’s enthusiasm for the
value of such Services. ‘War winners’ was his opinion, perhaps reflecting his
own recent wartime position in the Middle East. But, nearer to home, I was asked
to advise him (and the Prime Minister) on suitable arrangements for supervision
of a fledgling external Service that had been set up, whose energetic activities
and discussions in Washington and London were causing disquiet among senior
Ministers. I had no conviction that it would successfully add to the mountains
of information coming to us from overt sources. I was apprehensive that, at a
time when we were setting out to break down reservations in Asia about our
immigration and other policies, any blunders by intelligence gatherers could be
serious.
Greatly strained as we were, coping with recurring international military
and other crises in the mid-1950s, I tried to avoid being lumbered with any role
for me in this. I was also distrustful of the swashbuckling individuals, relishing
some high-level contacts they had made in Washington, who were heading the
venture. They appeared to bring about their own demise when Ministers decided
to abandon the project. But, after the individuals were disposed of, the project
was revived and I was told to create some kind of supervisory role for the
External Affairs Department, without being involved in knowledge of any
clandestine project. This was squaring circles, and the Charter I drafted was
later criticised by Justice Hope. Yet it preserved the constitutional validity of
Ministerial authority through a conventional Departmental Secretary, while
enabling the Minister to disavow, for diplomatic reasons, knowledge of any
cause of complaint by a foreign government. The Charter was applied during
the remainder of my service in Canberra—one of my least rewarding duties.
Later when I had moved to Defence, I tried to get inter-departmental agreement
to have the unit confined to a training role, until it developed adequate expertise
in intelligence gathering without risks to good defence relations abroad.
By the time Justice Hope started his enquiry I had several years experience
with both the product and (somewhat loose) supervision of the Defence Signals
Division, which was concerned (as was later publicly declared) with intelligence
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from foreign communications and with protection of the security of our own.
Use of the assessments of the Joint Intelligence Organisation under its National
Intelligence Committee was vital to some Defence decisions, including major
weapons acquisitions, whether as to timing or content. The system served very
well the requirements of the Defence apparatus and its Minister.
We took it as a duty to answer the Judge’s questions. I took control of the
Department’s responses on policy and opinions about how things worked in
practice, although he had in addition direct access to the various agencies. When
his Report was supplied several years later to the Fraser Government, I was to
learn how little influence my views had made. Various changes that he
recommended, in areas where I had administrative responsibility, were not
discussed with me.
He had no administrative experience. In Chapter 3 I question the validity of
some of his assumptions about how Ministers in Canberra would concern
themselves with studying intelligence assessments; I also note the superficiality
of his treatment of the extent to which the Services and the Defence Department
rely on the credibility of the intelligence assessment process in making decisions
on weapons selection and otherwise.
Reflections looking back: Whitlam and the Central
Intelligence Agency
In the later months of 1975 another phase of anti-American fervour erupted.
This led to a renewal of American concerns about the security from public
disclosure of those defence activities known to the Minister and the Department
but not made public.
Whitlam it seemed had a deep antipathy to the Central Intelligence Agency’s
involvement in destabilising left-wing governments. The toppling of the elected
(Salvador) Allende Government, and its replacement by the repressive (Augusto)
Pinochet military government, in Chile was such a case. The Prime Minister
ordered that the names of all Central Intelligence Agency personnel in Australia
be supplied to him. No doubt scenting political advantage, he publicly declared
the tenant of Doug Anthony’s house in Canberra to be a retired Agency employee,
and former Director of the Joint Defence Space Research Facility at Pine Gap.
As I said earlier, it was not until the 1980s that it was revealed by the then Labor
Government that the so-called space research activities at Pine Gap employed
intelligence officers; and as explained earlier, I considered it important in
Australia’s interests, for several reasons, that the Soviet Union should not be
informed in this way of the information-gathering functions of this highly
classified and valuable facility.
The Prime Minister was about to make a public address in Melbourne and I
tried to contact him to warn him about the security implications of his campaign
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to embarrass Anthony by declaring the former senior American at Pine Gap to
be a member of the American intelligence organisation. But I met again the
obstacle of my attempt to make contact being filtered by his personal staff. In
this case, my attempt was treated with derision and a leakage to the press.
To make matters worse, a ham-fisted American intelligence official, Ted
Shackley, in Washington fired off a telex to his contact in our Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation, extravagantly predicting serious consequences for
Australia’s relations which could follow the Prime Minister’s disclosures. When
I saw a copy I decided that this man’s threats were not a matter for concern and
that higher level policy people in Washington could be relied upon to hose him
down. But I did not count upon the mischief of some person publishing the
message, perhaps deliberately using the Australian media to regenerate hostility
to the Government’s defence ties with the Americans. A few copies were
distributed within the Department (and possibly Foreign Affairs) and at the
political level. I reported to my Minister by having a copy sent to Morrison’s
electoral office in Sydney where he and some of his personal staff were located.
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation took the message to Whitlam.
Knowing Whitlam as I did, I did not share American concern, and certainly
not their excited reaction, except in respect of one aspect of our intelligence
sharing arrangement with the Central Intelligence Agency. The problem grew,
unwittingly, out of the Prime Minister’s distrust of the Agency, which was
widely shared in the Labor Movement. I was not in a position to know whether
there was any basis for suspecting domestic interference in Australia by the
Agency, this being the responsibility of the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation. But I was completely aware of a fully disclosed Agency activity
of benefit to Australia. It was one that would be held to be so by members of
government of any political persuasion who were made privy to its nature and
purpose.
Our principal Defence Department intelligence liaison was with the parts of
the American systems which provided us with intelligence, on a reciprocal basis
where that capability existed. The liaison gave us intelligence gathered by
technology that we did not possess. Some informed us of the state of the nuclear
balance between the superpowers on which stable peace depended.
The Defence Department did not have, or need, liaison with any Central
Intelligence Agency operations by individuals working under cover in other
countries—the most notorious and, to some, objectionable activity of the Central
Intelligence Agency. One of the valuable elements in the Hope Report was
certification of the value to Australia of ‘close intelligence links with some of
the major intelligence agencies in the Western world’. During one of my meetings
with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I told him of the burden
of popular obloquy that partners had to carry, because of the lack of public
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awareness of the Agency’s work in independent analysis of situations in addition
to its covert illegal activities on the ground by its agents which attracted criticism
and notoriety. I suggested that he could do more to publicise the difference in
the multifaceted activities of his organisation. I have no reason to believe that
my suggestion had any practical effect.
The 1975 changes: A new Minister, Chiefs of Staff and
‘the Dismissal’
Barnard resigned from Parliament in June 1975 and was appointed Ambassador
in Sweden. His place in Cabinet was taken by Bill Morrison who had been
Barnard’s Minister Assisting (and earlier, Minister for Science). Morrison
therefore needed little briefing about the full range of portfolio interests.
My own relationship with him was not new, but subject to a complete reversal
of status. Morrison had been an officer in External Affairs subject to my
authority. He had taken a specialised course in Slavonic studies in London. I
had posted him to Moscow as First Secretary and Chargé (his second posting
there). In that post he had attracted the attention of the Soviet system and,
following our expulsion of a Soviet First Secretary from their Embassy in Canberra
for espionage, the Soviet Union retaliated and declared Morrison persona non
grata on a spurious charge of breaching diplomatic decorum. Barwick as Minister
robustly defended Morrison’s reputation and rejected the Soviet claim. But the
expulsion of Morrison proceeded.
What followed led me to issue a sharp instruction to Morrison. In the media
excitement in Australia over the expulsion, Morrison was met by the media at
all staging points of his exit. He so clearly enjoyed talking to the media and the
light of publicity cast on him that I told him while en route to Australia to cool
it or, more precisely, to shut up. While the Minister was dealing with Parliament,
and I with the Russians and the media, with the truth of the matter as best we
could ascertain it, it was necessary to avoid inadvertent conflict with what was
being uttered by a distant voice off-stage. What I failed to detect was a budding
politician enjoying being a public figure. He left the Department in 1969 after
successfully contesting a Sydney seat for the Labor Party. He had had a
remarkably rapid rise to the Ministry in the Whitlam Government, holding
several portfolios.
As a subordinate of Morrison the Minister, what I had said to him in 1963
did not appear to have affected our official relations. Unlike most of his
predecessors, he was well informed on international security and defence issues.
He took me and others on the customary call on the Pentagon and other American
officials. He investigated the US Coast Guard Service, prompted by the current
strain on our naval patrol boat capabilities caused by the flow of ‘boat people’
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into Australian waters. He also examined progress by the Americans with the
light frigate programme.
Back at home, the Defence Reorganisation Bill was debated in the Senate in
August and on 28 October the Governor-General approved the Act and directed
that it be proclaimed and enter into force on 9 February 1976. But before then
events were moving into a crisis for the Government.
Morrison’s 1975–76 budget sought an estimated 2.8 per cent of the Gross
Domestic Product. It reflected the increased cost of Barnard’s earlier decisions
on manpower and conditions of service, as well as the price inflation which
Labor’s fiscal policies had generated throughout the economy. Nevertheless, an
increase in capital equipment’s share was achieved.
But in late 1975 the Government was forced into finding ways of paying for
government services as supply dried up under the Senate blockade. Treasury
initiated a plan for paying members of the Services with vouchers, redeemable
at banks. It was unworkable. An example of this was the situation in which
wives and dependents of the Navy’s other rank seamen, away at sea, found
themselves—unfamiliar with banking and fearful of what might happen next.
Before this bizarre, but constitutionally significant, situation developed
further, 11 November arrived. I had no knowledge of the Prime Minister’s
intentions or, indeed, of any of the political manoeuvres leading to that day. I
attended the Remembrance Day service at the Australian War Memorial, returned
to my desk briefly, and went to lunch, returning to my office before 2.00 pm.
I remained in complete ignorance of what was going on at Yarralumla, and have
since relied, years later, on the details provided by Paul Kelly in his book.10
While I was sitting at my desk catching up with accumulated papers, my
secretary burst into the room to say that the Prime Minister had been dismissed
and replaced by Malcolm Fraser. This seemed so improbable that I asked where
she had received the information. ‘From my mum, listening to the radio,’ she
said. I told her, no doubt with some acerbity, not to interrupt me in future with
tales from her mother. Nonetheless, I switched on the radio. I heard Malcolm
Fraser speaking from the Government benches. I do not recall whether I gave
my secretary the apology for my disbelief that she undoubtedly deserved.
ENDNOTES
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The Early Fraser Ministry
James Killen, Minister for Defence
Before retirement in 1979 I served my remaining four years in government
service under James Killen as Minister and Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister.
At the end there was a well-intentioned, but publicly controversial and
financially impractical, proposal from Ministers that I accept an extension beyond
the compulsory retiring age of 65, which I declined. On retirement, I was able
to turn to neglected family affairs, some writing and occasional involvement in
seminars, and to take a short-term appointment nominated by the Prime Minister
to review the Public Service in Fiji for that Government.
Killen had held the Navy portfolio (now defunct) in the McMahon Ministry.
After the now familiar formalities of inducting a new Minister into some classified
areas which were subject to limited access, my first interest was to ascertain
whether the reorganised system, and the policies put in place by his Labor
predecessor, would be confirmed or wound back. Several matters hung in the
air. Although amendments to the Defence Act had been proclaimed, they were
not to come into effect until February 1976. The content of the Five Year
programme would need to be reviewed by the Government, along with its
underlying strategic assumptions. We could expect a call for a comprehensive
review of those assumptions. Recommendations expected from the Hope Royal
Commission affecting Defence would require decision. There was the Defence
Force Academy project, several times deferred. There were inefficiencies, such
as the low productivity of the civilian workforce in the Williamstown Dockyard
managed by the Navy, which needed fixing. The Department had the problem
of the over-manned technical and support staff which had been dedicated to the
long defunct rocket programme at Woomera. I needed also to learn from the
new Minister how he would respond to the unabated sniping from his backbench
over the role of civilians in the Department.
Killen confirmed that the Coalition would not try to unwind the system
embodied in the legislation. But he wished to place above it a Defence Council
chaired by the Minister. I had the documentation prepared. My own attitude
was that it was not really necessary to have a Council for him to call in the
Secretary and the Chiefs to report collectively to him, but there was no harm in
it. Unlike the kind of executive Board of Management for which some Chiefs
had hankered, and with which Killen was familiar in his Navy portfolio, such
a Council could not be reconciled with the new legislation establishing new lines
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of authority downwards from the Minister through the diarchy accountable to
him. A new Council could advise the Minister but not make decisions. In the
event it met rarely.
Problems to overcome in the new system
The time had come to work out arrangements and procedures between the
Secretary and the newly created office of Chief of Defence Force Staff in the
exercise of their joint administration of the Defence Force. At the same time each
Service Chief, now possessing sole command of his Service, had to be given the
financial and other delegations needed for him to exercise this comprehensive
responsibility, acting within the policy parameters bid down from the
Department.
Within the Department it was necessary to give practical shape to the several
‘organisations’, described in my Report, in the form of conventional Public
Service establishments—in most cases divisions headed by First Assistant
Secretaries under a Deputy Secretary. I obtained the concurrence of my Service
colleague, General Sir Francis Hassett, with this new structure of functional
Divisions overseeing uniform policy application to all three Services. Some were
headed by two-star Service officers, some by civilians. For example a new
Facilities Division, to which I appointed an officer who had originally been a
Defence Scientist, would programme the construction and maintenance of
buildings and facilities at Service bases. In this way I intended to bring under
supervision specifications which sometimes were the product of ambitiously
creative Works Department architects, with no incentive for economy, and base
commanders seeking nothing but the best for their headquarters. In contrast,
living quarters for soldiers’ families in Townsville and elsewhere in the North
lacked amenities, as a result of earlier Treasury control requiring the Services
to conform to the standards of State housing commissions.
The new situation facilitated the setting up by the Department, without
tedious negotiation with independent Services, of project teams to manage the
acquisition of capital equipment whose procurement and performance
specification had previously been approved elsewhere in the system and endorsed
by the Minister. It was not so easy to find qualified Service leaders in this field,
and thereafter to prevent the loss of the expertise they acquired as a result of
their Service’s promotion or posting policies that took them away to other duties.
We had other frustrations, working subject to the rigidities of different portfolio
authorities outside Defence. While approving contracts with overseas suppliers
involving large financial implications (larger than likely to be found in the
private sector), and with the need for them to conform, subject to penalties, to
strict Service specifications, I was denied having legal advice at one’s elbow.
The indivisibility of Commonwealth legal opinion required that we take time to
inform and consult another Department, and to accept the Attorney-General’s
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Department’s own priorities for use of staff. External consultancies were not
easily approved as an alternative.
With the disappearance from each Service of the two-star Board members,
each of whom had responsibility for managing the specialised area under his
command, new lines of authority from, and accountability to, the Chief of Staff
had to be drafted. Some archaisms remained to be eliminated at some stage, such
as the Army’s persistence with semi-independent regional Commands in state
capitals—a hangover from pre-Federation colonial days. The Navy, formerly
commanded by its five-member Naval Board, was now to be made unambiguously
responsible to the Chief of Staff. I left these matters to the Chief of Defence Force
Staff. I later came to recognise that I had made an error of judgement in not
scrutinising the systems the Chiefs were setting up, where they involved matters
of finance and defence policy and not military command of training and
deployment alone.
Various misunderstandings or challenges from the Chiefs had to be cleared
up or disposed of. The Chief of Air Staff of the time challenged the concept and
practicability of ‘two-hatted’ arrangements. More importantly, the Chief of
Defence Force Staff in 1976 stated his view that, on most matters, senior civilian
and Service officers should be responsible to both the Chief of Defence Force
Staff and the Secretary. This view was unacceptable because the Government
had approved my concept that such civilians would remain responsible to their
Public Service head, but ‘responsive’ to the Chief of Defence Force Staff.
Conversely, it had been agreed that Service officers under command would be
‘responsive’ to the Secretary on matters within his responsibilities. Neither
Service command of Public Servants or civilian command of Service officers
would apply except by specific assignment, and then would not extend to
discipline or conditions of service. With the passage of time, working
arrangements between the two joint administrators reduced frictions and worked
in the way that I expected and have described in the previous chapter. In order
to become aware of causes of dissatisfaction with Public Service attitudes, I
arranged to make a call periodically on each Chief for frank discussion of any
such problems.
As one Chief of Defence Force Staff succeeded another, I came to believe that
there was some reluctance on the part of the occupant of this office to overrule
the Chiefs of the two Services to which he did not belong. I can only speculate
about the attitude of mind behind this. I do recall that during the high-level
committee consultations on the five-year programme involving the Chiefs over
which I presided during the 1970s, it was often a senior civilian adviser rather
than a Chief of Staff who initiated a critical analysis requiring rejection of another
Chief of Staff’s proposal. There was one exception—maritime aviation was a
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subject where such inhibitions vanished, as the historic rivalry between the Air
Force and the Navy lit up meetings.
The Chief of Defence Force Staff had a rather small staff, yet there was no
obstacle to his appointing more senior people to support the exercise of command
over the Services, calling a Service to account to him where justified. In later
years, looking on as an observer outside Defence, I have noted the use by Chief
of Defence Force Staff (now Chief of the Defence Force) of the power of command
to bring about substantial changes in Service Commands. Some of these ideas
existed in the 1970s but were not put into practice.
Public perceptions in the politics of Defence
I did not expect that proposals from the Services for weapons better related to
Australia’s strategic environment, along with the necessary policy decisions,
would be achieved quickly. Changes in organisation do not of themselves change
policies or underlying attitudes. They are intended to work towards the right
policies. But in the public discussion in Parliament, and by the so-called defence
correspondents in the media, the purpose of change was largely neglected.
Instead, attention was paid to the more emotion-stirring and newsworthy aspects:
whether one of the Services was to have a favoured weapons system denied,
whether civilians had come out winners in some debate and so forth.
A central requirement remained—to ensure that each Service was preparing
for the same wars at the same time and in the same place, as Malcolm Fraser had
put it back in 1970. Embedded attitudes, old rivalries and aspirations might take
another decade or more to change.
Would the electorate, upon which Ministers depended for survival, also
adjust? Unlike most areas of Commonwealth Government activity, defence and
foreign policy have a constituency which is founded not so much on material
and definable interests as on memories, inherited convictions about friends and
likely enemies, along with associated fears and attachments, and some historical
myths. Some memories and old faiths lose relevance because of radical change
in weapons and surveillance technology; or because Australia’s geopolitical
environment has changed in directions not shared by the countries who have
been our familiar friends and allies. But, on my observation of politics at work,
it becomes difficult—particularly on the conservative side of politics—to change
defence priorities rooted in the past. Old and respected images, like that of the
underpaid self-sacrificing volunteer digger of the First World War, stand in the
way of new priorities that make less call today on service to the nation of this
kind. But there are public institutions that preserve the past in order to honour
it. The leadership of the Services themselves, with proud memories of battle
achievements, sometimes find lessons in them which have dubious application
to contemporary threats that governments would be likely to accept as justifying
102
Defence Policy-Making
a military response. Our Services excel in their mastery of ever-advancing
technologies. It will always be more difficult to ensure their relevance to credible
threat contingencies. That involves judgement about the unprovable, and the
assembly of intellectual resources going outside the Services for verdicts that
are well informed and objective—and not always popular.
Differing views on our strategic interests
A principal interest for me was whether the Coalition intended to resurrect
‘forward defence’ as the strategic basis for developing changes in the force
structure and, if so, in what direction we would be expected to look for future
potential deployments.
I had chanced my arm in an address to a Summer School at my old University
of Western Australia in January 1976. I had then argued that we should
distinguish between outbreaks of violence abroad that could not be called a
‘threat’ (that activating word) to the physical security of Australia, and any
events that did; and, as to the latter, countries with the maritime capability to
attack Australia were very few, and that we would have adequate warning time.
Ideas similar to this were included in a White Paper which we drafted, with
Pritchett making a major contribution, and which Killen issued in his first year
in November 1976. Killen recognised publicly that Britain would no longer count
as a military power East of Suez, while at the same time paying a tribute to the
protection which historically Britain had offered Australia.
The Paper pointed to our limited ability to operate in distant places, and to
the requirement for successful defence in areas closer to home. For this we needed
a force capable of expansion, with a substantial capability of operating
independently of allies. I believed we were making progress in two respects:
realism about the limits of our capabilities, and abandonment of the earlier public
position that a policy of greater self-reliance would throw in doubt the faith,
necessary to preserve publicly in the conservative view, that the Americans
would bring combat support under ANZUS if Australia needed it.
At much the same time, both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Andrew
Peacock were speaking of the dangers in the Indian Ocean from the developing
Soviet presence and the disappearance of the old power balance. Peacock also
pointed to the Soviet Union’s achievement of nuclear parity with the United
States. When the Prime Minister began publicly defining the threats against
which Australia should prepare, I doubt that he was much influenced by the
Defence Department’s focus on where we believed our essential interests lay
(along with its realistic view of our capability of serving them). I did not know
whether Fraser consulted Killen, but the content of Fraser’s statements confirmed
that the Prime Minister was little influenced by the argument in the White Paper
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that Australia’s concern should be restricted to any threats developing in
Australia’s geographic neighbourhood.
In 1976 Fraser made a number of visits overseas, presumably wanting to
convey a policy outlook different from that of his much travelled predecessor.
In July he visited Japan and China. His report spoke optimistically of the prospect
of a better understanding with China, while expressing apprehension about the
build-up of Soviet military strength. He declared it was a concern of Australia
that no power would dominate either the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asia.
This focus was different from the Defence Department’s concern with our
immediate archipelagic North and with the constraints on our capability to
deploy beyond our shores. Our difficulty in supporting physically our modest
deployment in Vietnam made the point. Stores and maintenance facilities were
concentrated in the South of the continent. Means of transport were limited.
The constraint was also political: electoral resistance to providing manpower by
conscription until a crisis situation was recognised, by which time adequate
training might not be feasible.
Yet, in the face of these predictable handicaps, our political leaders have
sometimes had a yearning to create an Australia somewhat larger than life and
to make political commitments that would be difficult to live up to
militarily—whether in Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings or in
communiqués with leaders of countries visited. Political and moral exhortation
is one thing; being prepared to take military action is quite another. There was
a welcome note of self-reliance in Fraser’s omission of ritualistic statements of
our dependency on the content of the ANZUS Treaty. But he was consistent in
his convictions about Australian activism. When Defence Minister six years
earlier, in the first declaration of his outlook towards Southeast Asia and the
surrounding Pacific and Indian Oceans, he had said: ‘If that environment is
going to change we want to be able to play a meaningful part in the change.’
In 1976 and 1977 he was reiterating a long-held distrust of Soviet intentions.
When later the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and enlarged its Indian Ocean
naval presence, his reaction was to acquire an aircraft carrier with blue-water
capabilities, accepting the claim that such vessels make on financial resources
for the escort protection they provide.1
Offering defence commitments beyond the military capacity to meet them is
not new in the world. British diplomacy has long practised it. For Australia a
similar diplomacy or yearning for an international role carries the risk of being
left exposed, because an imprudent deployment is not easy to reverse without
a price. Deployment abroad engenders national pride. But withdrawal, if made
necessary in the face of danger because of being left without allied support,
would have the opposite effect and becomes difficult for any government.
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I had earlier seen a risk of this kind in the continued retention of the Air
Force squadrons at Butterworth after the British had withdrawn from the area
and our aircraft on the ground were only protected from close-range guerrilla
attack by a not yet effective Malayan Army. In 1969 Prime Minister Gorton had
said that their retention made it easier to deploy other units if the need arose,
which begged the question whether this vulnerable deployment had strategic
value for Australia. My view did not prevail. The withdrawal was made years
later.
Fraser was using new people to advise him, particularly on the global threats
from the Soviets. In respect of the Indian Ocean as a source of threats, statements
by Peacock provided perspective, reminding us of the vast oceanic distance
separating the Soviet base in Berbera from Western Australia. It seemed to me,
however, that Australia had a more credible interest in the choke points in our
archipelagic North than in more distant Soviet locations.
President Carter and the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean came under discussion in mid-1977 when Malcolm Fraser
made his first call on US President Jimmy Carter. By then the Americans had
advocated that they and the Soviets accept a limitation on their respective
presences in the Indian Ocean, maintaining a balance but at the lowest practicable
level. Australia supported the idea. I do not recall whether there was any Soviet
response. At the same time, the Soviet Union was waging a diplomatic offensive
by developing its SS-20 medium-range missile capability against North Atlantic
Treaty Organization positions in Europe, while simultaneously proclaiming the
virtues of a détente in East-West relations which was attracting some support
in world opinion.
Later during the 1990s high Russian officials of that earlier period admitted
to television interviewers that détente had the specific intention of attracting
public opinion, particularly in France, away from support for the American
deployments in Europe. One official ruefully admitted lack of coordination with
this political propaganda, in as much as the military industry sector chose this
time to make the threatening deployment of the SS-20.
I thought it one of Carter’s woollier foreign policy forays, when he expounded
the idea of making the Indian Ocean a demilitarised zone. Hearing him advocate
this to Malcolm Fraser as an appeal to world opinion to offset the advantage of
the Soviet case for détente, it occurred to me that the President had chosen for
the experiment in disarmament the most distant location from his own territory.
In the diplomatic discussions it had been recognised that demilitarisation
confined to the Indian Ocean did not address the potential for a build-up of
aggressive air capabilities on the littoral to the Ocean. Pentagon officials began
to espouse the idea of an agreement to prevent superpower forces from being
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so deployed. Australia was one of the littoral states potentially affected. I had
discussions with the Pentagon (and, as it proved necessary, with our own Foreign
Affairs Department), explaining the impracticability of the idea. I sent Pritchett
(who was later to succeed me as Secretary) to explain Australian defence interests.
In formulating the Department’s attitude I pointed out to our Foreign Affairs
Department what the domestic political consequences might be if, in a Senate
election, the voters of Western Australia were told of an agreement that forbade
the Americans deploying, in an emergency, on their exposed coastline while
Queenslanders suffered no impediment to the return of the Americans to their
State.
Détente continued to gather some support in the foreign offices of the world
and among peace-loving people. I cannot claim to have discerned at the time
how specifically it was aimed at destabilising support in France for the American
presence in Europe. But in discussions in Canberra I did warn against allowing
détente to become the kind of defence soporific that the Soviet Union intended
it to be.
As is well recognised, Carter imported judgements about morality into his
foreign policy. We had a direct experience of his personal devotion to practising
his religion: we waived diplomatic immunity to allow his Secret Service access
to the Australian Embassy Chancery rooftop to protect him on Sundays while
Carter worshipped in the Baptist Church adjoining our building.
Inflation: Its consequences for Defence in the 1970s
Much of the Department’s activity under Killen and the new Coalition
Government from 1976 onwards was aimed at bringing to fruition the reforms
initiated by its predecessor, and fighting for funds predicated in the ongoing
Five Year Defence Programme. The programme under Labor had substantially
moved towards a greater share for capital equipment and capital works on bases
and fixed installations around the continent.
The days of Ministerially directed reforms were behind us. One reform whose
origins preceded the Whitlam Government was the programming system now
embedded in the management of the Services and of the activities of the
Department. But its methods, and the priorities it recommended for Ministerial
incorporation in his approved programme, continued to be challenged by Services
whose equipment or manpower bids were reduced or denied under the discipline
of the system. In addition, new strains were imposed on the system from the
fiscal controllers in the Government as it began to address what threatened to
become dangerous inflation. The Consumer Price Index, a standard measure of
inflation, grew by 9.3 per cent in 1977 and tight fiscal measures still left it at a
high growth of 7.8 per cent in 1978. A practical consequence of this, affecting
me and others, was to spend very much time in conference with the Chiefs
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revising, reprogramming and debating where the axe should fall—time which
could otherwise have been spent in addressing deficiencies in various parts of
the sprawling Defence empire.
Moreover, I would surmise that this frequent recasting of plans, necessitated
by the unwillingness of Ministers to provide budget funds at the level previously
approved for planning purposes, fed into doubts about the legitimacy of the
system. With a receptive audience among those backbenchers with a Service
background, scapegoats could be found—particularly the role of civilians in
assessing and disputing plans for their part of the total force structure put
forward separately by each of the three Services.
Before long we also began to experience the Fraser style of directing the
business of government, and the extent to which he subjected his Ministers and
their officials to an inquisition as to what they were doing, and as to the validity
of the policies they were recommending to Cabinet. In the main, the Defence
Department and its Minister got off lightly, apart from cuts in expenditure
aggregates, until the 1978–79 budget. I do not recall any Prime Ministerial
intervention in the shaping of the force structure (this was, as I understand it,
to change later when, after retirement, I was no longer privy to what went on).
Fraser was directing his enormous energy, and his demands on others, to
reforming the machinery of government and to meeting the economic and social
problems of Australia. We nevertheless felt the backwash of his demands for
re-examination of advice, and for a response to demands for information under
short and sometimes unreasonable timetables. Some Parliamentary Committees
noticeably began treating public servants more peremptorily than had been
customary. The style was catching.
Towards the end of 1976 I used a session of the Minister’s new Defence
Council to tell him that unreasonable strains were being imposed on both civilian
and Service officers from the expenditure controllers of Cabinet in the campaign
against inflation, and to request his intervention. We had particular problems
when Cabinet demands began to be directed at designated expenditure activities
without an understanding of the consequences. I believed that some had more
to do with pandering to popular prejudice than with achieving rational
economies. Cuts imposed on travel expenditure were such a case. Rather than
preventing suspected high-living in luxury hotels, the cuts impacted more on
the ability to send Servicemen to places where they could train with others in
suitable formations, or on the ability of auditors to travel to the remote areas
where expenditure delegations were exercised and waste might occur. But we
had limited success in getting a hearing.
Beyond these irrationalities on particulars, Defence had eventually to accept
a reduction of previously approved programmes in toto. In explaining to
Parliament the 1978–79 Defence appropriation, Killen was obliged to explain
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that budget stringency had forced the rescheduling or modification of acquisitions
planned in the White Paper two years earlier. He was nevertheless able to point
to the transition of the Services to the new technologies of missiles and sensors
which had particular value for a country where manpower was limited and had
vast areas requiring protection. It was particularly satisfying to the Department
that he linked the acquisition of some specified equipment to the requirements
for operations in Australia’s near neighbourhood—the focus we were advocating.
He spoke of patrol boats with an improved sea-keeping capacity for deployment
off-shore, and of the stipulation that contenders for the major fighter replacement
should have an air-to-surface capability against hostile shipping in the approaches
to Australia.
In making his March 1979 statement to Parliament, Killen accepted the
Department’s advice to marry an emphasis on ability to defend ourselves against
credible threats to our own soil with, as he put it, ‘the practical option of
contributing to Pacific defence in accordance with the ANZUS treaty’. As to the
first, he said that our allies could be expected to look to Australia ‘to be
reasonably self-reliant, and to make a maximum effort to look after its own
security’. For me this was a satisfying recognition by a Minister of a conservative
government of the outlook given shape by the earlier Labor Administration.
Since he was at the same time announcing reduced expenditure targets, Killen
went to some lengths to explain that few powers possessed the capability of
overwhelming our sea and air forces at the end of a long logistic line, and that
most of them are friends and allies.2  Lesser regional powers did not possess the
capability to succeed; and, were they to set out to develop it over time, the
intention would be blindingly obvious to us.
In later years, under a succeeding Labor Government, this view of ample
warning time came to be challenged as being over-sanguine about the strength
of potential local threats. But I saw a cause for satisfaction in that, subject to the
ebb and flow of simplistic political rhetoric, there emerged at last a consensus
that Australia should make defence of its own territory the first duty of a
self-respecting nation without looking first to others.
Differences with the Royal Commission on Intelligence
Early in 1977 Mr Justice Hope began to issue his findings and his opinions on
organisation. His Second Report made findings on security checking and a
security appeals tribunal—matters involving the balance between individual
rights and care for national security. As an administrator I welcomed the clear
judicial definition of where responsibility lay, a matter which had troubled me
in respect of some cases that arose in my dealings from External Affairs with the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation almost 20 years earlier.3 The
Judge’s recommendations cleared away a fog of uncertainty on these matters.
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His Third Report was of a totally different character, reflecting the mixed
bag of subjects given him by the Whitlam Government. It dealt with the
machinery for the official control, direction and coordination of Australia’s
Intelligence Services (all of them concerned with Australia’s interests
internationally). As one finally responsible for the administration and funding
of several of the Services, I was deeply interested in the Judge’s opinions.
I saw no reason then, nor do I now, to treat them as judicial findings, based
on evidence and the application of the law. The rights of individuals were not
involved. Some laws were relevant (such as accurate use of appropriations) but
only marginally to what was a complex administrative matter requiring
judgement of how Ministers and officials operated, how they used the system,
and how, on the basis of reliable administrative experience, they might operate
in future. Working habits could in practice be more important than strictures
as to how Ministers and officials ought to use intelligence.
I thought some of the Judge’s ideas on these aspects to be inept and his
proposed structures (with one important exception) misguided and faulty. As
to intelligence-gathering from covert sources, I had long held the view that more
information was being fed into the system than would be used by a power
possessing interests and influence internationally as limited as those of Australia
in peacetime. We had inherited from the Second World War a large and generally
efficient collection system, working in collaboration with two great powers,
equipped to reveal any threat to strategic interests in any part of the world. But
in the post-war world, Australia’s activities narrowed as we defined for ourselves
a regional rather than a global focus. At the same time there remained a need
that was intangible, to assist our partners by gathering information that was of
use to them by way of reciprocity for what they provided to us. My opinion on
putting limits to our efforts had to be qualified by this consideration. Limits
could only be a matter of judgement. The Judge did not share my doubts. His
reports called for more and not less intelligence-gathering.
What was needed, in my opinion, was an understanding of how Departments
and Ministers and Services operated in Canberra in practice, as distinct from
theoretical ideas founded in a constitutional view of the role of Ministers. There
is an attraction towards creating new administrative machinery to satisfy
requirements that owe more to theoretical pre-conceptions than to hard-nosed
prediction of actual usage.
As to control of the covert agencies, there had always been the problem of
how to arrange a chain of accountability to someone accountable in turn to
Parliament. One agency was responsible ultimately to the Department of Defence
while the other (with an undeclared source of funds) was under the general
policy direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.4
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For the system of interpreting and issuing assessments on the material
provided by the gatherers, there was the opposite problem. To which single
Minister should they be accountable? The existing organisation was the product
of the Fairhall/Bland administration. The Minister for Defence was accountable
through his funding of the National Intelligence Committee and its staff, while
the Minister for Foreign Affairs could make demands on the body for priority
reports through his Department’s representation on a supervising National
Assessment Committee. The two principal customers thus had their interests
satisfied.
This conclusion necessarily had to be reviewed by the Judge when he took
the didactic view that other Ministers and Departments ought to make use of
intelligence reports on economic and commercial subjects. The system of control
would have to accommodate them.
I thought his basic assumption to be wrong, having long observed, and heard,
the preference of leaders of the economic Departments to rely on their own overt
sources and contacts abroad. As to Ministers, their long periods of absence far
from Canberra, their working habits when spending four days in Canberra, and
the competing claims on their time made it extremely unlikely that reading
intelligence reports would claim their attention except on rare occasions.
The Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers were different. The existing system
satisfied both Departments. It had replaced an earlier ponderous Committee
system based on British practice with which I had had difficulties in External
Affairs 20 years earlier. It had provided little aid to policy decisions because of
an inability to keep time with the need for a prompt response to, sometimes
public, international developments. The current Joint Intelligence
Organisation/National Intelligence Committee system had the further advantage
of having qualified staff with proximity to their policy customers able to task
them with explanations of what they were interested in—thus avoiding the
ever-present risk of the intelligence community cocooning itself in a world
satisfying its own interests.
As I shall suggest, the Judge’s alternative system failed some of these tests
of suitability as far as the Defence Department was concerned. In one respect
his recommended system had the virtue of breaking away from overseas
precedents by devising a system to meet Australian needs. But I believe there
was probably a lack of understanding of the differences in the focus of
assessments needed in the conduct of foreign affairs and those needed for
decisions in the Defence system. Foreign Ministers and Departments are expected
to respond promptly (and not lag behind the media) to new events and situations
abroad. When there is no crisis of a security kind directly affecting Australia,
the Defence system is more likely to need assessments looking to the longer-term
future. The process does not demand a Ministerial response. He needs to know
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that the subject is being worked on for incorporation in later decisions. Emphasis
on the longer range derives from the criteria for weapons procurement and
training in their use. All require best estimates, at decision time, of the nature
of military threat and of the most effective response 10 or even 20 years
hence—such is the lead-time, and the time in service, of what is procured or
trained for.
The Defence system therefore must have confidence that those making the
assessments which will underlie decisions on force structure bring to bear expert
knowledge, a reputation for balanced judgement, and an understanding of what
studies will be relevant to shaping the force structure. In making his
recommendation that ‘the greater part of the Joint Intelligence Organisation be
transferred to the administration of the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet’, the Judge failed to acknowledge these requirements. His suggestion
that an officer of one of the Services be seconded to the new organisation
indicated his lack of understanding of the need of the Services to be associated
in the way I have indicated. A single Service officer divorced (physically and
organisationally) from the Defence system would be a piece of ineffective
tokenism.
In December 1976, Killen criticised in Cabinet the proposed demolition of the
Joint Intelligence Organisation. Cabinet charged a Committee of senior executives
with recommending a way of effecting sensibly the broad purpose of a central
assessing and evaluation body responsible to the Prime Minister, without
endorsing specifically any part of the Hope Report. I made my objections and
criticisms known and this prompted the Prime Minister early in the 1977 New
Year to telephone me from Nareen.5  He directed that we meet shortly to discuss
our differences on how to reform the assessing organisation, saying he was not
wedded to any particular solution.
Nevertheless, as Cabinet had already decided to create new machinery, in
the several meetings that I had with Fraser I could only argue the case for
retention of an effective Joint Intelligence Organisation and suggest the restraints
needed on this new creation. We met on one occasion for two hours. As to the
first, I explained the futility of the idea of satisfying the military and defence
requirements of a broad spectrum of intelligence for weapons procurement, as
well as military operations, by seconding a single Service officer to this new
body. I said that if that body was to enter these fields, the Prime Minister might
have to explain publicly why the Chiefs and their supporting Department should
rely on the priority given them, and the judgements made by people they had
no part in appointing, had probably never heard of, and who were accountable
to a different Minister. I also said that my earlier experience made me sceptical
of the Judge’s expectation of useful commercial information from clandestine
sources.
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I said there would be a danger of empire-building unless a ceiling was put
on staffing, and the numbers of quality people available were few. I suggested
50 or 60 would be adequate. A Joint Intelligence Organisation with functions
reduced, but recognised as serving diverse Defence needs, would cooperate with
the new body that he wanted.
In what followed these views appear to have prevailed. The Office of National
Assessments was kept to the functions and staffing limits that I advocated.
During my remaining years at Defence, the two organisations developed
cooperative relations including sharing of secure premises. In later years I heard
suggestions that the Office of National Assessments was occupied more with
distributing assessments of current events affecting Australia, as against the
longer-range view of potentialities needed by Defence. This I believe to be more
demanding on the quality of assessors because it depends on sound judgement
as much as reliable information.
Experiences serving Malcolm Fraser
There were various occasions abroad, not all concerned with Defence policy,
when the Prime Minister required me to accompany him. His activities abroad
went beyond matters of strategy and the increasing military build-up by the
Russians. His Government took the view that Australia’s resources of uranium,
at a time of growing dependence on electricity generation from nuclear plants,
gave us a bargaining counter. Thus armed, Malcolm Fraser decided to tackle the
European Economic Commission over its restrictions and subsidies that were
hurting Australia. He first visited governments in France and Germany. Although
defence matters were not on the agenda, save for a call on the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (General Alexander Haig—later US Secretary of State), I
was included in a party of officials, headed by Fraser’s ‘can-do’ Departmental
Secretary (Alan Carmody, a former trade official). In an atmosphere of frantic
activity, serving the Prime Minister’s demands for up-to-date briefings, this was
a visit to Europe like no other. In each capital we saw little beyond the walls of
hotel rooms where the team wrote papers at night, not on the country outside
but on the one about to be visited next morning. In Brussels I was given a seat
at the table of a European Economic Commission meeting headed by the President
(Britain’s Roy Jenkins) and listened to our Prime Minister wade into the
Commission (on subjects for which I had no current responsibility). There was
much agitation on the part of several Commissioners. It was not my function to
ascertain when back in Australia what results ensued. I came away with the
distinct impression that Fraser’s brusque diplomatic methods in a formal European
environment might have been more likely to shock than to persuade.
Back in Canberra, there was not much reason for the Defence Secretary to
see the Prime Minister direct. We had had that close association in 1971 and
1972, at a time when he had few confidants and when he needed to talk while
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he was weighing up whether his dissatisfaction with Gorton should cause him
to resign. I have reason to believe that he then trusted me, and some public
references to me in later years bear that out. But I did not seek to take advantage
by asking to see him when he was Prime Minister. One Minister urged me, as a
person he believed the Prime Minister would listen to, to tell him of the
discontent among Ministers with the demands he was making on them by taking
so much business into Cabinet for them to be grilled in lengthy meetings.6  Since
the way the Prime Minister managed his Cabinet was none of my business, I
took no action on the matter.
In 1976 Fraser called me in to express concern about what he thought to be
a loss of respect in the Public Service for political impartiality. There were
leakages to the Opposition and media of classified documents. This was a time
when he was demanding high standards of propriety among his Ministers (and
some lost office for various reasons). Over lunch for the two of us in the Cabinet
ante-room, he asked me to accept appointment as Chairman of the Public Service
Board on the retirement of the incumbent Sir Alan Cooley, apparently believing
I could guide the Service back to its traditional standards. In a second meeting
I asked him not to pursue the idea. I said I doubted whether I had the necessary
good temper for negotiating with the unions over the pay demands then in
process (he seemed amused and unimpressed by this). But, more important, I
wanted after some years of strain to keep open the option of early retirement,
which was an option I would have to forgo in order to do justice to such an
appointment. He was understanding. I expressed support for the appointment
of Sir Keith Shann, one of our most able Foreign Affairs officers, when his name
came under consideration.
Fraser confirmed his confidence in me in various ways despite our infrequent
official contact. He had come out in support of me in November 1976 when I
was made the target of a smearing claim in the Bulletin that the Prime Minister
was concerned by the alleged passage of a classified document from Defence to
the Russians. The leaked document was one that had in fact been submitted to
the previous Government. Fraser testified in the House of Representatives that
I had served the Labor Government with, as he put it, ‘complete and absolute
loyalty’, while describing my competence in generous terms—a statement with
which Gough Whitlam expressed agreement from the Opposition front bench.7
I did not look for compliments about my competence, but I was always sensitive
to any suggestion of lack of integrity. That attitude was to express itself later
when there started a long-running campaign, false and defamatory, suggesting
that I had acted, under American persuasion, to warn the Governor-General of
the lack of attention to security by his Labor Prime Minister—a subject to which
I later return.
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There were times during these years when I looked for some relief from the
strains of my job. I had never been a good air traveller and suffered from tensions
and lack of sleep during so much official travel. I took opportunities for
recuperation. On a visit to England I was able to escape from London for a long
weekend to stay at the headquarters of a famous trout fishing club (the Houghton)
on the River Test. It was too good to be true: mown verges on the stream, no
ti-tree to foul the backcast, the river manager to point out which of the abundant
trout was worth a cast and which were only two or three pounds and unworthy
of the effort. One companion turned out to be a former Secretary of State for the
Colonies under an earlier government (a member of the Lords, whose name I do
not recall). We talked about some of the African colonies, which he had seen
through to independence, and my own experiences in New York when British
policy was under attack.
In 1976, early in his term of office, Fraser made the customary call on the US
President in Washington (at this time President Gerald Ford, following Richard
Nixon’s political demise). Fraser and his small party were made guests at Blair
House, notable for its comfort and the elegance of its period American
furnishings. I was made a guest at an elaborate White House banquet in Fraser’s
honour attended by a mixed list from officialdom, the stage, and Hollywood. I
found myself talking to Gregory Peck about Australia and about the actress Ava
Gardner’s memorable comment, when making a film of Nevil Shute’s On the
Beach, that the city of Melbourne was a suitable location for a film about the
end of the world. Peck said she was very contrite about that, but I authorised
him to tell her that, as a Sydney-sider, I entirely agreed.
Having dealt with some intelligence and other defence matters, Fraser set out
to discharge an earlier promise by Gough Whitlam to present a cheque for the
establishment of a Chair of Australian Studies at Harvard University. Although
I had nothing to do with the project, Fraser took me along. After leaving the
Carlyle Hotel in New York, where we overnighted, we became aware of a wild
storm along the East Coast, which was disrupting planes and generally creating
havoc with transport. A notably impatient man, Fraser was not pleased by delays
and uncertainties of this kind. We eventually arrived in Boston late after a
turbulent flight, and Fraser joined his hosts in a modified programme of which
I was not part. Indeed the principal task I was given was to avoid getting
separated from the party that would later have to move swiftly for the take-off
of Fraser’s plane bearing him to Canada. I lunched and had useful conversations
with some Harvard academics. I was left with the impression that Harvard did
not really need our money, and that a less affluent Ivy League University might
have been a better choice. Afterwards I fell asleep in the charming guest-house
which had been put at my disposal. Awakened by domestic staff, I was told that
the Australian party had long gone on their way to the airport, along with my
means of transport. With some help from a student taxi-driver, I made it and
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caught up with the Australian party, now stranded and unable to leave while
the storm continued.
Drama continued at the otherwise deserted airport. Fraser boarded his aircraft,
which then taxied to the centre of the airfield and sat immobilised hoping for
clearance. Meanwhile the Australian Ambassador in Washington (Nicholas
Parkinson) and I had been given unrestricted use of the Delta Air Lines lounge,
bereft of staff or passengers, but agreeably provided with self-serve refreshments
which we were urged to accept. One solitary stranded passenger eventually
appeared—an inebriated man yearning to return to his wife in Florida whom,
as he told us many times, he loved very much. Into this touching scene came an
airport official conveying a message from the aircraft captain that our incarcerated
Prime Minister was now demanding to be let out, and that he now intended to
fly back to Washington. There was dismay in his Ambassador’s face. But after
further time elapsed Fraser did take off for Canada. Now relieved from further
duty, Parkinson and I resumed our enjoyment of the available hospitality. A
considerable time later a rescheduled flight was given a clearance and Parkinson
and I were able to return to more sobering official talks in Washington.
A refuge in the mountains
Early in the 1970s I acquired a property among the mountains in the Yaouk
Valley. It was to give me a river, which was its western boundary, for trout
fishing, a longstanding passion. It was also to provide an escape at weekends
from the demands of someone who has figured in this narrative (and remains a
friend to the present day)—the then Defence Minister, Malcolm Fraser.
Progressing from primitive camping expeditions, using hazardous tracks in bad
mountain weather, we erected a durable log cabin with facilities. It was delivered
to the site in a ‘knocked-down’ condition, despite numerous obstacles, by an
intrepid local carrier. Thereafter its erection was undertaken by family, friends
and a remarkable local, German-born carpenter. We laid the concrete base on a
hurried weekend visit from Russell. My daughter carted gravel, others tended
a diesel-driven concrete mixer, my wife shared the smoothing and finishing of
the concrete, while I carted water. My carpenter later completed the roofing
and the interior, assisted by more weekend visits by me. When working alone,
he reached the site by crossing the river in an old vehicle that I left permanently
parked by the river for his use. When the river was impassable for a vehicle, he
removed his boots, forded the river and made his way on foot. I raised a large
granite fireplace and chimney to provide a sole source of heating. Various
civilised amenities were later added.
Relevant to this story of my Defence associations, I was now able to invite
overseas visitors, such as New Zealand’s military Chiefs and Britain’s Permanent
Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Sir ‘Ned’ Dunnett, for fishing
excursions. Likewise my Chiefs of Staff colleagues came from Canberra on day
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visits, and when General Sir Francis Hassett had a minor breakdown in health
I cared for him there over several days of a holiday period.
Once beyond the ranges separating the Australian Capital Territory and the
Yaouk Valley, rank and orders of precedence dissolve. Personalities with rank,
when encountered by the locals, are judged on local terms. I saw this lesson
learned by the then Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir David Stevenson, who
was berated by a fierce woman on horseback for closing a gate through which
she was mustering cattle on their way to her property adjoining mine. On another
occasion it was appropriate in local terms that I remained seated in my vehicle
while my passenger, General Sir Arthur MacDonald, dealt with gates and waded
waist-deep in a swollen rivulet, replacing sleepers in a washed-out culvert, when
he came to spend a day in the country. My genial road makers, who often came
with their bulldozers, liked to address their city-bound employer and his wife
as ‘young Arthur and young Mrs Arthur’.
Later in the 1970s, when the incumbent Governor-General—first Sir Paul
Hasluck and later Sir Ninian Stephen—came to escape the formalities of
Yarralumla, I telephoned neighbours to ask that these dignitaries not be
obstructed in any way en route through their properties. None objected and I
sensed that they did not see the point of the request. There was a potentially
more serious obstacle when Malcolm Fraser with his security guard came to visit
to fish in the late 1970s. I rang around similarly. I informed a down-stream
neighbour that I intended to put the Prime Minister on the river on the property
between us, the owner of which I knew was away but who was sure to approve.
But the neighbour I consulted was on guard, having promised to eject intruding
fishermen. He was unmoved by my protest that the Prime Minister of the nation
was entitled to some deference. More out of consideration of me as a neighbour
than of the visitor, he proposed a somewhat Irish solution: ‘All right! Just tell
him to keep his head down so I can’t see him near my place’. Given Fraser’s
great height this was a bizarre request that I thought it best not to pass on to
him.
The ability to escape to ‘Koonaroo’ was not irrelevant to my being willing to
carry on at Russell. Persistent resistance to reforms and sniping from Coalition
backbenchers against civilians in the Defence Department caused me bouts of
nervous tension from which I needed relief.
Despite the absence of a telephone, I could always be reached with some
ingenuity. As recorded earlier, when Cyclone Tracy struck Darwin in 1974 a
neighbour was roused by telephone and shouted across the river over the noise
of the rapids that I was to interrupt my holiday and return to Canberra.
Years later, when Chinese forces crossed the border into Vietnam, Fraser
demanded my presence at a meeting to be held in the Cabinet room on a Sunday
to assess the situation. While my wife and I were clearing obstacles along a track
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through the mountain at the back of Koonaroo, we were startled by the sudden
appearance of a police car. Fraser, never to be denied, had ordered that the
Cooma police be sent out to bring me in. After a circuitous consultation by the
Constable’s two-way radio via Cooma as to how long it would take me to drive
back to Canberra, compared with the despatch of an Air Force helicopter to try
to find my property, return by air was decided on. My wife was left to make
her way to Canberra by 4WD while I answered the Prime Minister’s call and
attended the Parliament House meeting. It was an occasion when some hosing
down proved desirable. I was able to support our Joint Intelligence Organisation
analyst (Brigadier John Baker, in later years to become a much respected Chief
of the Defence Force)8  in arguing that a full-scale invasion was unlikely and
that the Chinese move should be treated as a blunt warning to the Vietnamese.
Subsequent events supported this judgement.
I turn now to some selected areas of reform that were different from questions
of strategy and the administration of the three Services. They were the application
of science and of advanced education, each in its own way vital aids to a modern
fighting force.
The Defence Science Laboratories: Management
Although the defence science laboratories had been brought into the Department,
in the 1974 reorganisation neither their status nor control had been satisfactorily
dealt with.
There were inherent problems, some arising from geographic dispersion and
others from confusion as to whom they were serving. Moreover, the interests
of the scientists themselves had to be considered. There was a feeling among
some that they failed to receive the acknowledgement from the rest of the
scientific community that their achievements deserved because, unlike others,
they did not publish papers open to appraisal. Defence security precluded
publication of work they were doing on electronics and its application to
offensive and defensive weapons, sensors, methods of surveillance and much
else. Moreover, their interaction with American and British work in the defence
field required strict precautions against unauthorised disclosures. Sympathetic
leadership was needed, not merely discipline over their use of defence resources.
An objective basis on which to determine what research should be expanded,
and what curtailed or terminated, was often hard to find and open to argument.
There was the familiar contest between pure research and the application of
science to definable outcomes serving defence.
In respect of staff originally deployed at Woomera and in Salisbury to support
the British ballistic missile programme, now abandoned, we worked out a
programme of retrenchment and transfers only to be frustrated by some timidity
at the political level. It was further experience of the curbs that existed in those
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days on the managerial freedom of a departmental Secretary—lacking power to
recruit or retrench or promote or transfer without the concurrence of some
external authority.
Farrands brought life and energy into the office of Chief Defence Scientist.
He contributed to policy advising in Canberra and I believe he enjoyed respect
in the laboratories around Australia for his leadership.
In 1977 I took a closer look at the system. This coincided with Farrands’
appointment to head the Department of Science and my appointment of a
replacement. He was Professor Tom Fink, Dean of the Engineering Faculty of
the University of New South Wales. Fink had a proven record in the application
of engineering to the solution of marine propulsion and other areas. I took advice
and preferred him over a scientist chosen from the laboratories, while believing
that there were some younger men who would be eligible in time (as later proved
to be the case).
During visits to some of the laboratories I detected a preference, apart from
that for the pure research conducted in some, for serving requests from the
Services for aid in problem-solving such as curing defects, or extending the life
of equipment. But the Department itself needed advice of a different kind, such
as on current acquisition projects, and was not sufficiently in control of priorities
in the laboratories. This was a hangover from their former attachment to the
Supply Department, with its attitude of independence from the Department of
Defence. The urge for independence surfaced in the hopes of some scientists to
become part of a statutory body, presumably to decide its own priorities. But
to be separated from the users of scientific advice would be a rejection of their
raison d’étre and fatal. It had no support from me.
Management called for judgement on other aspects. There was the familiar
tension between claims for pure research and the application of proven
knowledge to practical use, in which the former was at risk of losing out in the
competition for staff and funding.
In 1979, when the Government decided that all government science should
be reviewed, two Defence inquiries were initiated into activities in science and
technology. One was an externally directed study to establish the level of
scientific quality of this Defence activity; the other was a review by the
Department of the utility to it of the resources being devoted to this area.
Following these reviews, the entire staff was embraced into the Defence Science
and Technology Organisation, within the Department but with its own sense of
corporate cohesion.
Members of this Organisation contributed, in ways of which the public could
not be aware, to the possession by the Defence Force of equipment tailored to
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the distances, air and sea temperatures and other physical features, many of
them unique, of the continent and its surrounding oceans and air space.
Planning the Defence Force Academy: Obstacles
I earlier described the origins of the concept of a single tertiary-level institution
for educating selected cadets from all three Services. For a decade I pursued the
objective with determination because of a strong conviction of the need that I
have described earlier for more tertiary-educated officers. On more than one
occasion when addressing assembled officers, I said that civilians like me were
needed for our experience in government policy matters, but that the way was
open for us to be displaced by uniformed officers as and when they satisfied
Ministers that they had an adequate understanding of the theory and principle
of democratic government administration over and above the professional skills
of their Service.
I also had a belief that joint operations between Service personnel in combat
would be helped by recall of camaraderie and joint endeavours of officers during
cadet years. I was influenced in this belief by discussions in New Delhi with
Indian officers engaged in the 1965 war with Pakistan, who told of the ease of
informal communication during the crisis between those of different uniforms
who had lived and studied together.
Existing educational standards among officers nominated for policy positions,
or for overseas courses of study such as the Imperial Defence College, were, in
my opinion, seldom high enough. The deficiency was compounded by Service
practices of various kinds. The accolade of being a ‘graduate’ was conferred too
loosely after attendance at a course of seminars without examination. There was
a recurring confusion between training and education—between learning how
to do things (often technologically complex) and reasoning about objectives and
consequences and the fundamentals of society.
Apart from the engineers in the three Services, the number of graduates was
low. But to increase the number by requiring attendance at a new single
institution met one obstacle after another. Some difficulties described were real;
others sprang from scepticism about the advantages of liberal education at a
high level, or from an unwillingness to disturb existing arrangements with some
Universities in certain disciplines.
In responding to these objections I had to acknowledge the strong and
respected tradition of the Army’s Duntroon. I did not think it profitable to
advocate with the Chiefs the need for a system of dissipating the loyalty of their
tribesmen towards them in favour of a sense of belonging to a single Defence
Force.
All three Chiefs wanted assurance that their cadets would remain in an
environment in which essential disciplines were enforceable as to conduct and
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decorum and respect for authority, as well as producing the physical training
to test adequacy for the rigours of combat.
There was also the practical problem of how best to relate the educational
curriculum to concurrent initial Service training appropriate to the aspiring
sailor, soldier or airman. For the Air Force, there was the particular problem of
when to undertake flying training and how to programme that unique training
in with a normal University-level curriculum. Flying training taken only at the
beginning of a three- or four-year course was unacceptable because the skill
would be lost by the time the cadet graduated.
The Chiefs stressed the all-important requirement of leadership being
inculcated. During one session with them they began to question what the
curriculum of academic studies would be. We were not presumptuous enough
to believe that we, rather than academics, would decide the detail, but I agreed
that the question was a valid one, up to a point. When ‘man management’ was
suggested, I said I doubted if this was a tertiary subject and said ‘what about
philosophy—it gets you asking questions’. The ensuring silence implied that I
had made a poor joke. The Air Force wanted primarily engineering and science.
I tried to steer them towards making room for their cadets to have their minds
open to the humanities.
These questions were matters of policy, in my opinion, and not to be left to
the academics’ views of their responsibility to this unique cadre of students,
however much they might (and did) talk about freedom from interference on
academic matters. I was in yet another minefield of professional egos. On a
learning visit of my own to the Faculty of Military Studies at Duntroon, I learned
from some academics that I belonged to a breed called ‘bureaucrats’.
I accepted the Service view that, apart from some unavoidable use on cost
grounds of civilian academic courses in some specialisations (such as engineering),
joining the campus of one of the major Universities, with the cadets housed in
some sort of barracks, would not provide the required disciplined environment.
When I suggested that there could be advantages in broadening contact with
ideas developing in the civilian world, and other financial advantages, if a quota
of civilian students were enrolled in the new institution, one of the Chiefs
growled: ‘long hair and thongs!’ I did not press the point. This was the 1970s,
with the libertarian 1960s still fresh in mind. Slowly we found solutions that
matched Service needs to an academic environment, and also wore down outright
opposition from some quarters.
But then we encountered the resistance from outside. It came from some
Universities and some vice-chancellors. When the Fraser Government announced
its intention to give the institution the status of a University named after the
distinguished Richard Gardiner Casey, the vice-chancellors started to revolt.
The Vice-Chancellor of The Australian National University, Professor Anthony
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Low, came to see me several times to warn me of the likelihood that his colleagues
would be sparing in their cooperation. There were doubts about matters of
scholarly independence in a military based institution, and so forth. I entertained
the thought that other motives might be at work. Was there room for a new
rival in Canberra? Would The Australian National University continue to be
denied an engineering faculty while the new institution would have a
well-endowed one? While unspoken, these motives might be there. When, in
the event, the idea of a separate stand-alone institution was given up, the
opposition of the vice-chancellors was largely dispelled.
While Labor was in office, a Defence Force Academy Council was set up
under a former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Adelaide, Professor Sir
Henry Basten, to plan the institution, using various studies of likely student
numbers from each Service and the preferred faculties. Estimates of numbers
had to be speculative. Some excessive predictions of numbers with the necessary
level of secondary achievement might have been prompted by Service self-esteem.
With Malcolm Fraser now Prime Minister, we had hopes of progress. But it
was first going to be necessary to sell the idea to Killen. He in turn would have
the obstacle of that group of backbenchers who made common cause with the
dogged opponents in the Services to the changes in education and institutions
that would be involved.
Nevertheless, we got to the stage of site development, and engaged the
National Capital Planning Authority in our projects. I had good support from
my colleague and friend, General Sir Arthur MacDonald. I enjoyed his candour
about the limitations of civilian advisers. When I suggested on an earlier occasion
that some operational activity could be performed at less cost by civilians he
had remarked, memorably: ‘Two or three civilians can perform a task, but have
more than that and you get a rabble.’ I was seated beside him at a briefing by a
landscape architect who was demonstrating, before a landscape model, the virtues
of a siting plan for the proposed academy. The amiable young man elaborated
on the care given for the amenities of the cadets by way of shrub-lined paths
leading from their quarters down to the lecture halls along which, as he said
engagingly, ‘they can meander or ride their bicycles’. My neighbour stirred
suddenly, then interrupted with the voice of command: ‘They will not meander.
They will not ride bicycles. They will march!’ A clash of cultures, one might
say.
The shape of what later became a college of the University of New South
Wales owed much to the respect enjoyed by its Vice-Chancellor. Professor Rupert
Myers was a scientist, engineer, long-time University administrator, and active
in many national cultural activities. He was an excellent bridge between the
cultures, and I think he, and I as an administrative reformer, valued each other’s
cooperation.
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Obstruction continued. The Parliamentary Public Works Committee took
evidence from some Service officers who were not supporting their Chiefs. After
canvassing alternative ways of educating Service cadets, rather than pronouncing
on the building project as such, the committee came out against the Australian
Defence Force Academy project. The Prime Minister spoke to me, suggesting
that they might have gone beyond their charter. I said I entirely agreed and that
they ought to stick to discussing bricks and mortar and not education policy.
In the event the Government went ahead. A few months after I left the system
it announced (in February 1980) that the Academy construction would proceed,
and that it would be under the academic supervision of the University of New
South Wales. The opportunity to create a University named for Casey, the great
Australian who had served at Gallipoli, had had to be forgone.
Australian Defence Force Academy cadets of all three Services have, since
the opening, won respect for academic achievements, in some cases of the highest
order, while also meeting the exacting standards of military discipline and
leadership. It is noteworthy that some of the highest achievers have been female.
At the time of recording these recollections I have been informed that Australian
Defence Force Academy graduate officers are now occupying responsible policy
positions in the Defence Department.
Using soldiers in support of police
In 1978 I received a summons from the Prime Minister to join his advisers at the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at the Hilton Hotel in Sydney.
The Prime Minister of India was Morarji Desai, and Fraser was apparently aware
that I had got on well with him in New Delhi and could provide a useful contact
if needed in Sydney.
I arrived at the hotel to find that a bomb had exploded in the street, killing
a worker in the vicinity. The Prime Ministers were due to travel the following
day, for the traditional ‘retreat’, to be held at Bowral. Sir Geoffrey Yeend, the
Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, and the small group of advisers
were told by Fraser that he wanted the Army to provide protection along the
route, lest the bombing be followed by a terrorist attack on the visitors. He
spoke to Neville Wran, the Premier of New South Wales, and it was agreed that
the police would not be capable of providing adequate protection against such
an event. I was charged with the initial moves to get an Army detachment
organised. I recognised that it would be necessary to have legal power vested
in the Army detachment to take any necessary steps, such as control of
movements of civilians along vulnerable points on the route and the use of
military force against any actual threat of violence.
The first was easier to achieve that the second. My colleague back in Canberra,
the Chief of Defence Force Staff, General Sir Arthur MacDonald, issued the
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necessary orders through the Army Chief to the chosen unit at Holsworthy, after
establishing what military presence might be needed, the details of timing of
movement and so forth. Brigadier John Coates (later a Chief of Staff and scholar)9
came from Holsworthy to our little office in the hotel to discuss final details of
the intended travel, and to indicate the capabilities of his men.
What still remained to be established was their legal power to act against
civilians. I was no expert on procedures for authorising military action in support
of the civil power (that being the police). Nor, after several telephone calls to
the Department and legal advisers, was useful information easy to find. The legal
procedures had not been dusted off in several generations. My memory told me
they were based on archaic British Army doctrine in British India. The need of
legal cover was real. A soldier manhandling a civilian, or in the worst case
shooting him without legal cover, could end up in goal. I knew something of
the Indian experience where riots from time to time required the Army to be
called in to support the police. Indian histories record the notorious case of the
wretched Brigadier Dyer, blamed for the massacre of rioters in the Punjab
(although most died not from gunshot but by being crushed in a panic).
Instead of squiring Morarji Desai, I was given the problem of providing legal
protection for which, together with Yeend, I tried to find answers far into the
night. Telephone calls to colleagues in the Attorney-General’s Department yielded
nothing useful. My memory told me that it had been British practice after a
call-out in India to require a magistrate to survey a riotous situation. If the police
were unable to cope, he was required so to certify, whereupon warning shots
could be followed, if necessary, by open fire upon perceived ringleaders. But,
where to find this quasi-judicial process at night in the middle of Sydney? Our
small group of officials pondered briefly on the idea of finding a magistrate,
possibly in bed or watching television, and presenting him with a bewildering
request to authorise a Commonwealth agency to use force if necessary against a
resident of his State. The notion collapsed into hilarity while we searched our
minds for a more practical solution. One was produced by the Army itself. After
formal call-out action in Canberra, Brigadier Coates deployed his detachment
along the road to Bowral. For those travelling this route by car rather than
choosing to be uplifted by Chinook helicopters, he arranged for police to be
available at points where any suspicious action might require a response, the
soldiers being a deterrent.
While some citizens of the Southern Highlands might have been alarmed by
the appearance in their midst of armoured personnel carriers (needed solely for
their communication systems) nothing ever threatened the Prime Ministers, as
I was to learn later when back in Canberra.
Thus I returned to Canberra without ever meeting Morarji Desai.
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Final months in the Department
James Killen continued as Minister for some years after I retired. During our
associations I found him affable and cordial to staff, and courteous to his civilians.
One might expect, when visiting his office, to hear about the talents of the
racehorse pictured on his wall (just as my first Cabinet Minister 20 years earlier,
Casey, liked to talk about the aeroplanes that he flew). Killen took evident
pleasure in his association with Service officers whether in his office, on their
parade grounds, or in their messes. His strength lay in Parliament where he used
his oratorical flourishes and witticisms to change the atmosphere of the House.
He showed me personally much consideration. Examples were his insisting that
a wall plaque on a new building in Melbourne where he attended the opening
should bear my name rather than his; and his generous designation of my wife
for the launching of HMAS Canberra at the Seattle shipyards.
Killen had his problems with Fraser’s style and methods as did other Ministers,
one of whom resigned in protest. It was not a case of interference in the Defence
Minister’s territory but rather locking him up in long Cabinet meetings that
denied him the time to spend with his advisers. Whether Fraser was using a
commendable process of consultation, as some have suggested, or employing a
method of getting his own way by wearing down opposition, is a matter of
opinion.10  My own judgement is that Fraser disliked going out on his own and
had to rally supporters. Whether this was the politician or the man I am unable
to say.
Some of his Government’s decisions were troublesome for defence
administration. Although the Government proclaimed a priority for fostering
productivity in Australian industry, I encountered long opposition to declaring
redundancies in the over-manned facilities remaining at Woomera that I described
earlier.
At the same time Fraser supported consistently the reforms in the system
with which he had earlier been associated when Minister for Defence, one being
getting the Defence Force Academy created.
The gap between the strategic guidance and Defence
preparations
When I left the Defence Department there still remained doubt whether the
structure of the Defence Force and the deployment locations of its formations
were an accurate reading of what the official strategic guidance called for.
I had taken the view that it was for the Services themselves, and not the
civilian administrator/adviser, to apply professional judgement to proposing for
approval the detailed operational capacities, the particular equipments, the
deployment of formations, and the logistics they would use for the kind of
combat or deterrence declared to be a credible contingency in the agreed strategic
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outlook. But the Services, led by the four-star officer in the Department who
had command over them, did not fill the void. From time to time they would
complain about how the void frustrated them, but it remained.
Nor did Ministers in my time ask questions about the linkage or its absence.
I have observed that, long after my retirement, under the direction of a
well-qualified Minister (Kim Beazley), the gap was filled by the so-called ‘Dibb
Report’ of 1986. Paul Dibb I know to have been an unusually well-informed
officer with experience in strategic assessment. He was aided by a senior Army
officer [and two senior-level civilians] and they mustered sufficient military
support for the statement of capabilities, and the redeployment of units and
assets, that was needed. There was a subsequent redeployment of forces to the
North and West, and the mothballing of some equipment.
During his term, Beazley laid down a dictum in terms that civilian advisers
had been urging Ministers to impose on the Services during the two previous
decades in documents quoted earlier. This was a disciplined relationship between
defence preparation and reasoned strategic guidance. In my time we could not
be sure that we had unambiguous support where it mattered—the Cabinet Room.
It seemed to me as an outside observer of the final years of the Fraser Ministry,
at the time of the Afghanistan and Indian Ocean scare, that much of the earlier
sober advice not to equip Australia for far-off missions, beyond the likely
willingness of the community to support them with manpower and other
resources, carried little weight. Perhaps those years illustrate the axiom that it
is difficult for governments to change policies because to do so is an inherent
admission of past error, to be exploited by the Opposition.
In his Roy Milne Lecture in November 1987, Beazley laid some blame on
Defence Department practices for the difficulty:
Effective defence policy must be grounded in a sophisticated and accurate
assessment of our political and military environment but political
pressures almost invariably work to favour vague and simplistic fears
over careful analysis.
These fears, he went on to remark, prevailed over ‘the more highly intellectual
presentations that are the usual product from Russell Hill’.11
He focused the blame on the closed internal processes of discussion there,
while the public debate, with which Ministers were necessarily concerned,
proceeded unaffected on its traditional course.
No Minister that I worked for drew attention to the defect in the advisory
system. In retrospect I can see that the process, starting with Shedden and
followed by his successors Hicks, Bland and Tange (and I would guess those
that followed) of deliberating without the presence of Ministers, and thereafter
mailing, in effect, the results to them, made an ineffective impact on Cabinet.
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Looking back I can recognise other deficiencies in the scope of our inquiries
in the 1970s. For example, the process of devising a force structure capable of
projecting effective power from Australia, or of using it on our own soil if it
came to that, should embrace contingency plans for mobilising the resources
(such as transport) belonging to the private sector, and the support of the
instrumentalities of government at all levels in the Federation. This for long
remained an unexplored field for the Defence Department, perhaps because our
history of fighting in the territory of other countries or on the high seas narrowed
the vision of what defending our own territory entails in practice.
But I doubt that Beazley (who had a grasp unusual among Ministers that I
served) offered a way by which the usual run of Ministers could dislodge popular
misconceptions about defence threats. To persuade Ministers to listen to
necessarily long presentations by the experts in the field would call for priority
over party room, Parliament, constituents, petitioners and many other claimants
on a politician’s time. Two full-time Ministers are the minimum required, such
is the scope of activity for which the Defence portfolio is responsible. And it
will be up to the Prime Minister to appoint Ministers not for their ability to beat
drums that Servicemen like to hear, but to recognise what the security interest
of the country requires. But can they always be produced by the electorate?
Putting aside such a counsel of perfection, as history suggests we must, the
public will need to support academic and serious media analysts, and to
differentiate them from the lobbyists advocating narrow interests, some of whom
can be observed in Parliament itself.
Two Ministers will not be on top of all the activities across the country and
abroad. As might be expected, I believe Ministers will need a Public Service
that is not afraid to supply the memory that few Ministers can have, or to suggest
what does and does not serve the national interest, accepting that public servants
can be shown to be wrong and may have to be moved if they are persistently
wrong or waffle under tension. I also believe that the staff of Ministerial offices,
appointed to serve above all the electoral interest of the Minister and the
Government (assuming they are always identical) should not, while entitled to
be kept informed, condition Public Service advice. Their advice may be parallel,
but it should be separate.
Personnel policies and practices in the Services
One reason for the predominance of civilians in the screening of Service bids
for expenditure commitments lay, in my opinion, in the failure of the Services
to prepare officers for this kind of objective analysis and to retain them in the
job with the experience they gained. While in some heated controversies
aggrieved Services dubbed civilian investigations to be ‘paralysis by analysis’,
the civilians counter-charged the Services as being too submissive to shiny
brochures of the arms manufacturers with their lobbyists in Canberra, and to
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the attractions of ever-advancing technology with insufficient weight given to
cost-benefit. There were doubtless exaggerations on both sides. The civilians
strengthened their claim to objectivity by the use of defence scientists, some of
whom I transferred into systems analysis. All three Services had specialist
engineers to support their bids along with operational experience which,
however, did not necessarily equate with analytical ability. Their project officers
could not remain long in the job because of the Service practice of job rotation.
To my mind an even more fundamental obstacle to those in uniform becoming
perceptive and objective analysts lay in the educational standards accepted by
the Services. Their personnel policies (described in Chapter 2) compounded the
difficulty. Officers measuring up to the demanding tests of professional
knowledge and leadership in the field were expected to become analysts
understanding policies in procurement laid down by the Government. I believe
that reforms in the educational system for officers have gradually changed this
picture. These observations are not hindsight. Frequently, in lectures to senior
officers, I personalised the matter by describing the capabilities they needed to
acquire if they wanted to reduce the influence of officials like me.
The depth of education (so often confused with Service training) seemed to
vary from one Service to another. The Army, perhaps because they were not
tied so much as others to managing high technology (in short, modern warships
and aeroplanes, and their sensors and weapons systems), seemed to produce
officers who had spent more time in forms of a broader education.
These personnel practices in the Services, perhaps particularly how officers
were selected for higher rank, deserved more attention from Ministers than they
received. When invited after my retirement to address an Australian Defence
Force Academy seminar on officer education I said
Personnel management will be supremely important. When we
supplement professional training … with expensive tertiary education.
… Governments will want to be satisfied with Service management. I
have to say that there is no aspect of Service administration so firmly
removed from external scrutiny and public discussion. This reclusiveness
should be dissipated. I watched with concern the tendency (of one
Service) to blow out its brains through age retirement and wonder at the
personnel policy that permits this.12
Defamatory media fabrications
During the decade following my retirement I was pursued by false and
defamatory media accusations about my service in Defence. It was said variously
that I had contacted the Governor-General (Sir John Kerr), or required the Chief
Defence Scientist (Dr Farrands) to warn the Governor-General that my Prime
Minister’s actions were imperilling Australia’s security relations with the United
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States. A more offensive embellishment was to the effect that I had acted at the
behest of a foreign intelligence agency, namely the Central Intelligence Agency.
The statements were untrue. At no time did I discuss with Kerr either the
actions of the Prime Minister or any aspects of Australia’s security relations.
The journalist perpetrators were Brian Toohey, William Pinwill and John Pilger.13
Toohey and Pinwill had each had privileged access to classified defence
information when occupying positions of trust in a Defence Minister’s office
through which Departmental and Services papers passed on their way to the
Minister. Toohey worked in Barnard’s office in 1972; Pinwill in the office of Bill
Morrison (when Morrison was Minister Assisting from mid-1974 and later
Minister for Defence in 1975). He was employed there when the Minister lost
office in November 1975 and the Minister’s records had to be packed up and
disposed of by his staff.
Each of these persons after leaving his Minister’s office made a career for
himself in journalism writing about defence subjects, including Australia’s links
with American agencies. Toohey wrote somewhat boastfully in various Fairfax
journals about his possession of classified Defence documents from undisclosed
sources. By the mid-1980s he had secured the editorship of the Fairfax journal,
the National Times (later defunct). While less prominent in his journalistic career,
Pinwill, as a servant of government, undoubtedly had access to information that
he was subsequently able to use in his writing, presumably for remuneration.
It is noteworthy that the notorious Shackley telex was sent on my instructions
to Morrison’s office to keep him promptly informed. That telex from an
Australian official in Washington reported a foolish threat from the Americans
that Whitlam’s actions would imperil continued American intelligence
cooperation. The message surfaced in the media and was made the centrepiece
of theories by these and other journalists of a conspiracy to influence the
Governor-General immediately before he dismissed the Prime Minister.
In 1979 Toohey was pursuing inquiries into links between the Department
and Kerr before the November 1975 dismissal. Farrands had had a discussion
with Kerr in November that had been arranged pursuant to Kerr’s practice,
which started (and he had discussed the idea with me and others at a meeting)
early after his appointment to Yarralumla, of asking senior public servants to
talk to him generally about their work—in this case the kind of work conducted
in the Defence science laboratories.
I told Farrands that I did not intend to make any response to Toohey’s enquiry
about this meeting because I did not trust him to use information without
distortion to suit his agenda, and I directed Farrands to do the same. I understand
that this ban on Farrands excited Toohey’s suspicion.
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In early 1982 Toohey began his first attack on my integrity with the statement
in the National Times that I had arranged for Farrands to brief the
Governor-General on the security concerns about Whitlam, and that Farrands
had done so. All—Kerr, Tange and Farrands—have denied the truth of what
was written. Farrands and I (both then in retirement) independently engaged
lawyers to charge the Fairfax press with publishing false and defamatory
statements. Both of us said, in effect, that we would not proceed to Court
proceedings if we received satisfaction. In my case this was the printing without
rebuttal of my letter of denial and payment of my legal costs. My denial was
widely published in the more responsible journals. Three years later Toohey
sent me a catalogue of questions about contacts between me and American
agencies connected with a former Pine Gap Director. I told him to direct his
inquiry to the then Minister for Defence, Beazley. A similar request to the head
of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Allan Wrigley, received a
more acerbic refusal.
In retrospect I recognise that it was an error of judgement to believe that the
best way to treat these falsehoods was silence, to allow them to die of inanition,
while I got on with a fully occupied departmental life. But this conventional
Public Service practice of leaving public discussions to Ministers was not a
sufficient protection where one’s personal integrity was being challenged. This
became clear when the slur sprang to life through the mouth of a television
commentator, John Pilger, who is given to finding conspiracies on dubious
evidence but often given hospitality by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation
and occasionally the Fairfax print media. He was aided by Pinwill acting as
consultant. Pinwill wrote at one time a denial of the need for truth in reporting,
saying pretentiously: ‘Journalism is not a court of law; it is a process of weaving
together, often from necessarily anonymous sources, the strands of history.’
Pilger declared a ‘senior public servant’ to be guilty of denouncing Whitlam’s
security reliability. Someone in London having used my name publicly, I was
asked by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation whether I was the individual.
After I warned the ABC to be aware of a possible action for defamation, my name
was omitted. I observed, during a later television debate about the ABC’s use of
Pilger’s programmes, that Paul Lyneham of the ABC remarked that ‘he had
threatened to sue’, which is a journalist’s way of leaving the derogatory
impression that an unpublishable allegation against an individual might still be
a valid one. A number of senior journalists wrote pieces accepting my denial.
Post retirement experiences
In the early 1980s Fraser responded to a request from Fiji’s Prime Minister, Ratu
Sir Kamisese Mara, for an Australian to advise on the operation of his Civil
Service Commission. Fraser recommended me for the task. After months of
investigation in Fiji my reports, public and private, addressed the lack of method
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and much elementary incompetence which I found in the way the staff were
exercising, or neglecting, their control of departmental establishments and
selections for promotion. I saw at first hand the conflict of principle with equity
in the opportunities for higher office as between Indians and Fijians, where
merit alone would have greatly favoured one race against the other, less educated
and agile-minded.
Later the Government gave me the privilege, when an election made it
impossible to send a Minister, of representing Australia among the envoys
celebrating Fiji’s 10th anniversary of its independence. There were appropriately
dignified ceremonies to mark the occasion. Britain was represented by Princess
Anne, whose conversation revealed a percipient understanding of what was
going on in Australian politics. Inescapably, as has been my experience abroad
over the years on solemn occasions, there were events that I found less than
solemn. The Crown Prince of Tonga, a huge man of seemingly immeasurable
weight, was taken on a tour of the University campus. Prudent arrangements
had been made for reinforced seats at intervals to enable rest to be taken.
Unhappily his guide, becoming distracted, led him off course. Rest was taken
but I am told at the expense of much damage to University property as he
smashed one conventional chair after another.
Some other hangovers from my Public Service days were less enjoyable.
While in Fiji I was pursued by the Privileges Committee of Parliament to appear
before them concerning actions, thought to be intimidatory, against an officer
who had given evidence critical of the Department and Chiefs of Staff to a
Parliamentary Committee. While within public administrative circles I made
known my poor opinion of the judgement of this particular whistleblower, I
avoided any action that would be contempt of parliamentary privilege. On return
to Australia I learned that there had been some heavy-footed and insensitive
actions by officers in the Department during my absence. When I did appear
before the committee, various propositions were put to me that knowledge of
the critical view of the individual by so influential a person as myself had
inspired culpable actions against the individual by others in the Department.
My recollection is that I displayed due modesty at the implied compliment, but
left it to the Committee to find some wrongdoing to pin on me by the indirect
route they had chosen. I believe their Report suggests they were not successful.
On serving Ministers
As earlier recorded I had, prior to the 10 years of advising Defence Ministers
and implementing their decisions, performed the same duty for several External
Affairs Ministers in the course of 20 years beginning in 1943. Allowing also for
the Ministers in other portfolios who acted temporarily during the frequent
absences of our own Minister, I came to observe at close quarter rather more
than 20 of the species.
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Each of the External Affairs and Defence portfolios made its own unique
demand in respect of policy and the kind of directions needed to be given to
subordinates. All were similarly accountable to Parliament for what they did or
what was known of what they failed to do.
My own personal experiences with individual Defence Ministers have been
narrated in Chapters 1 and 2. In many ways I was fortunate in the relationships
that I had earlier in External Affairs. There one had to adapt to differences of
personality and style. One or two were most likely to be influenced by forms of
approach that I found difficult to adopt. I am not a natural flatterer and this
irritated Evatt. Nor did I excel in the kind of acerbic wit, puncturing the
arguments of others, that Menzies enjoyed hearing from some of his favourite
advisers. My problem was the greater when Menzies uttered excoriating verdicts
on some of the anti-colonial and non-aligned leaders of the time. The External
Affairs argument for understanding and tolerance of the anti-Western rhetoric
of those days rested not on demonstrable facts but on somewhat vaporous
arguments about the need to have respect for ‘Asian opinions’.
In my first years in External Affairs, Evatt, in his strident and excessive
demands on Australia’s behalf abroad, made me aware that the family relationship
with Britain was no guarantee of respect for Australia’s interests. After the 1949
election, direct contact with four significant Ministers in succession (P.C. Spender,
R.G. Casey, R.G. Menzies and Garfield Barwick) left a strong imprint on how
they expected the Department to respond to international situations and
institutions.
Within days of taking over from Evatt, Spender told me of his intention to
abandon Evatt’s reliance on the United Nations at a time when threatening
communist regimes were spreading. Putting limited reliance on Britain, we would
turn to the United States for security protection. His stated fears of a resurgence
of Japanese militarism seemed unduly pessimistic. We suspected that he was
using that argument against joining the soft peace treaty, which John Foster
Dulles wanted, to extract a formal commitment from the United States to satisfy
our concern for our future security. He achieved what he wanted against the
scepticism of his Prime Minister. He had looked to a group of officials (not
including me) to marshal the arguments and draft the texts.
Inheriting this achievement, along with the developing hostility of Communist
China to a formal conclusion of the Korean War, Casey applied himself to
cultivating better relations with the Asian countries emerging from colonial
status and declining to be aligned with the Western powers to which Australia
was attached. The Department was enthusiastic in supporting him. But he lost
out on many occasions in Cabinet, which was clinging to the past and containing
some racial prejudices. In the Department we responded to his caring style
towards his officers and fully supported his indefatigable activities abroad, but
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I doubt that we did enough to persuade him of the need to carry public opinion
with him in his endeavours in Asia.
I saw no harm but little prospect of practical outcomes in Casey’s
well-intentioned advocacy, with his high-level British and American contacts,
of a return to the Anglo-American unity that had been crucial in the defeat of
Germany. The Department shared his despair at Menzies’ support of Eden’s
disastrous attempt in 1956 to restore British influence in the Middle East after
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s takeover of control of the management of the Suez Canal.
In contrast with Spender, who allowed no room for officials to share the
limelight that was always important to him, Casey made a point of including
senior officials in his conversations with world political leaders of the time. I
was a frequent beneficiary. His motive was to enhance the status of officers of
his Department. He was unlike Spender in another respect. Status, whether social
or political, was not something that he had to lay claim to. He had acquired both
as a young man. There was no need to give officers notice of his superior status.
In the case of one or two who had personal problems he was generous with
fatherly advice.
In the mid 1950s, during Casey’s frequent absences abroad, the Defence
Minister, Sir Philip McBride, acted in his portfolio. Undemanding on policy
matters, McBride was another Minister who treated his officials with great
courtesy. He was unflappable as well. This I learned when, soon after dawn, I
had had to beat on his hotel door to coach him in preparation for an early visit
by the Soviet Ambassador bearing an expected protest that we had abducted
Mrs Evdokia Petrov on the Darwin airfield earlier in the night. The occasion
was her decision to seek asylum from the grip of her Soviet guards on the way
to Moscow in order to join her husband who had weeks earlier defected from
the Embassy.
With Barwick we had no difficulties in serving his policies, and he had clout
in Cabinet. He consulted his Department and enjoyed a debate, usually
good-natured. He also enjoyed winning; and more often than not we had a bonus
in hearing unsolicited opinions on a surprisingly wide range of subjects other
than External Affairs.
Although Menzies was usually avuncular in manner towards his public
servants, I was sometimes ill at ease in his presence during my two years with
him as Minister. There was seldom any dialogue on matters I brought before
him; and when he had approved a Cabinet submission in his name I could not
be sure that he would not present it to his colleagues as simply a Departmental
view. Perhaps he was already coming to the view, expressed to Barwick a year
or two later, that it would be best for me to vacate the Secretary’s office.
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To influence Hasluck we had the obstacle that, as a former Departmental
officer dealing directly with Evatt in Canberra, and having served on the UN
Security Council and jousted there with the implacable Andrei Gromyko, he did
not believe he needed advice. I believe he had also a desire to rid the Department
of any pretensions to act other than under strict instructions, as it had done
years before when he saw John Burton acting thus. On one occasion I was sharply
told that ‘policy is for Ministers’. I did not take kindly to undeserved rebukes
of this kind.
Having returned after five years in India to serve under the young Malcolm
Fraser in Defence, I admired his energy. Because he tended to jump to
unfavourable conclusions without waiting for the evidence, and to be sparing
in the advisers he trusted, one could expect arguments with him. In contrast,
his successor, David Fairbairn, was passive, stolid and uncritical, taking few
initiatives and none to change the ineffectiveness of the weakly controlled
Defence system. I have earlier recorded my experience with Gorton and Fairbairn
in the twilight of the McMahon Ministry. I had many opportunities to advance
my views to the new Labor Ministers when they came into office, although not
always in time to try to head off some impetuous intentions of Whitlam in his
later months.
Recalling these experiences with Ministers prompts some general observations
on the relationship of the Public Service with Ministers in the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s. I discovered that a required art of the official is sometimes to infer policy
from a silent or inarticulate Minister—which is not the image cultivated by
politicians of a Service whose simple duty is to wait for policy direction and to
implement it faithfully. As to those Ministers who welcomed policy advice, some
would respond if it were made in conceptual terms. Others preferred the concrete,
perhaps because of a canny wariness lest there be unforeseen consequences in
generalisation. Perhaps this lay behind John McEwen’s opposition, described
earlier, to advice from the Defence Committee in 1958 to achieve a greater defence
capability of acting without allied assistance. Some intellectually well-equipped
Ministers (Evatt, Spender, Menzies) would sometimes formulate policy direction
in a dialogue with officials on the principles to be applied. Casey, an engineer
by training, preferred less elusive and more concrete propositions and would
not have been party to the demand in later years for a more modest policy role
for the adviser. He once asked me: ‘You show me all the options. But what, for
the love of Heaven, do you recommend?’ He liked the detail of the Colombo Plan
aid in its various forms. As to less tangible matters, the advice to be offered by
an official in External Affairs or Defence, for the Government to use in
communicating with other governments during the Menzies era, would often
have to be derived from the rhetoric of generalisations frequently used by
Ministers, like ‘support for friends and allies’ or ‘support for ANZUS’.
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In advising Ministers on defence matters, their decisions would need to have
regard to public perceptions and not simply material facts (like the state of
another country’s military capabilities). These drivers would include accumulated
popular fears or mistrust of particular countries as well as embedded loyalties
to those seen as friends, particularly by Coalition backbenchers who served
alongside Britain in the Second World War. The official learned that the driver
differed as between the two sides of politics, be it loyalty to the United Nations
or loyalty to Britain, or avoiding public disagreement with the United States.
Advising Prime Ministers had a special dimension for obvious reasons. There
was no right of approach past one’s own Minister (something that Chiefs of Staff
had to be brought to accept). Moreover, there was a progressive concentration
of power in the office of successive Prime Ministers and its extension into areas
belonging to other portfolios. The impact of this on officers of other Departments
varied with personalities. There was scope for occasional bullying at one extreme,
while at the other Sir John Bunting was invariably considerate in explaining
how Menzies would prefer a matter to be handled. Some of his subordinates
were not so open about the advice they were privately giving. The view that
Casey expressed to me, that Menzies should accept that he use his Ministers as
his advisers, had no chance of succeeding.
All the Ministers were scrupulous in not revealing to me any details of Cabinet
discussions. When Menzies opposed the more liberal proposals of his External
Affairs Minister, Casey would indicate as much to me by well-mannered grimaces
at Menzies’ name. Barwick, who did better at overcoming Menzies’ opposition,
would trumpet his successes to me with the joyful cry: ‘Thunder on high today!’
The possibilities of advising a Prime Minister while travelling overseas have
varied. In those early External Affairs days, with Menzies so unsympathetic to
much of the advice we would offer, announcement of an impending Prime
Minister’s Conference in London, with Menzies on the loose, would be received
with some dismay in the Department. Menzies was always considerate towards
conventional procedure (while Gorton was not). External Affairs would always
be included in his entourage and treated with courtesy. But as to influence on
policy in Conference, or in the meetings he had with British leaders, it was
negligible. He himself made sure of this. In the Savoy Hotel where we were all
quartered in close proximity, Menzies was adept at skipping in and out of his
suite without being waylaid by any of the advisers lurking in the corridors
hoping to get to him with last minute ‘briefings’. He made amends for any injury
to amour propre by sharing his martinis at cocktail hour, which was not the
occasion for badgering him with policy advice.
It comes naturally to a former public servant to argue the virtues of a Public
Service that is competent and possesses experience and memory that few
Ministers can possess, and the value to Ministers of listening to Public Service
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advice. Whereas Menzies was confident enough in his Ministry’s control of
policy to urge his new Ministers to consult and listen to their officials, a later
generation became more selective in this practice, apparently believing such
dependency was weakness or perhaps open to misunderstanding of the thrust
of the Party’s policies. As to the intellectual qualification of Ministers, there is
little doubt that, as compared with my early days, there has been a marked
increase in their academic qualifications (which, however, is no guarantee of
better judgement).
In the early 1950s the speed of change in Australia’s external environment
called for more information and explanation to the public. Unlike later years,
the Universities during the years of the Menzies ascendancy of the 1950s
contributed little. The practice of Ministerial ‘guidance’ of the media, with facts
and statements of attitudes on external security issues arising from time to time,
differed greatly as between Casey and Menzies. Casey bombarded the press with
statements that he wrote on matters great and small; Menzies in contrast remained
aloof and often scornful of so-called ‘scribblers’, preferring to make formal
statements to Parliament. In like fashion, Hasluck rejected sharply a suggestion
of mine that he give daily access to him for guidance by an officer that I had
appointed to give non-partisan background information to the media. He
professed to be indifferent to what the media chose to say.
After Labor’s reorganisation of Defence in 1974, Defence Ministers needed
relief from being overloaded, but in a form that preserved central control of
policy and consistency in its application in each of the Services. Previously,
overload was not the problem. Three Ministers, usually junior from the late
1950s, each supervised (perhaps with differing assiduity) one of the Services;
and a Minister of Supply supervised Defence factories, purchasing contracts,
Defence science and some international cooperation. The relationship between
Public Service and Ministers was significantly affected by Labor’s transfer of
authority to the Minister for Defence that I have described, along with the
widened power of the Secretary.
The problem of overload was exacerbated by the rejection of my advice to
place some Supply Department activities elsewhere. The Whitlam Government
turned to a device that I had had some part in devising when Menzies had taken
the External Affairs portfolio, and had decided to call on another Minister to
assist him. He had agreed to establish an exact list of matters upon which the
Department would take orders from another Minister (in this case the Minister
for the Navy, Senator Gorton). The necessity for this makeshift device lay in
Counsel’s opinion on the Constitution. This was to the effect that Section 64 did
not permit more than one Minister to administer a Department; and that if a
member of Parliament were made Assistant Minister, and received emoluments,
he would be subject to a severe penalty. In later years the constraint disappeared,
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after the Hawke Government on different legal advice made dual appointments
without challenge.
In the Defence Department in the 1970s, a ‘Minister Assisting’ had relieved
the Minister of some time-consuming matters of procedure and routine in respect
of the Services. He was allotted the Service personnel area for policy direction
and control. But Ministers Assisting had their public and electoral repute to
advance in their own portfolio rather than get involved in controversies
elsewhere. The deficiencies in Service promotion policies, described in Chapter
2, and the failure to prepare enough uniformed officers for policy and analytical
work, remained. In the absence of Ministerial direction, the practices of the
Services carried on as before.
Two conceptions of Ministerial–Public Service relations were held in my
time, although put under challenge in my later years and since. One was that
the Service would be expected to apply its accumulated experience and its
intellectual resources and judgement to discerning where the national interest
lay; and to make this the foundation of its advice to Ministers. Along with this
went the obligation to implement what the Minister decided, without going
public on whether or not the view of officialdom had prevailed. This notion of
a closed-circuit relationship later gave way to adoption by Ministers of multiple
sources of advice, and to a challenge to the right of the non-elected officials to
purport to define where the national interest lay.
A second conception was that assurance of permanency in the career carried
an obligation to offer the Minister unpalatable advice where necessary for the
public good. Because the Departmental Secretary was appointed by the
Government, he could not claim permanency as a legal right, because the Minister
must have trust in those who are best placed to know his shortcomings while
bound to accept his directions. Silence in public had to prevail, leaving it to the
parliamentary process and the media to bring to light half-truths and self-serving
evasions. As to that, these methods of scrutiny were not, in my experience,
likely to bring to light confusion of mind or indolence or other frailties that
afflicted some.
Whether the break-up of the fabric based on these conventions serves the
national interest remains to be seen. In matters involved in the defence or
diplomatic posture towards rival or potentially hostile powers, which was the
area of my own practical experience, I have reason to doubt both the ethics and
the prudence of permitting non-public servants who are not bound in a career
structure the opportunity to take information gained in the service of
governments for use elsewhere serving their own interests.
As for myself, I accepted the obligations that went with having the freedom
that prevailed in the early years to advise Ministers in private as one wished.
In showing a Minister the respect, in both substance and manner, due to the
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high elected office that he held, I also expected reciprocity in civility towards
me. I had no cause to complain, being too junior, to take offence at Evatt’s
sometimes bullying manner. A testy encounter in later years with John Gorton
(when he was Minister assisting Menzies in the External Affairs portfolio) ended
in a draw, which had no lasting effect that I observed in my later relations with
him as Prime Minister.
In the matter of relations at the personal level, some of my colleagues seemed
to hold the view that too much closeness could threaten the non-partisan standing
of the Service. As to this, there was a dilemma when it was a Minister himself
who sought a friendly social relationship. While it would be imprudent and
perhaps demeaning to court a Minister’s friendship to serve a hope of further
advancement in the Service, it would be churlish, I believed, to reject a friendly
social relationship when offered it. Casey treated his officers as a family (he had
been an officer himself), and to some he was appreciative in practical ways of
their health or other problems. After his retirement (but only then) he presented
several of us with mementos expressing gratitude for our assistance. Maie Casey
showed a particular regard for, and was generous to, my daughter.
In the early 1950s Canberra was a dreary place for Ministers far from home.
Only a few acquired houses for their family (they included John Gorton, later
Malcolm Fraser, and Robert Menzies with the Lodge). Diversions were few, as
were friendships in a Cabinet bound together only by the politics and hopes of
survival they shared. When Casey, something of an outsider to them, occasionally
asked whether my wife would provide him with a grilled chop, we did so
knowing how unhappy he was in Canberra. The friendship that existed between
us remained long after his retirement.
Some other Ministers may have had a similar relationship with their
Departmental Secretary of which I was unaware. In one case of a senior Minister,
solace took a different form. He was a hard drinker and gifted raconteur in the
evening lounge of the Hotel Canberra, and it was widely believed that the
manager of that institution earned his MBE for seeing the Minister into his bed.
I developed lasting friendships with Garfield Barwick and later Malcolm
Fraser. I was not inhibited by any sense of departure from party-political
neutrality. When Gough Whitlam and Lance Barnard took over, my relations
with the Prime Minister were cordial; and likewise with Barnard and his wife,
fostered when my wife and I shared convivial times with them after travelling
in their aircraft for official discussions in Asia and Europe. This benign attitude
to me was not shared by the Victorian Left Wing of the Labor Party, who attacked
Barnard for it.
To be a party political eunuch is not everyone’s ambition. But in my chosen
career it made possible my part in founding, under the Labor Government, a
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radically changed system of defence decision-making, and afterwards preserving
it under a Coalition Government for my successors to build upon in later years.
Reflections on a personal journey
The experience that I brought to Defence, already related, was very different
from that of the Service Chiefs with whom I was to work, and whose codes of
Service loyalties and responsibilities I had to understand.
As noted earlier, my first international experience was not with matters
military but with international plans and organisations in economic, social and,
later, political areas. My first encounter with defence and security advice was
when North Korea (later joined by China) invaded the South, and the United
Nations authorised a military action against the invaders in which Australia
joined.
Many people had earlier sharpened my awareness of the interests of Australia
in the world requiring to be protected. H.C. Coombs and fellow economists
whom I served had campaigned to convince a resistant United States of its
obligations to conduct expansive domestic policies upon which the trade
opportunities of other countries depended.
Some of my External Affairs experience had limited value in Defence. My
financial responsibilities had not been great. My managerial experience had
been directed at creating an effective organisation for the Department for the
first time; and for assessing the suitability of people for particular responsibilities
within it. I had much to learn in Defence (which was not the kind of assessment
that came naturally to my predecessor and friend Henry Bland). I had by then
formed a view of the Public Service and its disciplined performance that some
of my earlier External Affairs subordinates may have found over-demanding. I
had a deep conviction that public service was more than a career; that it was a
duty to the public.
I recorded in earlier chapters my judgement that the Services were gripped
overmuch by the experiences of the past in addressing Australia’s present and
future. I came to recognise that this was to some extent an understandable
product of deep attachments of loyalty and spirit that were fostered by living
institutions. In Foreign Affairs it is easier and best to be pragmatic about whether
or not to allow traditional friendships to affect policy. Rash misjudgements in
the language of diplomacy seldom have long-lasting effects; and time is a healer.
But in Defence the lag time in everything is long, and wrong preparations, or
nomination of the wrong likely adversary, carry the risk of more lasting damage.
Caution about change can be justified.
I had to think again whether the censorious views I had expressed before
coming to the Defence Department (noted in Chapter 1) were less applicable to
the Chiefs than to the defence organisation, kept in being by successive
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governments, that preserved rivalries for resources without a disciplined system
requiring conformity to government-approved strategic priorities.
The most senior Service officers brought into the Department as Chairman
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee or Chief of Defence Force Staff brought an
experience very different from that of a chair-bound civilian. My first had British
Army experience pre-war and later served in combat with Australians in the
Middle East and New Guinea during the Second World War. My second, a naval
aviator, had had carriers sunk under him twice. The third had served in combat
in the Middle East and later Korea. The fourth had commanded in Vietnam; and
the fifth had commanded the Malayan Navy after many sea-going commands.
The Service Boards contained officers who had served on the ground or in the
air over Europe and North Africa.
As they rose to eminence in the fighting profession, they had one feature in
common: with occasional exceptions, they had been commanded by, and been
given their strategic instructions by, an ally (Britain or the United States). In
1970, Fraser proclaimed that the Services should prepare their military capabilities
from a strategic assessment that was common to all three and accepted by the
Government. It was this that subsequently occupied me in getting it articulated
and observed in practice. The residual influence of Australia’s past associations,
going back to earlier Imperial defence, helps explain how much grip the past
had on the later response to the contemporary Australian environment. But there
was more than that for the civilian administrator to understand. As I see it, the
lifeblood of a uniformed Service is loyalty; and when it was directed upward it
was directed eventually to Australia’s Head of State by three ‘Royal’ Services.
Past campaigns fought under American as well as British strategic direction are
honoured; and in addition there are public institutions preserving and honouring
past service in these campaigns.
All of this called for respect on my part. But respect could not extend to
accepting priority for modernising and replacing equipment and developing
capabilities originating in past campaigns against enemies that no longer existed,
or which no longer credibly related to this continent’s changing geopolitical
environment. As I have tried to illustrate in this memoir, my work with the
Services was mainly about getting a consensus on what capability was relevant
to the future and within the country’s realistic willingness to support it; and
about persuading Ministers to accept that conclusion. This was unfinished
business in my time. And with so many uncertainties always up for judgement
and debate, it is likely to remain so.
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ENDNOTES
1  In order to maintain Australia’s naval aviation capabilities, the Fraser Government decided to acquire
the HMS Invincible from the United Kingdom. When the Falklands War broke out in 1992, however,
the Fraser Government agreed to permit the UK Government not to conclude the transaction. Alternative
options were still being considered within the Australian Government at the time of the 1983 general
election. Soon after its election, the Hawke Government decided not to pursue the idea of a new aircraft
carrier for the Royal Australian Navy.
2  Killen’s Ministerial statement on Defence on 29 March 1979 is at Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,
vol. H of R 113, pp. 1324–34.
3 This is principally a reference to the case of Ric Throssell. See Ric Throssell, My Father’s Son, William
Heinemann, Richmond, Vic., 1989, and Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins, Allen &
Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 2006, pp. 92–93.
4 The references here are to the Defence Signals Directorate and the Australian Secret Intelligence
Service. The existence and role of these agencies, and the identity of their heads, is now publicly
acknowledged, but this was not the case for most of Tange’s career.
5  Fraser’s property in the Western District of Victoria.
6 Tange indicated at another time that this Minister was James Killen.
7  See Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. H of R 102, 17 November 1976, pp. 2756–57.
8  Paul Dibb, who also attended the meeting at Parliament House, remembers the Joint Intelligence
Organisation analyst (to which Tange refers) as Brigadier J.O. Furner (who later became Director-General
of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service) instead of Brigadier John Baker.
9  John Coates, who was a Colonel rather than a Brigadier at the time of this incident, later became Chief
of the General Staff (the position now known as Chief of Army) with the rank of Lieutenant General.
After retirement he became a distinguished military historian at the Australian Defence Force Academy.
10 These questions are discussed at length in Patrick Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: a study in prime
ministerial power, Penguin, Ringwood, Vic., 1989.
11  Kim Beazley, ‘Thinking Defence: Key Concepts in Australian Defence Planning’, Roy Milne Memorial
Lecture, 6 November 1987.
12 The source of this quotation has not been located. It does not appear in the text of Tange’s talk on
‘The Education of Officers for Government Administration’ to a meeting of the Australian Study Group
of Armed Forces and Society in May 1980, as reproduced in Sir Arthur Tange, Defence Policy
Administration and Organisation: Selected Lectures 1971–1986, a collection of lectures printed in 1992.
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